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This  master's  thesis  inquires  how rapid  economic  transformations  and fractures  intersect  with
alterations  in  personal  religious  sentiments  among  university  students  in  Slemani,  Kurdistan
Region of Iraq. The answers to the research question are sought by tracing Kurdistan Region's
recent history and contemporary social reality in connection with transformations in the global
economic system, especially in the context of the today's international 'War on Terror'. At the same
time, the thesis will emphasise an ethnographic approach which begins with the students' own
experiences and interpretations.
The research data has been accumulated during fieldwork carried out in spring and autumn of
2014.  In addition  to  fieldnotes  and participant  observation,  it  is  comprised  of  semi-structured
group interviews that took place in five different campuses around Slemani and its surroundings.
Theoretically the research follows a tradition of anthropological research on Islam which examines
religion as an internal social force rather than an external social structure and emphasises both
individual experience and contextuality but the thesis also seeks to historicise and analyse wider
societal changes through world-system theory.
In the  oil-rich  autonomous  Kurdistan  Region in  northern  Iraq,  the  students  represent  the  first
generation to have been born and brought up almost entirely during the time of self-rule, which
began to develop with the establishment of the No-Fly zone in 1991. Societal transformation in
Kurdistan especially over the past two decades has been extremely rapid. At the same time, while
the region has stabilised, prospered, and reintegrated into the global world-economy, students and
youth in general have felt increasingly disgruntled and betrayed by unfulfilled political promises.
The social role and visibility of Islam on campuses have likewise grown.
This thesis posits that the intensification of religiosity and the growing support for modern and
transnational conservative religious movements is connected with the improved access to various
communication technologies such as the internet.  Kurdistan's Islam has traditionally been very
heterodox and syncretic but, in parallel to the rest  of the Middle-East, the acts of negotiating,
challenging,  and  reproducing  religious  traditions  and  interpretations  has  become  even  more
polyphonic. However, this development has to be understood against the background of growing
inequality, widening generational gaps, societal instability, the past and present threats of violence,
and the geopolitical conditions of the entire region. This complex social reality is analysed as
'uncertainty', as a state where conflict or the possibility of conflict is not an anomaly or a rupture of
everyday routines but instead societal emergency is the natural condition of ordinary life itself.
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Tämä  pro  gradu  -tutkielma  kysyy,  miten  nopeat  taloudellis-yhteiskunnalliset  murrokset  ja
henkilökohtaisen  uskontosuhteen  muutokset  risteävät  ja  kytkeytyvät  toisiinsa  suleimanialaisten
yliopisto-opiskelijoiden elämässä Irakin Kurdistanissa. Vastauksia tutkimuskysymykseen etsitään
kartoittamalla  Kurdistanin  lähihistoriaa  ja  nykypäivän  yhteiskunnallista  todellisuutta  sekä
hahmottamalla  niiden  yhteyksiä  laajempiin  globaalin  talousjärjestelmän  muutoksiin  erityisesti
nykypäivän  kansainvälisen  “terrorismin  vastaisen  sodan”  kontekstissa.  Samalla  tutkielma
kuitenkin  korostaa  opiskelijoiden  omista  kokemuksista  ja  tulkinnoista  lähtevää  etnografista
tutkimusotetta.
Tutkimusaineisto  perustuu  etnografiseen  kenttätyöhön kevään ja  syksyn  2014 ajalta.  Aineiston
keräämisen  menetelmänä  on  käytetty  osallistuvan  havainnoinnin  ja  kenttäpäiväkirjojen  lisäksi
puolistrukturoituja ryhmähaastatteluja, jotka toteutettiin viidellä eri kampuksella Suleimaniassa ja
sen lähiympäristössä.  Teoreettisesti  tutkielma pohjaa kontekstoivaan ja  kokemusta  korostavaan
islamin  antropologisen  tutkimuksen  perinteeseen,  joka  tarkastelee  uskontoa  yhteiskunnallisena
voimana  ulkopuolisten  rakenteiden  sijasta.  Samalla  tutkielma  kuitenkin  pyrkii  samanaikaisesti
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Opiskelijat  edustavat  Irakin pohjoisosassa sijaitsevan öljyrikkaan Kurdistanin itsehallintoalueen
ensimmäistä  sukupolvea,  joka  on  syntynyt  ja  varttunut  lähes  kokonaan  vuoden  1991
lentokieltovyöhykkeen  perustamisesta  alkaneen  autonomiakehityksen  aikakaudella.
Yhteiskunnallinen muutos Kurdistanissa on erityisesti kahden viime vuosikymmenen aikana ollut
äärimmäisen nopeaa. Mutta samalla kun alue on vakautunut, vaurastunut ja integroitunut uudelleen
osaksi globaalia maailmantaloutta, opiskelijoiden ja nuorison tyytymättömyys sekä kokemukset
lunastamattomista  poliittisista  lupauksista  ovat  lisääntyneet.  Islaminuskon  yhteiskunnallinen
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viestintäteknologioiden,  kuten  internetin,  käytön  helpottuminen.  Kurdistanissa  islaminusko  on
ollut jo perinteisesti hyvin heterodoksista ja synkretististä, mutta muun Lähi-idän tapaan sielläkin
uskonnollisten  perinteiden  ja  tulkintojen  neuvotteleminen,  haastaminen  ja  reproduktio  ovat
entisestään moniäänistyneet.  Taustalla  kuitenkin vaikuttaa  ennen kaikkea kasvava eriarvoisuus,
kuilut  sukupolvien välillä,  yhteiskunnallinen epävakaus,  niin  menneiden vuosikymmenten  kuin
nykypäivänkin väkivallan uhkakuvat sekä koko Lähi-idän geopoliittiset olosuhteet. Tätä sosiaalista
todellisuutta  tarkastellaan  tutkielmassa  analyyttisesti  epävarmuutena,  tilana,  jossa  konflikti  tai
konfliktin mahdollisuus ei ole poikkeus tai repeämä tavallisessa arjessa, vaan jokapäiväinen elämä
itse on jatkuva yhteiskunnallinen hätätila.
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Glossary
Asayish: The security service and gendarmerie organisation of KRG.
Ba'ath:  The  Iraqi  branch  of  the  Arab  Socialist  Ba'ath  Party.  A
nationalist  and  higly  centralist  party  which  ruled  Iraq  until  2003.
Former  Iraqi  president  Saddam Hussein  was  the  party's  head  from
1979 onwards.
Daesh:  The local name for Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS),
derived from Arabic.
Gorran: 'The Change'  Movement,  a new political  party which split
from the PUK in late 2000s. It pushed PUK aside in regional elections
in the autumn of 2013.
KDP:  Kurdistan Democratic Party, the leading political party in the
region. KDP dominates provinces of Hawler and Duhok.
KRG: Kurdistan Regional Government, the government of the region.
Peshmerga: 'Those  who  face  [towards]  death'.  Traditionally  the
Kurdistan Front's armed guerilla wing in the struggle against Saddam
Hussein's regime, but it became the recognised formal armed forces of
the KRG after 2003.
PUK: Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. A political party which split from
KDP in the mid-1970s. The party is projecting a more left-of-centre
and urban image than its rival KDP. Its traditional stronghold is the
Slemani governorate.
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Picture 1: Mountains outside Slemani. 
(Photograph by Ville Laakkonen)
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1. Introduction: Oil, faith, and uncertainty
‘How is it possible that your Swedish isn't any better, you're Finnish after all?’ Asks the man sitting
next to me and laughs. He is a Kurd from Stockholm. As we have been waiting for the boarding to
begin at the Istanbul Atatürk Airport, he has been giving me advice for my stay in Slemani. The
man is one of the dozens of Kurds, from countries like Finland, Germany, Great Britain, Sweden or
Turkey, flying to Slemani governorate to visit their relatives or coming back home after a business
trip. What has struck me as unreal is that none of this, a direct flight to Slemani on a passenger
plane operated by one of the major airlines in Europe, would have been possible only some ten
years ago. 
Hours later it is past 4 am and I have finally arrive at my friend’s home in a middle class residence
complex of towering blocks of spacious flats. The car park is a maze of massive shining Chevrolets,
Land Rovers,  and  Toyotas.  Noticing  my bewilderment  as  I  am looking  around me,  my friend
remarks ‘and still, people are not happy.’
How rapid economic change and alterations in religious sentiments intersect? This, in the context of
students’ lives in Kurdistan Region in northern Iraq, is the question my research seeks to address.
On the one hand,  it  stems from the unease created by many popular  discourses which address
religion,  especially Islam, in both meanings as faith and as an institution,  as separate from the
social,  historical and economic context in which it is instantiated. On the other hand, it  is also
motivated by the curious realisation that, apart from few sub-disciplines and research traditions
among humanities and social sciences, the role of Islam in Kurdistan is routinely downplayed.
Kurdistan Region,  once the northern periphery of the republic  of  Iraq,  has been gaining wider
international recognition since the fall of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime. In the aftermath of
the Gulf War of 1991, the peoples of the region, the majority of which are ethno-linguistically
defined as Kurds, were granted de facto autonomy to govern their society1. In the post-Saddam
Hussein era, as large parts of Iraq have succumbed to a political breakdown and a brutal civil war,
the Kurdish authorities have managed to partially insulate their enclave and carry on reconstructing
the local institutions and infrastructure ravaged by decades of violent conflict and poverty. 
1 Nevertheless, this autonomy was not formally recognised until more than a decade later.
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In  the  Global  North the  resilience  of  Kurds  in  Iraq  and their  Kurdistan  Regional  Government
(KRG) has been admired (e.g. Hitchens 2007) and the region’s economic growth advertised (e.g.
Morris  May 4,  2013).  In  short,  the  erstwhile  rugged  mountain  guerrillas  of  the  old  European
imaginary have been transformed into a global political and economic success story. This has been
the official discourse of Kurdish authorities too. For example, the Kurdish veteran politician Jalal
Talabani,  who  served  as  the  president  of  Iraq  until  2014,  gratefully  addressed  the  ‘people  of
America’ in  2006  and  proclaimed  that  the  city  of  Slemani  in  Kurdistan  now had  over  2 000
millionaires, while prior to the invasion of 2003 there were only 12 (Kurd Net September 19, 2006).
But over the course of the 2000s and 2010s other kinds of voices have emerged too, for instance
accusations  of  corruption,  strongly centralist  institutions,  lack of  tolerance towards  dissent,  and
failures to redress growing inequality. These questions have also been addressed by few scholars: a
research in 2012 identified the problems of inequality as (I) inherited, (II) due to corruption, (III)
pertaining to the nature of the labour market, and (IV) residing between urban and rural areas of the
region (Noori 2012). 
The  two contrasting  social  realities,  two stories  abou  Kurdistan  Region,  are  equally visible  in
relation to religiously framed insurgency. One would be hard pressed to find a note on Kurdistan in
Gilles Kepel’s massive Jihad: The trail of political Islam (2006), yet, hundreds of youths have been
recruited by their fellow Kurds to join the civil war in Syria (Coles February 4, 2014; Salih August
3, 2014). Islamist2 parties, even if often marginal, are visible in the public sphere. While the KRG
proclaims its openness to diversity, members of older urban generation, not worried about terrorism
but rather concerned with conservatism, lament that skirts have disappeared from the university
campuses and that male and female students do not hang out together any longer. 
Kurdistan Region is at the same time both progressive and devoted to tradition, multicultural and
nationalistic,  peaceful  and  locked  in  combat,  sovereign  and  intensely  dependent  on  external
benevolence, growing in political importance and sidelined in global lobbies. These contradictions
and  contrasting  realities,  and  the  problems  of  their  noticeably  ahistorical  and  decontextualised
portrayal in popular discourses, lie at the very core of my inquiry.
2 I use ‘Islamism’ to refer to ideologies which seek to establish a society where political and legislative institutions are
derived from Islamic law and doctrine.
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1.1 Slemani
“Can you imagine it could be anything like this anywhere in Europe?”
A Kurdish man, walking through the sea of hundreds of party flags
Slemani3 is the capital city of the Kurdish governorate by the same name. It lies in a mountainous
region bordered by Iran in the East and the Diyala governorate in the south. Traditionally described
as the home of Sorani Kurdish arts and culture, the city, once besieged by the Ba’athist regime in
Baghdad like the rest of the Kurdistan Region, has witnessed steady growth in security and foreign
investments,  and a massive construction boom. Five-star spa hotels,  shopping centres, towering
office buildings, and restaurants with international menus dominate the new city centre. But this
core of the city is lined with a periphery of half-finished, doomed building projects, crumbling old
alleyways, and roads that have been waiting to be paved with asphalt for decades. The same is true
for people. Some have prospered in security their grandparents could never have imagined while
others are struggling with poverty. While transnational4 entrepreneurs and the local economic elites
import guest workers from Nepal and Ethiopia, civil servants drive taxis outside office hours to
make ends meet, and ordinary working-class neighbourhoods are confronted with unemployment.
It is these contradictory social realities that I set out to examine. I was encouraged to go to Slemani
instead  of  the  capital  Hewler  because  in  “Suli”  I  would  still  be  able  to  encounter  “authentic”
Kurdish culture, and fare a lot better with my limited budget. My choice to focus on students was
based  on  two  considerations:  (I)  it  gave  me  a  chance  to  delineate  a  specific  (if  internally
heterogeneous) social grouping to work with, and (II) students occupy a very particular position
‘betwixt and between’ (Turner 1969, p.  95) adulthood and childhood, and they were the future
generation of which much was expected in the globalising Kurdish society. All in all, I spent a little
over four weeks in the city during the year 2014, some two in spring from late March to mid-April
and another two in autumn from late September to mid-October. In hindsight it is easy to establish I
was ethnographically speaking immensely lucky in that my fieldwork was carried out during times
which were very dramatic and intense. 
3 Also transliterated for example as Sulaymaniyah or Sulaimani. However, I have chosen to use the transliteration
used by the Kurdistan Regional Government.  Similarly,  I  use the Kurdish names, rather than their international
equivalents often derived from Arabic, for the names of other geographical locations too.
4 I use the term 'transnational' quite extensively in my thesis. Simply put, the term refers to various kinds of global
connections which transcend nation-state borders. See for example Steven Vertovec (2001, 2009).
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In spring the local politics were in virtual deadlock: the leading parties in Kurdistan Region had
failed to form a government following the 2013 parliamentary elections. Former opposition party
Gorran (Change) Movement had pushed the traditional PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) aside,
but the latter would not cede its power. Additionally, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)
and the Iraqi central government in Baghdad had quarrelled for a long time over the distribution of
revenues resulting from oil drilled in Kurdish areas and this had resulted in Baghdad withholding
the KRG’s share of the federal budget since early 2014. Just a couple of days after I had arrived the
campaigns  for  municipal  elections  began,  and the  local  political  climate  was  overheating.  The
whole city was decorated with party banners and election posters, after office hours men would get
together and drive around the city centre waving party flags and honking car horns well into the
night, and local media was filled with political talk shows and propaganda.
In autumn the economic situation that had gradually weakened before had become considerably
worsened. Early in the summer ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham5), notorious for its brutality
in Syria, had begun an onslaught through northern and western Iraq. As the combatants of ISIS,
with  the help  of  former Ba’athists  and dissident  Sunni  factions  alienated  by Baghdad’s  Shi’ite
leadership6, ravaged through large swathes of land, they had ultimately reached within less than 50
kilometres from the Kurdish capital Hewler. While the initial attack had been successfully repelled
(with the help of US airstrikes), war was putting an increasingly heavy burden economically and
socially on the Kurdish population. The KRG–Baghdad friction over oil revenues also continued to
be unresolved7. The Gorran Movement had risen in power in Slemani, beating Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan in the elections, but virtually nothing had changed on the ground level. In between late
2013 and autumn of 2014 the capital Hewler had seen two car explosions, first of its kind in years.
Security measures were tight. While Slemani, far removed from the actual battlefields, continued to
be safe, fear and uncertainty were tangible.
5 Generally,  the name ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) is also used. In 2014, ISIS also proclaimed an
Islamic caliphate on the lands it controlled at the time and changed its name to Islamic State (IS).
6 See Rudaw interview with Exeter professor and a former Iraq advisor of the United Nations, Gareth Stansfield
(Whitcomb June 29, 2014).
7 The dispute was ultimately formally settled in late 2014, but as of January 2015 the parties involved continue to
argue over details such as possible repayments.
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1.2 Making sense of it all: methodology
'An Ethnographer who sets out to study only religion, or only technology, or only social
organisation cuts out an artificial field for inquiry, and he will be seriously handicapped in
his work.'8
First and foremost, my research is an ethnographic study. Strictly methodologically speaking, it is
an attempt to systematically learn from my subjects by engaging with their everyday life. It is an
experience-based  inquiry  into  meanings,  practices,  and  memories.  Roger  Sanjek  (1996)  has
formulated a textbook example of the research process. His triangle of anthropological inquiry has
three components: ethnography, contextualisation and comparison. Ethnography means the long-
term involvement in the everyday life of the anthropologist's interlocutors through participatory
fieldwork. Contextualisation, then, is the process of mapping out the historical and socio-cultural
particularities of the subject of study – what sets it apart from other locations and contexts. Finally,
comparison  works  on  two  basic  levels,  comparison  with  other  social,  economic  and  cultural
contexts and comparison with the research literature on the same subject or context. Actual work,
the way I see it,  is a continuous alteration between these three points of the triangle where the
movement goes back and forth in every direction. In short, what anthropology as a field of social
science and ethnography as a method of data gathering have to offer is an insight more rigorous,
intimate and personal, and thus revealing something that structured interviews, discourse analysis or
archival research alone often do not.
As Laura Nader (2011) has argued, ethnography is not the description of socio-cultural realities, but
a theory of how to describe them. My particular theory of how to describe the social realities of
students in Slemani is that I am trying to historicise the practices, meanings, and phenomena of the
‘ethnographically visible’ (Farmer 2004), and ultimately to go beyond it for a richer understanding.
It is a theory informed by Eric R. Wolf’s magnum opus  Europe and the People without History
(1982), but also draws on his characterisation of four modes of power (1990).  According to Wolf
the fourth mode, structural power, is the 'power that not only operates within settings or domains
but that also organises and orchestrates the settings themselves' (ibid. p. 5). This structural power is
in  essence  the  global  relations  of  production  and trade,  and it  directs  my research to  ask how
contemporary economic reality in Kurdistan Region, with its oil flows and foreign investments, is
affecting the practices of everyday life? Following from that question, my ethnography seeks to
8 Bronislaw Malinowski (1978, p. 9)
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trace  how  the  global  world-economy  and  its  structuring  power  are  interrelated  with  religious
practices in this one particular locality?
To achieve this research aim, my thesis is structurally divided into analytical themes which from the
outset may seem conceptually very far from each other, but nonetheless flow back and forth as I am
tracing  the  primary  analytical  thread,  economic  change  and  religious  sentiments,  across  the
historical  trajectories,  experiences  of  violence,  and economic  realities  which  have  shaped  (and
continue to  shape)  the students’ life-worlds.  Each chapter of this  thesis  forms a building block
towards answering the initial question. Chapter 2 explicates the theoretical grounds of my study and
begins by outlining my theoretical approach to Islam and Muslim experiences. From there on I will
elaborate on how I am proposing to make sense of the global economic system which connects
Kurdistan Region with any other state, society, or culture around the world. Chapter 3 is dedicated
to analysing the history of Kurdistan Region, its  relation to states and state-crafting, as well  as
global economy and warfare. There I seek to lay the groundwork for addressing how biographies
marked by violence configure a very particular present. Chapter 4 gradually moves from history to
the present and is motivated by a quest to understand how the global is embedded in the local. It
seeks to present the contemporary reality of Slemani and the surrounding region. By looking at the
continuous sense of emergency, the ‘chronicity’ (Vigh 2008) of crisis, and its world-economic and
religious implications,  I  try to dissect the ethnographically visible in which the students I have
worked with study, make plans, and give meaning to their experiences. Chapters 5 and 6 seek to
convey and analyse these meanings, especially so in relation to the triple-meaning of religion: as
faith, practices, and institutions. 
1.3 The difficulties and possibilities of putting it all together
'[v]iolence is not somewhere else—in a third world country, on a distant battlefield, or in a
secret interrogation center—but … it is an inescapable fact of life for every country, nation,
and person, whether or not they are personally touched by direct violence.' 9
Weaving together large questions is obviously a delicate task. I will be using a number of concepts
which may have a number of definitions, or their definitions are at times contested. Most of them I
am hoping to clarify in Chapter 2, but a few words on those I do not explicitly elaborate on are in
order. As I will point out later, and this is something that is discernible from Wolf (1982) but also
9 Carolyn Nordstrom & Antonius C.G.M. Robben (1995, p. 2).
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manifest in the works of many scholars I am making a reference to, is that globalisation is hardly a
new process. However, the kind of globalisation I am thinking about here is a very much intensified
stage of what may have begun centuries ago. Yet, I do not have the possibility within the scope of
this research to trace all the transnational interconnections, spatial qualities attributed to states (e.g.
Ferguson & Gupta 2002), borders, or the experiences of belonging that there is to analyse10. Instead,
for the purposes of my research this process, or rather these intertwined processes, are connected
with  a  very  particular  global  legislative  and  institutional  ideology  commonly  referred  to  as
neoliberalism.  Neoliberalism is  often  perceived as  the  process  of  expanding  the  administrative
ideology of private capitalist businesses to other spheres of social life. For Loïc Wacquant (2012)
neoliberalism is a political, not economic, project connoting a re-engineering of the state towards a
disciplinary pole of the bureaucratic field (including a particular emphasis on legal and carceral
systems).  However,  as  Don  Kalb  (2012)  points  out,  neoliberalism  is  not  merely  institutional
phenomenon. Rather it also has very concrete effects on a very tangible level of lived experience.
These are effects the students I became acquainted with also perceive and debate.
My thesis is markedly different from a number of ethnographic works on Kurdistan Region (e.g.
Barth 1953; Bruinessen 1992; King 2014) because it takes urban middle class as its focus. I would
argue that the traditional rural focus risks painting an exoticised picture of “simple village life”
when,  in  fact,  Kurdistan  has  always  also been a  land of  important  urban centres.  The region's
Kurdish capital Hewler is most likely one of the world's oldest continuously inhabited settlements
(Lawler 2014). Looking back at his  Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of
Kurdistan (1992),  Martin van Bruinessen notes that while it was true that he had 'looked for, and
found, Kurdish nomads and peasants', most of his Kurdish friends 'were in fact neither nomads nor
peasants but educated townsmen' (Bruinessen 2013, p. 211). He also admits that 'I spent, in fact, a
fair amount of time in towns and cities during my first two years of fieldwork in Kurdistan, but the
urban  dimension  of  Kurdish  society  remained  under-analysed  in  my  dissertation'  (ibid.).  It  is
noteworthy, however, that my acquaintances were consistent in their insistence of separating the
urban  Slemani  from  its  rural  surroundings,  “the  villages”.  The  inhabitants  of  the  latter,  “the
villagers”, were considered by the urban middle class to be unlearned and conservative, especially
in matters pertaining to  religion and individual  freedom. This position is  indirectly analysed in
Chapter 5 through discussions on both symbolic violence and social status.
10 See  for  example  Deborah  A.  Thomas  &  M.  Kamari  Clarke  (2013)  for  a  review  of  different  approaches  to
contemporary globalisation.
11 The entire article is an interesting analysis of the urban history of Kurdistan and Kurdish culture, but in order to stay
within the scope of my research, I will leave the discussion here at Bruinessen's introductory remarks.
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One particular problem I wish to address here is  the danger of reifying or oversimplifying the
multifaceted nature of Slemani and its students. Even if I write about Islam in a singular form, I do
acknowledge how syncretic and varied the religious traditions are even in a single location such as
Kurdistan Region.  What  I  am trying to  say about  Muslims and Islam is  that  Islamic faith  and
religious institutions, rather than being an external mold in which a society would be cast, actually
form discourses, traditions, and debates within the society. Another issue is that we are dealing here
with very complex geographical and political  reality where names, meanings,  and concepts can
easily become blurred. I have chosen to use the term Kurdistan Region which is short for Kurdistan
Region of Iraq. Occasionally, I may refer to Kurdistan alone, but generally that word is used for the
Greater Kurdistan12 which is a historical and geographical area that is currently divided between
four  nation  states,  Iraq,  Iran,  Syria,  and  Turkey.  Kurdistan  is  a  very  much  politicised  term,
especially in Turkey where the state does not formally recognise that parts of such entity would
reside  within  its  borders.  I  have,  however,  also  used  the  term Southern  Kurdistan  to  refer  to
Kurdistan Region as the southern part of the Greater Kurdistan. I write about Kurds as a separate
ethno-linguistic group, mainly because the Kurds themselves often do so, but I wish to underline
that  both  Kurds  as  a  nation  and Kurdistan  as  a  geographical  area  consists  of  several  dialects,
religious  and ethnic  identities,  and political  aspirations  (see  e.g.  Kreyenbroek & Allison  1996;
McDowall 2004). If my scope seems limited, it is simply because of the fact that if had tried to
touch every aspect possible, the reader would not make it as far as to Chapter 6 until sometime in
late 2020.
At the same time, there are obvious shortcomings in my methods and their analytical results. My
ethnographic material is collected in following institutions: two private universities, the American
University of Iraq Sulaimani (AUIS) and Komar University of Science and Technology (KUST),
and  three  public  institutions,  the  University  of  Slemani,  University  of  Slemani  College  of
Commerce, and Dukan Technical Institute. In addition to participant observation, I conducted semi-
structured group interviews in all of these universities apart from AUIS. Moreover, I went on a
piazza, that is, walked around the city’s streets and parks, and sat at cafes and teashops with my
interlocutors. In many of the group interviews and some of the more informal events only few of the
students could speak English and my Sorani Kurdish is not good for pretty much anything else than
getting a taxi. In these occasions the conversations quoted here have taken place with either the help
of a pre-arranged translator or some of the participants doing the translation. Similarly, when I have
spoken English with my acquaintances, their skill levels have been very varied. I have chosen to not
12 Kurdistan translates as the ‘Land of the Kurds’.
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to  transcribe  those  discussions  and interviews  word  for  word  but  instead,  without  altering  the
meanings13 they convey, tried to do justice to what people have wanted to say. I have also chosen to
anonymise all of my interlocutors, to protect them from possible repercussions or difficulties their
participation in my study would cause.
Finally, there are a few sources of which I have made an extensive use in selected parts of my
thesis. David McDowall’s Modern History of the Kurds (2004) is simply by far the most extensive
historical  overview of  the  Kurds  published in  English.  While  there  is  a  somewhat  “accepted”,
canonical status for what I analyse here as Kurdish history, in order not to rely on a single source I
constantly make reference to other sources which have recounted the same events. Diane E. King’s
Kurdistan on the Global Stage. Kinship, Land, and Community in Iraq (2014) is one of the rare, and
definitely one of the most recent, contemporary ethnographic accounts of Kurdistan Region. The
scope and the richness of material recounted in the book make it impossible to ignore it in any
“lesser” ethnographic accounts such as mine. There are points where I disagree with King but I will,
however, try to enter in a dialogue with her analysis in several chapters of my study.
13 A number  of  expressions  connoting  particular  viewpoints  or  political  positions  did  appear  regularly  in  the
discussions I took part in. During my analysis, if I have not been sure about what meaning my interlocutor gives to
certain words, I have established these viewpoints and positions by comparing different recordings, translations, and
field notes I have had.
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Picture 2: A view from the new campus of University of Slemani. 
(Photograph by Ville Laakkonen)
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2. Theory: on being Muslim in the world-economy
'My aim is not to persuade the reader to substitute a relativized and fragmented vision for
one of global unity. Rather it is to situate some of these religious, cultural, and ideological
forms  and practices  that  people  regard  as  Islamic  in  the  life  and development  of  their
societies.'14
Despite the fact that Kurdish Islam is historically marked by a unique blend of local heterodoxy and
syncretism (Bruinessen 1999a & 2000; Kreyenbroek 1996) and even though Kurds have once been
labelled in the Middle East as Muslims only when “compared to the unbeliever” (Bruinessen 1999a,
p. 2 & 2000, p. 15), and in spite of the recent ruthless aggressions shrouded in Islamic rhetoric
thrown at them, hundreds of Kurdish youth have left to join Islamist factions in Iraq and Syria.
During the last  few years  groups of  middle class boys have grown thick beards  as  they reach
adulthood and some urban girls all of a sudden don a headscarf as they start their sophomore year.
These actions, which can be seen constitutive of a participation in the global Islamic movement
centred on piety and reformation, have been locally met with disbelief and internationally largely
ignored. Yet, it is altogether an interesting phenomenon and one, I will argue, that cannot be studied
without  taking into account  both the regional  history and the rapid economic change currently
taking  place  in  Kurdistan.  This  thesis  asks  how economic  transformation  in  Kurdistan  Region
intersects with alterations in religious sentiments among students in higher education. The question
is theoretically grounded on two different analytical standpoints, the anthropological study of Islam,
and the word-systemic analysis of globalisation. 
2.1 Muslims, not Islam
‘Eid15 is for Muslims. Daesh is not.’
 A receptionist, in his early twenties
First of these standpoints, the anthropological understanding of religion, is itself a varied field of
study. Religion, faith and morality are complex concepts themselves and could be looked at from a
number of different angles. However, the point of view I am adopting is one that looks at being
14 Michael Gilsenan (2000, p. 19).
15 Eid refers to the Feast of Sacrifice (Eid al-Adha in Arabic,  Eid-e qorban in Persian), celebrated by Muslims to
honour Ibrahim's (Abraham in Christianity) willingness to sacrifice his own son as a proof of his submission to God.
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Muslim as a lived experience (e.g. Marranci 2008). My approach is in many ways also informed by
Talal  Asad  (e.g.  1983;  1993;  1996),  who  looks  at  the  socially  constructed  formation  of  the
“believer” or the “practitioner” and the reproduction of traditions, as well as the ways how Islam is
appropriated  in  different  social  contexts.  Thus,  for  the  purposes  of  my thesis  Islam is  seen  as
historically layered, locally and temporally varied configuration of knowledge, practices and beliefs
which  not  only  facilitate  social  and  political  reform,  but  also  work  as  ways  to  articulate  and
configure multiple meaningful subjectivities and processes of self-realisation. In other words, at the
centre of the anthropological inquiry undertaken here is an individual embedded in a particular
social context, which is one of Kurdistan's urban centres16, not only making sense of the world or
submitting to God and the words and deeds of the Prophet Mohammed to whom God spoke to, but
actively interacting with and transforming this very same social context. Religion is folded into the
ways people generally live their everyday life – work, engage in trade, enter marriage, take part in
recreational activities, eat, drink, rejoice, mourn, and ultimately, depart from this world. Or, as Talal
Asad  has  posited  when  discussing  Christian  worship  and  arguing  against  the  prominence  of
symbolic  analysis  over  social  context:  '[i]t  is  not  simply  'worship'  but  social  and  economic
institutions in general, within which individual biographies are lived out, that lend stable character
to the flow of a Christian's activity and to the quality of his experience' (Asad 1983, p. 241). It has
to be acknowledged from the outset that in a way I am not researching or exploring Islam inasmuch
as I am working with Muslims and their exploration and production of Islam (or “Islams”). 
In anthropological writing a number of scholars from different academic traditions and times have
contributed  to  my entry  point  into  understanding  Islam and  Muslim individuals.  For  example
Michael Gilsenan (2000) has essentially argued that the study of Islam requires an understanding
that also takes into account the political,  economic and colonial  histories of a given context in
question. He also emphasised the meaning of social relations, that the study of an element on its
own or solely in connection with other elements deemed “religious” 'would not reveal its social
meaning' and that we would 'have to be prepared to find that religion is often only a very minor
influence'. (ibid., pp. 19–20.) This statement is partially echoed more recently by Magnus Marsden
and Konstantinos Retsikas who questioned whether “being Muslim” is always at  stake in what
people of “Muslim background” do (2013, p. 2). Thus, everything an individual does cannot be
reduced solely to religiosity even if he or she would be outspokenly pious. Similarly, even when
seemingly present, religion might rather be a medium, a set of vocabulary, to articulate a certain
16 It is of utmost importance to underline that in spite of the fact that Islam in Kurdistan is simultaneously connected
with numerous global Islamic cultures  and movements,  the actual  subject  of  my study is  specifically Islam in
Kurdistan and not for example Islam in Albania, Mali, Malaysia or Saudi Arabia, let alone some monolithic and
essentialist Islam often pictured in popular media.
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course of action than a  fundamental  devotional  driving force.  Also,  as many other  works (e.g.
Marranci 2008; Soares & Osella 2009; Bowen 2012) have stressed,  there is  no singular Islam,
neither  univocal  religious  views  nor  a  unified  Muslim reality.  For  example,  speaking  of  Arab
contexts,  Bruno Etienne has  made the point  that  they are ultimately homogenous only in  their
compliance  to  monotheism  and  monism  (2007,  p.  239).  Discussing  Muslims  in  France,  he
highlights  the  fact  that  Islamic  doctrines  are  constantly  debated  by  many  different  fiercely
competing  religious  groups  (ibid.,  pp.  241–243),  something  which  is  equally true  in  Iraqi  and
Kurdish societies as well. 
On the other hand, Islamic faith, or any other religious conviction for that matter, is obviously not
simply reducible to a societal phenomenon. It is naturally a spiritual and ethical endeavour for each
person subscribing to it and being a Muslim is equally varied and ambiguous experience for the
individual believer as it is for societies and institutions. This is to say that alongside appreciating the
historical, political, military, and economic circumstances, the personal significance of Islam must
be taken into account, as faith and the moral conviction derived from it are also deeply personal and
intimate matters. I would argue that as a religion, or rather, as a compilation of various religiously
defined traditions, discourses and values, Islam often emphasises a very distinct approach to praxis.
This is explicitly manifested by the importance of the exercise of (and debates about) prayer and the
various norms on daily life covering matters such as food, drink, fasting, clothing, and behaviour in
both public and private spaces. These norms, in turn, operate through categories of compulsory,
recommended,  allowed,  disliked  and forbidden.  Thereby a  Muslim,  through individual  actions,
forms, and reforms, his or her subjectivity as a “practitioner” and embodies the words of God and
the life of the Prophet. Or if put differently, practice becomes the basis of both the constitution and
the expression of a religious and moral position. 
The kind of embodiment and individual exercise of religiosity described in the paragraph above has
been analysed for example by Saba Mahmood (2011), who wrote about women's piety movement in
Cairo  and Charles  Hirschkind (2001),  who has  worked in  the  same city with  a  group of  men
regularly listening to taped cassette-sermons as an act of devotion. Another anthropologist writing
about Muslims and Egypt, Samuli Schielke, has in turn stressed the importance of the inherent
ambivalence of religious activity and the contradictions between stated intents and actual outcomes
(2009). Here practice is, in effect, the outcome of constellations of conflicting social obligations,
individual aspirations, moral double standards and compromises. In Schielke's words: 'I posit that it
is  precisely the fragmented nature of people’s  biographies  which,  together  with the ambivalent
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nature of most moral subjectivities, should be taken as the starting-point when setting out to study
moral discourse and ethical practice' (ibid. p. S37).
When analysing Islam in Slemani, I largely subscribe to the starting point outlined by Schielke
above. Additionally, to understand the religious sentiments in a particular socio-economic context
my focus is widely set on a larger body of students rather than solely on those who have undergone
a major reformation in their  relationship to Islamic faith in one way or another.  This choice is
motivated by the fact that rather than diverging, both secular and devout individual biographies
actually converge in the uncertainty of socio-economic realities in Kurdistan. Actually, more or less
all the students I was acquainted with, regardless of their conviction, felt compelled to position
themselves in religious and moral terms, be it by measuring each other’s clothing or discussing
politics.  Even on campuses,  which have a degree of insulation from the surrounding society in
terms  of  observation  of  social  norms,  spatial  arrangements  and  behavioural  judgements  were
commonplace. For instance, while at the private universities the set-up of seats was relatively non-
gendered,  at  public universities the women sat in front and the men at  the back, and man and
woman sitting next to each other  in the middle was a pronounced ideological statement which
nobody missed. 
The  friction  and the  interplay between  confessional  and  markedly secular  positions  have  even
perhaps intensified over the last six months due to the war against ISIS and from lecture halls to
shopping centres,  and mosques  to  public  demonstrations,  and ultimately from public  to private
spaces,  these  seemingly  disparate  moral  dispositions  constantly  meet,  challenge  and  reorient
themselves  vis-à-vis  each  other.  Furthermore,  my  preference  also  allows  for  meaningful
comparisons to be made between different dispositions. In this, my scope is closer to for example
Jenny White's study on Islamist mobilisation in Turkey (2002), Benjamin Soares' elaboration on
Islam and  the  neoliberal  era  in  Mali  (2005),  Daromir  Rudnyckyj's  work  on  Islamic  self-help
coaching and ‘market  Islam’ in  Indonesia  (2009),  or even Michael  M. J.  Fischer's  now classic
monograph about the Iranian revolution (1980) than to for instance Mahmood's account of Cairo's
pious women. I wish to achieve a perception which places religiosity within a wider societal context
and does not omit the majority of students from the analysis by limiting its concentration solely on
those undertaking to a perfected process of empowerment  and self-realisation through religious
reform.
The approach I have outlined so far is actually advocated quite eloquently by Christopher Houston.
To him the anthropological representation of Islam is one which understands the diversity and the
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contextuality  of  Islam,  directs  the  analytical  energy to  describing  the  processes  of  knowledge
production  resulting  in  multiple  “Islams”,  and  politicises  these  processes  and  understands  the
underlying  relations  of  power  through  which  practices  are  made,  sustained  and  transformed.
Ultimately, the anthropology of Islam is also the anthropology of the Muslim experience. (Houston
2009, p. 207). 
Finally, my thesis is also grounded on a body of literature which has focused on the global and
transnational aspects of contemporary Muslim persuasions. On the one hand, the concept of global
Islam is hardly anything new. For instance, Sadakat Kadri's (2011) history of the shari'a law or
Gilles  Kepel's  (2006)  meticulous  study  of  the  “trail”  of  Islamist  action  show  that  Muslim
populations  and  Islamic  teachings  have  transcended  imperial  frontiers  as  well  as  political  and
national borders throughout history. The same goes for people, nations, and commodities in general,
like a number of anthropologists of political economy have demonstrated (e.g. Mintz 1986 & 1998;
Wolf 1982). On the other hand, however, I believe it is fair to argue that even if they have to be
appreciated in relation to their historical developments, the questions pertaining to Islamic faith and
being Muslim in Slemani's campuses in 2014 are inherently very particular to our times. 
This particularity, and even a sense of urgency, stems from three important points. These will be
further analysed in the following chapters, but they are worth mentioning here as well. Firstly, I
would argue that after September 11th 2001 religious sentiments have become the primary object of
manipulation  and  thus  pushed  aside  the  nationalistic  and anti-colonial  convictions  on  which  a
diverse spectrum of organisations like the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) or Kurdistan
Workers' Party (PKK) were originally built upon. Thereby social discontent and powerlessness are
explicitly framed in confessional and moral spheres and political action often cast as opposition to
politics carried out by Christians or other non-Muslims (the militant Islamist case is discussed for
example  by  Zubaida  2009,  p.  81).  Secondly,  despite  the  rhetoric  of  global  ummah  (Muslim
community)  being often evoked, or “jihadist” militias even proclaiming a caliphate on the lands
they have conquered (a challenge to both secular and religious authorities world-wide if there ever
was one), the Muslim world and Islam's political dimensions are even more contested and fractured
than before17. While Islamic texts (much like Christian texts, too) are taken to speak to the global
community, the actual practice and mobilisation of faith always rest on a myriad of specific forms
of  social,  cultural,  economic  and political  life  at  the  grass  roots  level,  as  the  term 'vernacular
politics' (White 2002) suggests. Thirdly, the proliferation of personal internet access and various
17 See Kepel (2006, pp. 205–212) on the roots of this fragmentation in the Middle East, most importantly related to the
mixed reactions and power games in connection with the early 1990s Gulf War and its aftermath.
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forms  of  media  have  transformed  the  logic  of  many different  activities  ranging  from political
participation to proselytism and Qur'anic debates by allowing sermons, speeches, writings and news
to be produced, utilised, consumed, copied and transmitted simultaneously across the globe. This
third point is particularly important for my study, as the number of personal internet connections (as
opposed to internet cafes or workplace access) and state of the art smartphones has dramatically
increased over the past years.
2.2 Globalisation and the world-system
‘Have you heard about it? Some of them talk about making “a new Dubai”!’
  An undergraduate student of economics, in his early twenties
The second theoretical standpoint on which I am building my thesis is that of the globalised, all-
pervasive effect  of capitalist  world-economy.  That  some of  the Kurdish political  and economic
elites had plans to make a new Dubai out of the capital Hewler (internationally known as Erbil) was
something I heard many times during my fieldwork. It was generally mentioned with the tone of
voice that was a peculiar mix of cynicism and embarrassment, because the majority of the students
maintained that  whatever  money there was usually went  into  projects  which  carried  very little
benefit  for  the  common  people.  Whether  Hewler  will  ever  become  anything  even  remotely
resembling Dubai remains to be seen, but the fact is that Hewler had been named as the 2014 Arab
Tourism Capital  by  the  international  Arab  Council  of  Tourism18.  Similarly,  Slemani  had  been
declared as Kurdistan's ‘capital of culture’ by Kurdistan's parliament.  
Both  cases  illustrated  above  are  indicative  of  the  introduction  of  international  third  party
certification systems to Kurdistan Region. These systems, of which the most familiar examples are
the  fair  trade  and  organic  certifications  for  agricultural  products19 or  international  credit  rating
agencies such as Moody's Investors Service, are apt examples of the logic and the processes of
globalisation. 
18 See Erbil Tourism 2014 website (http://www.erbiltourism2014.com). The fact that it was Arab Tourism Capital had
made few people I talked with to cringe very unpleasantly.
19 Paige West (2012) does an interesting analysis of the neoliberal logic of third party certification in relation to coffee
production  in  Papua New Guinea.  The certificates,  which  can  cost  thousands  of  dollars  for  the  producer,  are
essentially  an  important  business  for  Western  coffee  companies  who  market  their  coffee  with  images  of
impoverished and “primitive” locals being helped out. Globally, the actual benefits of such systems depend greatly
on the location and the product.
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The word 'globalisation'  is specified by Oxford Dictionaries Online as follows: 'The process by
which businesses or other organisations develop international influence or start operating on an
international scale.' Alan Barnard defined globalisation more than a decade ago as  'the process of
increasing contact between societies, especially in the economic sphere, across the globe' (2000, p.
201). For Immanuel Wallerstein (2004, p. 86), in turn, characteristic of globalisation is the global
pressure  to  allow  capital  and  goods  flow  freely.  Along  similar  lines,  I  understand  the  word
'globalisation' to mean the sum and consequences of the specific processes through which particular
economic  structures  (including,  but  not  limited  to,  the  relations  of  production  and  exchange)
increasingly operate internationally towards global hegemony and legitimacy20. 
The way I am proposing to make sense of Kurdistan Region's connectedness to the processes of
globalisation is first of all through the world-systems theories (e.g. Arrighi 2010; Wallerstein 1974a
& 1974b & 2004). This perspective analyses a system that does not exist within a world, but is itself
a world. The world-system analysts argue that while there have been other world-systems before,
which were generally located in smaller geographical areas (e.g. Chase-Dunn & Hall 1997), we
currently live in a single global world-system characterised by a hierarchical division of labour and
unequal relations of exchange and production, where countries and regions are divided into core,
semi-peripheral and peripheral positions21. This world-system is the capitalist world-economy, or
the  system  that  Samir  Amin  (2014)  refers  to  as  the  'generalised  monopoly  capitalism'.  It  is
characterised by:
'(1)  [t]he  centralized  control  of  the  economy  by  the  monopolies;  (2)  the  growing
globalization,  including relocation of manufacturing industries  to the periphery;  and (3)
financialization.' (ibid. xvii)
Common with practically all proponents of the world-systems paradigm I am making a reference to
is the perception that the modern world-system, the capitalist world-economy, is based on the ideal
of  endless  accumulation  of  wealth  through  relative  monopolisation  of  production,  as  the  most
20 During the last couple of decades, social sciences have often made the distinction between economic and social or
cultural globalisation (such as the international spread of cuisine, popular culture, or literature, for example). Yet, the
majority of social inventions or cultural practices are often inseparable from the economic implications by which
they are conditioned. Most of the time my interlocutors did not make this conceptual distinction either. I believe, as
Jonathan Friedman (2000b) has argued, that it is not cultural products that somehow “flow” or become “hybridised”,
but that instead it is the social structures, that condition cultural reproduction, which are globally interconnected.
21 The essential theoretical component of the world-systems paradigm is the history and development of the capitalist
world-economy (i.e. the modern world-system). Depending on the scholar, the beginnings are traced to different
times, for example to the 13th (Arrighi 2010; Abu-Lughod J. 1989) or the 16th century (Wallerstein 1974a). My
study here makes use of world-system analysis only in terms of the contemporary modern world-system, because
the complete historical overview of Kurdistan is outside of both the scope and the page count of the thesis.
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profitable  products  are  those  which  are  successfully monopolised.  These  products  are  the  core
products (for instance complex technology, medical patents et cetera) and states where this kind of
production is dominant are consequently referred to as the core states. These regions in essence
make up the Global North, the West and Japan primarily, often in conventional discourses referred
to  as  the  “developed  countries”.  Production  which  can  not  be  monopolised,  such  as  the
appropriation of raw natural resources and manual labour such as component assembly, is called as
peripheral  production  and countries  where  these  forms  of  production  are  in  the  overwhelming
majority are assigned to the peripheral countries and regions, also elsewhere known as the Global
South, or the “underdeveloped countries”. Between these two ends of the world-system's axis there
are the semi-peripheral countries, where both core and peripheral production exists (such as Brazil
or  China).  Instead  of  production  as  such,  world-systems  paradigm  focuses  on  markets  and
exchange. Briefly put, through the global trade and unilateral appropriation of natural resources and
labour, unequal trade agreements included, the core states accumulate capital at the expense of the
peripheral states who have no means to monopolise their products, which in turn creates inequality
and dependency in both political and economic spheres. According to world-systems analysis the
core then sustains this axial hierarchy through the processes of increasing political, economic and
military penetration of the peripheral regions – processes which actually bring us back to the term
'globalisation'.
How does the idea of the modern world-system fit into analysing Kurdistan? I am arguing that the
major economic change (or growth in capitalist terms) Kurdistan Region has been going through
since the collapse of Saddam Hussein's Ba’athist regime in 2003, and especially during the last 5–
10  years,  is  actually  the  process  of  integration  into  the  world-economy.  I  prefer  to  speak  of
integration in spite of the fact that, as a part of Iraq, Kurdistan had already been part of the world-
system. The reason for this choice of terminology is twofold: firstly, it is only now that the oil-rich
Kurdistan is fully integrated as a more or less separate entity and not as the peripheral part of the
Republic of Iraq (a kind of double-periphery) and secondly,  this integration,  or reintegration,  is
actually part of global political and military processes where not just the traditional core states of
the global system, but also the ascending semiperipheries (such as Turkey) seek to reap benefits. It
is a reintegration to a peripheral position that stands in stark contrast to the semiperipheral position
of some of the states in the proximity of the Greater Kurdistan, mainly Turkey, Iran, and some of
the Gulf states. Michael Leezenberg (2005, p. 633) argues that the oil producing ‘rentier states’ (that
is, their income is derived from foreign capital instead of the export of goods produced by their
working class) would propose a challenge to the theory of dependency because their stable state
structures and growing wealth would somehow render them less dependent of the core. Yet, my
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thesis will seek to challenge this assumption. Another point which I believe is of great importance is
that Kurdistan Region's integration has also followed very particular post-Cold War logic – that
dominance over a peripheral or semi-peripheral region is established, with the enthusiastic support
of  local  political,  cultural  and  economic  elites22,  through  the  discourses  of  humanitarian
intervention, security and development23 rather than through brute force.
Yet, in spite of the world-systems theories' general applicability, some of their characteristics are
harder  to  digest  – especially from an anthropological  point  of view.  For example,  due to their
attempt  at  large-scale  analysis,  world-systems  theorists  rarely  focus  on  the  margins  of  social
systems, states and societies24. Particular socio-cultural forms of life, the subject of study for most
anthropologists, seems to be relevant to world-systems paradigm only insofar as they constitute of
small-scale world-systems of the past. Neither do world-systems theorists widely seek to understand
how  people  themselves  around  the  world  respond  to  and  conceptualise  the  capitalist  world-
economy25. In much of his world-system writing Wallerstein26, for instance, is mainly an analyst and
a critic  of  the core with very little  to say of the peripheries  under the core's  dominance.  Still,
anthropological approaches on the other hand, and my thesis is not an exception, stress the active
stance  of  dominated  or  marginalised  social  classes  and  groupings  (e.g.  Theodossopoulos  &
Kirtsoglou  2010;  Scott  2001).  Another  problematic  theoretical  claim,  and  this  pertains  to
Wallerstein as well, is the insistence on the fact that in the world-economy there is only one mode of
production (e.g. 1974b), while anthropologists have generally held that there are numerous modes
of production, even existing simultaneously within the same socio-cultural context (Nash 1981, pp.
396–398). 
Those older anthropological writings that have not dismissed the Wallersteinian paradigm altogether
have tried to bridge the ethnographic shortcomings of the world-systems theory by showing how the
22 It is true that some individuals, families, and even entire communities in Kurdistan Region have benefited from the
flow of oil money. The gains are, however, to a large extent remarkably unevenly distributed, on the one hand, and
the profits are based on distinctly unsustainable socio-political structures, on the other.
23 In fact the Gulf War in 1990, which incidentally led to the establishment of the No-Fly zone over large part of
Kurdistan Region a year later, has been held by some authors as a turning point in securitisation and peace-keeping,
where aid work and military enforcement became increasingly entwined. See for example Mark Duffield (2014) on
liberal peace-building.
24 Obviously,  this  argument  is  not  as  all-encompassing  as  it  sounds.  Anthropologists  within  the  world-system
paradigm, or those that otherwise employ it extensively, do work on the margins and pose questions pertaining to
experiences, grass roots social realities, and particular socio-cultural life-worlds (see for example Friedman 2000b;
Friedman & Ekholm 1985).
25 Of course, a small number of works by Arrighi, among others, have addressed revolution and what are generally
described as 'anti-systemic movements'. See for example Arrighi, Hopkins & Wallerstein (2012).
26 In addition to The modern world-system, vol. 1 (1974a) and World-systems analysis: An introduction (2004), several
other works are of importance here, especially Historical capitalism (1995) & European universalism: The rhetoric
of power (2006).
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systems point of view can be supported and improved by anthropological sensibilities (Nash 1981;
Roseberry 1988). And while not necessarily identifying with the paradigm, some anthropologists,
such as  Eric  Wolf  and Sidney Mintz  whom I  mentioned earlier,  have  had analytical  points  of
departure closely related to world-systems theories because they also highlighted the importance of
historical analysis of capitalist expansion to understand contemporary socio-cultural and political
processes27.  More  recent  anthropological  work  on globalisation,  capitalism and  domination  has
nonetheless mostly focused on particular phenomena illustrative of these global power structures
rather than attempting to employ the world-systems terminology and scope. These works, such as
Carolyn Nordstrom's study on war and economy in various sites of civil war and violent conflict
(2004)  and  Didier  Fassin's  and  Mariella  Pandolfi's  edited  volume  on  the  neoliberal  logic  of
humanitarian intervention and securitisation (2010), have from the outset little if anything to do
with the macro-narratives of Arrighi or Wallerstein, but I would argue that they all share a crucial
trait, which is also paramount to the study I am pursuing here: that different contemporary life-
worlds and sites of experience are interconnected through the global power-relations manifested in
ideological, moral, political and economic conditions which we all recognise, whether we live in
Finland, Puerto Rico, Iraq or Indonesia
2.3 Slemani, international
“Generally with globalisation we have benefitted from it, I support the cultural openness it
signals. I mean it’s not like we had a choice whether we have these companies here or not,
but in other terms, culturally, it's quite good.”
 A third year public university student
So far I have gone through two different, internally polymorphous, strands of anthropological and
social scientific analysis. One is concerned with the “making” of Muslim subjectivities through
particular historical developments and contemporary social realities, and the other with the global
political and economic hierarchy as well as the mechanisms of governance and intervention that
sustain or expand it. That these two standpoints make sense when connected, is hardly a revelation.
A number of studies in Islam already referred to actually make the explicit point of connecting local
religious reformations to wider global economic frameworks. Similarly, Islamic faith and doctrines
have never  been limited  or  consigned to  only one  geographical  location  or  sphere  of  political
influence. Yet it is rare that these interconnected aspects of the study of religion and the world
27 William Roseberry (1988, p. 162) has called these works 'antropological political economy'.
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economy are elucidated to the extent I am proposing to do here and this is why I chose to explicitly
bring them out separately, before merging them together in the following chapters.
Paul Farmer has argued that ‘[W]ithout a historically deep and geographically broad analysis, one
that takes into account  political  economy,  we risk seeing only the residue of meaning. We see
puddles,  perhaps, but not the rainstorms and certainly not the gathering thunderclouds’ (Farmer
2004, p. 309). Similarly, my central claim is that to understand what one sees when walking around
the  streets  of  today's  Slemani,  for  example  shop  windows  saying  ‘stor  pizza’ in  Swedish  or
advertisement posters affiliated with the Egypt-born Ikhwan (Muslim Brotherhood), and to perceive
how contemporary Kurdish Muslim youth position themselves in a life-world wrought with a sense
of  continuous  emergency,  this  connection  of  global  capitalism  to  particular  local  religious
sentiments needs to be explicated.  The students, the subjects of my study, offer a unique view into
the religious ambiguities, the rapid economic change, and the uncertainty of the region's future.
They are, after all, the first generation that was born in the No-Fly zone of the 1990s, who grew up
amidst the UN sanctions as well as the Kurdish civil war and reached adulthood during early 2010s
with expectations of prestige and cosmopolitanism. 
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Picture 3: A statue commemorating victims of 1991, placed outside an artists' workshop.
(Photograph by Ville Laakkonen)
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3. The Arrows of Fate: Slemani and the Land of the Kurds
Look, from the Arabs to the Georgians
The Kurds have become like towers.
The Turks and Persians are surrounded by them.
The Kurds are on all four corners.
Both sides have made the Kurdish people
Targets for the arrows of fate.
They are said to be keys to the borders
Each tribe forming a formidable bulwark.
Whenever the Ottoman Sea [Ottomans] and Tajik Sea [Persians]
Flow out and agitate,
The Kurds get soaked in blood
Separating them [the Turks and Persians] like an isthmus.28
What is the role of histories and memories in the formation of the present? Whenever I have talked
about Kurdistan with Kurds, be it in Slemani or in Finland or England, they are quick to point out
how the Kurds have been subjugated and betrayed again and again over centuries by the states
exercising control over the Greater Kurdistan. The notion that Kurdistan has been the victim of not
only surrounding powers but Western political interests as well is also widespread29. My Kurdish
acquaintances  are  also  largely right.  Historically,  as  Diane  E.  King points  out  (2014,  p.  172),
Kurdistan has been at the meeting point of three major empires: Ottoman, Persian and Russian. In
other words, Kurdistan has been a kind of 'contested periphery' (Carlson 2011) residing between
different empires, and with political, economic, and geographical importance to each one of them.
Hamit  Bozarslan  (2014),  in  turn,  makes  the  point  that  the  events  in  Kurdistan  and  Kurdish
aspirations to autonomy or sovereignty can not be separated from the discontinuities of the wider
cycles of ‘states of violence’ that have gripped the Middle East, where demarcations between the
state, border, extra-state, and trans-border actors have largely been diffused. Especially since the
World  War  I  Kurdish  futures  have  been  increasingly  shaped  by  the  political  and  economic
28 Excerpt from Mem and Zin (Mem û Zîn) by 17th century Kurdish poet and writer Ahmad-I Khani. Translation from
Amir Hassanpour (1992, pp. 53–55)
29 In fact, in one of my group interview sessions at Slemani’s public universities I was asked by a student “where were
you during the genocides?” I was representing Europe and the question was posed in reference to the ways how
indifferent European governments had been to Kurdish claims. 
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aspirations of the Global North and more recently, in the context of the neoliberal ‘War on Terror’,
Kurdistan became a geopolitical hotspot at the epicentre of operations carried out by the US-led
coalition (with presence in both Turkey and the Persian Gulf) and the republics of Iraq, Iran, Syria
and Turkey. Thus, any attempt to explore the socio-economic and political realities of contemporary
Slemani, and even its system of higher education, must be grounded on an understanding about the
wider framework of different operational historical trajectories. These trajectories weave together a
number of state and extra-state actors, colonial and political programs, experiences of persecution
and violence as well as of insurgency and martyrdom, and ultimately connect Kurdistan Region
with the rest of the Middle East, and the entire world, past, present and future. 
One fundamental issue has persistently marked the history of the Kurdish people for hundreds of
years. Given that the whole Greater Kurdistan has never constituted a sovereign state in the modern
sense of the word, it is important to note how the different Kurdish populations and emirates or
principalities have been in a constant struggle30 for political sovereignty and territory with the states
and empires who have included (or tried to include, often by force) parts of Kurdistan inside their
borders or frontiers (e.g. Bruinessen 1992; Hardi 2013, pp. 111–112; Hassanpour 1992; McDowall
2004). Until perhaps the early 20th century, these struggles have been largely local and between
princes,  landlords  or  tribal  chiefs  and  the  state  or  empire  administration.  The  struggle  for  an
independent state, for which the Kurds are known best these days, is a more recent development. 
According to Amir Hassanpour Kurdish nationalism originated from a feudal and tribal context as a
response to the expansion of increasingly centralising empires (Ottoman and Persian) laying claims
to the Kurdish lands (Hassanpour 1992, pp. 50–57). This process resulted in a nationalism which
precedes the actual concept of a nation (Hassanpour 1994, p. 3). David McDowall, in turn, argues
that despite the fact that the Kurds have made up an identifiable group for possibly more than two
thousand years, the thought of a whole Kurdish people gained its current strength only in the late
19th century (McDowall  2004,  pp.  1–2).  This  more recent  development  in  forming a collective
national identity coincides with the rise of Turkish and Arabic nationalisms (ibid. p. 2). Still, there
are,  as Kendal Nezan (1996, pp.  10–11) and Hassanpour (1992, pp.  56–57) point  out,  signs in
classical literature and geography which suggest that while the idea of a comprehensive, distinct
Kurdishness  may not  have  always  been  as  widely  spread  as  it  has  now been  for  almost  two
centuries, it might nonetheless pre-date the European modernist notion of a nation-state borne by
the French Revolution of the late 18th century. 
30 I use the term ‘struggle’ broadly here to describe any kind of political activity where the issues of local autonomy,
land rights, and voluntary or coerced allegiances have been at stake. Many, but not all, of these struggles have been
violent. 
26
Both the relationships to sovereign states and the early Kurdish nationalistic aspirations culminated
in the early 20th century’s colonial power games. Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire
after the World War I, the Middle East went through a series of major geopolitical transformations:
the caliph in Constantinople was replaced by Kemalist republicans in Ankara, the Ottoman Arab
lands of Syria and Mesopotamia were divided between France and the Great Britain, and nobody
could quite decide what to do with the Kurdish lands, where these different spheres of influence,
together with Russian Empire now under Bolshevik rule,  ran into each other.  For a  moment it
looked like an independent Kurdistan could be born. However, these plans were ultimately crushed
and, as a result of years of political jousting, haggling, and a number of violent conflicts (in which
the British also took part), the current borders cutting the Greater Kurdistan into four parts came
into  effect.  Southern  Kurdistan,  nowadays  known as  the  Kurdistan  Region,  where  the  city  of
Slemani  also  lies,  became  eventually  part  of  the  new state  of  Iraq31.  (King  2014,  pp.  19–20;
McDowall 2004, pp. 115–150; Nezan 1996, pp. 11–12).
Kurds in and out of Kurdistan have not, of course, been passive through the tumultuous history of
the  Middle  East.  Families  and  emirates,  and  more  recently  political  parties  and  regional
administrations,  have  struck alliances  or  cooperated  with  whichever  faction  or  state  they have
perceived the most beneficial to their cause, Kurd or non-Kurd32. The same goes for warfare. And
Kurdish notables have jockeyed for political position and power not only among themselves but
also in relation to the states and empires under whose rule their lands have been subjected to. While
the  Kurds  have  collectively  had  to  endure  a  number  of  massacres33,  even  genocide,  Kurdish
factions, too, have taken part in perpetrating horrors of the very same kind34. In other words, if we
assume the world to consist of more or less whole nations constituted by shared socio-historical and
ethno-linguistic characteristics, the Kurdish nation has been a nation among other nations, most
often the “targets of arrows of fate” as the poet Khani put it, but nevertheless active agents rather
than solely passive recipients.
31 There was a British–Turkish dispute over the Mosul vilayet, a province practically consisting of many parts of what
is now Kurdistan Region. The fate of the province, inclusion to British ruled Mesopotamia (Iraq), was ultimately
decided by the League of Nations (e.g. McDowall 2004, pp. 142–146)
32 On Kurdish politics, and politics related to Kurdistan, in the past, see for example Bruinessen (1992 & 2002) as well
as McDowall (2004).
33 In the 20th century alone, see for instance Bruinessen 1994 (pp. 3–14) and McDowall (2004, pp. 207–210) for
analyses of the Dersim massacre (1937–1938) in Turkey and Joost R. Hiltermann 2007 (pp. 81–85) for the gassing
of Serdesht in Iran by Saddam Hussein’s forces. The genocidal Anfal campaign and the gas attack on Halabja will be
discussed in this thesis in some detail.
34 One notable example is the Hamidiya cavalry, largely drawn from Kurdish areas and apparently modeled after the
Russian Cossacks, which served the Ottoman sultan and took part in harassing and killing Armenians (Bruinessen
2002, pp. 10–11; McDowall 2004, pp. 59–65). Kurdish troops were also taking part in the Armenian Genocide of
1915 (see for example Bruinessen 1999b).
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3.1 Poisoned arrowheads: The Anfal and Halabja
‘This is what you get! Taste that!’ — and the torment of the Fire awaits the disbelievers.35
“If they could, the Arabs would do it to us again”
A middle-aged Kurdish businessman
There is a particular moment in time, a point in a particular historical trajectory, which is of extreme
importance  for  Kurdistan  Region  in  Iraq.  In  today’s  Slemani  Governorate  it  is  carved  on  the
mountain ranges eroded by shelling, engraved on monuments commemorating the dead, and the
events  are  recreated  and remembered by countless  Kurdish proverbs.  The Anfal,  the  ‘spoils  of
(holy)  war’36,  largely  ignored  by  both  Western  governments  and  news  agencies  at  the  time
(Hiltermann  2007;  McDowall  2004,  pp.  361–363;  Yildiz  2007,  pp.  32–33)37,  was  a  genocide
campaign ordered by Iraqi president Saddam Hussein to suppress the Kurdish resistance once and
for all. While the devastation that Anfal caused is these days well documented (e.g. Human Rights
Watch 1993), it is discussed in some detail here because its consequences still continue to shape the
social realities in Slemani and other parts of Kurdistan Region.
During  the  Iran–Iraq  War  (1980–1988),  Iranian  government  succeeded  in  facilitating  a  truce
between the leading Kurdish nationalist forces (essentially the parties Kurdistan Democratic Party,
KDP, and Patriotic  Union of Kurdistan,  PUK) which had fought  against  the Ba’athist  regime’s
oppression for decades, but had remained hostile towards each other. The war had raged for years
already and Saddam Hussein feared the threat that the Iranian army would pose if it was supported
by a unified Kurdistan Front38. (Yildiz 2007, p. 25). As yet another round of peace talks with the
Front had ended, by President Hussein’s decree his cousin Ali Hassan al-Majid was given virtually
absolute power to deal with the Kurdish resistance as he pleased. The Kurds in the region were
35 The Qur’an, 8th sura (‘Al-Anfal’), 14th verse (translation by Muhammad A.S. Abdul Haleem).
36 Interestingly, the 2004 Oxford University Press translation by M.A.S. Abdul Haleem translates Al-Anfal in a far
more neutral manner as ‘battle gains’. Al-Anfal, the 8 th sura of Qur'an, deals with the Battle of Badr, the first battle
between Muslims and their Meccan opponents. However, as I will show below, there was nothing Qur’anic or divine
about the Anfal operations.
37 Sources I am referring to here argue that for many governments supporting Iraq against Iran lead them to overlook
the brutality of the Iraqi regime. According to Choman Hardi (2013, p. 108) Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran was seen as
such a threat in the US government that they were inclined to refrain from publicly criticising Saddam Hussein and
the Iraqi state, who were their allies. American and other Western companies had stakes in Iraq too (ibid.). The
silence was not obviously only of Western making. Hardi points out that the Iraqi government also went to great
lengths  in trying to hide the use of chemical  weapons against  the Kurds,  and that  foreign journalists were not
allowed to enter Kurdistan until the 1990s (ibid. pp. 109 & 117).
38 On the other hand, as Hardi notes (2013, p. 113), it is not accurate to assume Anfal to be part of the Iran–Iraq War.
Instead the Kurdish front’s cooperation with Iran offered Saddam Hussein’s regime an ideal pretext for solving the
“Kurdish problem” up north. Many of the attacks were carried out after Iran and Iraq had signed an armistice.
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accustomed to expecting atrocities from the central administration, for example hundreds of villages
had already been razed by the Iraqi army in 198539, resulting in 55 000 people becoming homeless
(McDowall 2004, p. 352). In 1987 al-Majid began the systematic operations of deportations and
executions. In early 1988 he launched officially the Anfal campaign, a military operation which
aimed at cutting the support and shelter from the Kurdish peshmerga fighters by attacking the rural
Kurdish civilian population40. Large areas of Kurdistan were declared as prohibited zones. Villages
were shelled, looted, and razed to the ground, people were forcibly relocated. Detentions, rape and
torture were carried out in methodical fashion. While quite a few people were shot on the village-
sites without distinction between civilians and peshmerga, the majority of them were taken to death
camps such as Topzawa near Kirkuk. After a while, usually after a couple of days of beatings and
interrogation, (mostly) teenage and adult males were loaded onto trucks and brought to execution
grounds where they were shot and piled up in trenches. (Hardi 2013; Human Rights Watch 1993;
McDowall 2004, pp. 357–367; Yildiz 2007, pp. 25–31). 
One of the trademark aspects, and certainly the most infamous internationally41, of the Anfal and the
military operations that lead to it, was the use of chemical weapons. Iraq had already launched its
chemical and biological warfare programmes in the 1960s but the production of chemical warfare
agents escalated,  with the help from numerous Western companies42,  during the Iran–Iraq War.
Chemical weapons proved useful against the Iranian army and al-Majid, who would later receive
the nickname Chemical Ali, decided to employ them to quell the Kurdish resistance. (Spiers 2010,
pp. 102–109). Mustard gas, sarin, VX and a number of other chemical and nerve agents were used
to  massacre  both  peshmergas  and  civilians  seeking  shelter  from  air-raids.  The  single  most
destructive chemical attack was carried out against the people of Halabja43, a Kurdish town in a
peshmerga  stronghold  area,  whose  control  Iraqi  army  had  lost  to  PUK  and  Iranian  forces.
Approximately 5 000 people, mostly civilians, died (McDowall 2004, pp. 357 – 358; Human Rights
39 Disappearances, deportations, executions, and torture were commonplace in Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist Iraq, but
the Iran–Iraq War brought arguably the worst out of President Hussein’s military apparatus. For example, already in
1983, before the Anfal, a retaliation for Barzani’s KDP’s alliance with Iran resulted in the disappearance of up to
8 000 members of the Barzani clan (Yildiz 2007, p. 52). In 1985 Iraqi troops rounded up some 500 children in
Slemani and a considerable number of them were tortured and eventually killed (McDowall 2004, p. 352).
40 This is not to say that the urban cities would not have been affected. For instance, systematically executed violence,
house-by-house searches, and disappearances took place in Slemani which was placed under a curfew in April 1988
(Hardi 2013, p. 114).
41 While it took years before the general public as well as Western governments acknowledged the horrors of Anfal,
certain organisations (as well as Iran, who did so already during the Iran–Iraq War) tried to alert the international
community to Iraqi army’s use of chemical weapons. See for example Physicians for Human Rights (1989).
42 See for instance Hardi (2013, pp. 108–109) and Hiltermann (2007).
43 As for example Human Rights Watch (1993) has noted, the Halabja attack did not follow the pattern of the Anfal
operations while it occurred at the same time. It was carried out solely with air-raids and ground forces were not
used to round up civilians for arrests and executions. However, I would argue that as an atrocity it is inseparable
from the Anfal, and my Kurdish acquaintances do not make this largely academic distinction.
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Watch 1993 put the number of casualties between 4 000 and 7 000) and the long-term health effects
for both survivors and their descendants were devastating (Gosden 1998a & 1998b; also Dworkin et
al. 2008).
The Anfal, which raged until the general amnesty proclaimed in September 1988 and claimed well
over 100 000 lives44 and displaced, orphaned and widowed even greater numbers of people, as well
as destroyed the majority of rural villages in Kurdistan, is deeply embedded in the social memory of
the Kurdish nation. It touches virtually all generations in one way or another and structures the
social and political life in the region. Like Hardi (2013, p. 107), I would argue it is the foremost
symbol  of  victimhood by which Kurdish aspirations  for  statehood or  complete  sovereignty are
legitimised. And considering the destruction that was inflicted during the campaign, the scars are
understandably deep. 
One day in April 2014 I was taking photographs of statues in front of the Slemani city library when
a middle-aged man approached me and asked if I liked the statues. After an initial chat about my
impressions about the city, we began to talk about economy and politics as we walked down Salim
Street.  The man was,  it  turned out,  visiting  his  relatives  in  Kurdistan  Region and had himself
permanently relocated to Asia where he had construction businesses. On the subject of tourism he
said: “you see the Arabs coming here now. How long do you think this is going to last? You know
the Anfal. If they could, the Arabs would do it to us again. That’s what they’re like.”  This was not
the only time I encountered an outspoken stance of mistrust towards Arabs45, usually directed at
visitors  and newcomers  to  the  Kurdish  region.  The  sentiment  that  your  oppressors,  those  who
murdered your family, walked away and still live next to you is relatively common among Kurds.
Even though Saddam Hussein and a number of high-ranking Ba’athists were executed or sentenced
to long prison terms, many Kurds feel like there has not been a closure, a full acknowledgement of
the horrors of Anfal or complete carrying out of justice. The fact that Saddam Hussein was never
officially found guilty of the Anfal46 has not helped either.
Many of those, especially at the grass roots level, who took part in the Anfal probably do walk free.
This does not, however, apply solely to Iraqi army troops but is also true for the irregular pro-
44 For instance, Yildiz (2007, p. 25) puts the figure to up to 180 000 and McDowall (2004, p. 359) estimates it to be
150 000–200 000.
45 It is curious how the word ‘Arab’ equates with ‘Iraqi’ in Kurdistan Region. Christians and other minorities, in turn,
were not considered Iraqi or Arab as such in everyday conversations, but rather as something else who the Kurds
just happened to live with.
46 Saddam Hussein was hanged for crimes against humanity, but the crime in question was the massacre of Shi’ites in
Dujail.  Although initially standing for  trial  for  Anfal  too,  President  Hussein was executed before the trial  was
finished. (See for example Hardi 2013, p. 120).
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government Kurdish militias who were employed by Saddam Hussein, the jash47. The history and
role  of  the  jash are  complicated.  The  Iraqi  heads  of  state  employed  Kurdish  militias  against
insurgents even before Saddam Hussein. These irregular pro-government troops, officially known
as  fursan (knights),  were  essentially  recruited  from  three  kinds  of  pools:  some  were  simply
unemployed looking for work, others (especially certain tribal chiefs and their men) loathed the
Kurdish nationalist rebel leader Mulla Mustafa Barzani48 and his followers, and some were coerced
into service. (McDowall 2004, p. 312). 
Saddam Hussein then made the  jash militia considerably stronger especially during the 1980s to
free regular forces for the war against Iran and to keep the Kurds divided. The  jash  organisation
worked in the following way: government bankrolled a local Kurdish leader (tribal, religious, or
political) as a  mustishar (‘advisor’), who then recruited the troops from his followers or fellow
village-men.  Some of  the  jash were happy to  be  bankrolled  by the  Ba’athist  state,  and others
opposed the Kurdish resistance, but many of them either felt forced to join or they joined because
they feared  for  their  families  or  their  villages’ future.  Some were  also  double-agents,  secretly
affiliated with the Kurdish resistance. (McDowall 2004, pp. 354–356). Many jash factions would
later switch sides in the 1991 uprising and join the Kurdistan Front led by KDP and PUK (ibid. p.
371).  In other  words,  while  some really did oppose the Kurdish resistance despite  their  ethno-
linguistic affiliation, for the majority joining the jash was in some respects seen as the only way out
of the burdens of the cruel war and rampant poverty49. 
Nonetheless,  a  large  number of  the  jash  were involved in  the  Anfal  as  perpetrators,  especially
rounding up civilians to be trucked away to detention (e.g. Hardi 2013, p. 113; McDowall 2004, p.
358 – though McDowall suggests that at least not all of the jash necessarily knew the people would
be heading to certain extermination). Some jash leaders also lured civilians out of their hideouts by
announcing false amnesties (Hardi 2013, p. 116). After the Gulf War in the 1990s the KDP and
PUK-led Kurdistan Front granted amnesty to the jash. Many of them joined one of the two parties
and some  mustishars, who either got rich while leading the  jash  or were rich already, have later
secured important positions in politics and business. This has caused a lot of resentment, especially
47 ‘Donkey’s foal’ or ‘little donkey’ in Kurdish.
48 Mulla Mustafa Barzani was a tribal chief, head of KDP and a leader in the Kurdish nationalist resistance. Mulla
Mustafa gathered quite a following and was a major player in Iraqi politics, but his uncompromising character made
a good number of enemies among the Kurds too. His son Masoud Barzani, the current leader of KDP, is the only
president Kurdistan Region has had since the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional Government. The Barzanis
are keeping it in the family, as both the KRG prime minister and the head of KDP intelligence services are currently
Mulla Mustafa’s grandsons, Masoud’s nephew and son respectively. 
49 McDowall (2004, pp. 356–357) also points out that the  jash were not, after all, exempt from Saddam Hussein's
Arabicising resettlement  programme later on. Many were forcibly relocated after the Kurdish nationalists were
crushed.
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from the victims of Anfal, and a heated public debate has been going on for years50. I personally got
reminded of this when I was driving around Slemani with a friend of mine, from a family strongly
affiliated with one of the old leftist opposition parties. He showed me the neighbourhood he used to
live in as a child. He recounted how just few blocks away from his home had lived a government
collaborator, a jash. “Oh yes, we still talk about them”, he noted.
The Anfal has also been operationalised as a political tool, much like war veterans in virtually every
region of the world. For example, during the dispute over the export of Kurdish oil, which led to
Baghdad withholding Kurdistan Region’s 17 percent share of the federal budget, some Kurdish
politicians rhetorically likened the economic embargo to the Anfal. At the same time, many victims
of Anfal have often protested that politicians, although making promises of social and economic
support in political rallies, have largely forgotten the victims' plight while commoditising the their
traumas51. Recently the use of chemical weapons in Syria and ISIS’ brutal attacks on Kurds and
Yazidis  in  Iraq,  including some reports  of  local  Arab  residents  joining  the  ISIS  forces52,  have
reopened the wounds of Anfal in an unprecedentedly violent manner, not only in Kurdistan Region
but elsewhere in the Greater Kurdistan and around the diaspora. The message to the world by many
KRG politicians and quite a few Kurdish intellectuals has been clear: Look at what is happening,
this is why we need a state of our own. Why should we be different from the Armenians and the
Jews?
3.2 War and Exodus
Time and again … Invariably, they would find their quest for self-determination tempered
by the bitter fact that, once again, historical and geographical circumstances conspired to
thwart their aspirations.53
50 For example, in the spring of 2014 a protest of dozens of families of Anfal victims demanded the jash to be arrested
and brought to stand trial. According to Gorran’s KNNC news agency (May 24, 2014b) the Iraqi High Court has
issued arrest warrants for 258 jash who collaborated with the Ba’athist government during Anfal, but the Kurdish
authorities have been reluctant to act. The Faili Kurdish Shafaq News (May 25, 2014) reported, however, of one
arrest in Khanaqin, a Kurdish town in Diyala governorate.
51 After the US-led invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime, a monument was built in Halabja.
The inauguration ceremony was attended by US Secretary of State Colin Powell. Residents of Halabja felt, perhaps
rightly, that the millions of US dollars provided by the Coalition Provisional Authority could have been put to better
use in a town largely wrecked by war. In 2006, on the eighteenth anniversary of the chemical attack, a protest
against the PUK authorities turned violent and security guards opened fire.  Furious Halabjans forced their way
inside the monument and burned it  down, destroying photographs of their  dead or  disappeared relatives in the
process. (Kakeyi March 5, 2012).
52 For Arab residents seen cooperating with ISIS against the Yazidi in Shingal (Sinjar) see Judit Neurink (August 21,
2014), and Arab residents of Gwer reportedly turning against Kurds when ISIS entered the town see for instance
Wladimir van Wilgenburg (August 13, 2014). Obviously, as I will try to elaborate later on, these matters are far
more complicated than they are made out to look like.
53 Hiltermann (2008, p. 7)
32
After the Anfal operations, the Kurdistan Front had practically nothing to lose. Large numbers of
the civilian population,  especially in rural Kurdistan,  were either exterminated or displaced and
huge swathes of countryside were desolate.  The majority of whatever gains the peshmerga had
made during the 1980s were lost and as a ceasefire was eventually brokered between Iran and Iraq,
the former withdrew its support for the Kurdish troops54. The Kurdish nationalist forces’ numbers
were considerably smaller  than before and, as the greatest  concern was getting the people into
safety,  their  operations were reduced to small-scale ambushes against  the Iraqi army.  While the
hopeless guerrilla war continued sporadically, at least parts of the Kurdish rebel leadership probably
considered parleying, yet again55, with Saddam Hussein. (McDowall 2004, pp. 368–369.) 
Even if the future looked grim by the end of the 1980s, the tide seemed to turn (temporarily – as the
Kurdish Front would later find out) in 1990. Because of the Iran–Iraq War Iraq was exhausted and
ridden with debt. Saddam Hussein sought to re-establish his domestic and foreign political power
by challenging the prevailing political and economic order in the region. President Hussein began
sabre-rattling in public against major Gulf oil exporters such as Kuwait and United Arab Emirates,
who he claimed were working for US interests56 (Ibrahim July 18, 1990). Eventually, Iraq threw
down the  gauntlet57,  first  in  a  misjudged attempt  to  annex its  creditor  and fellow oil-producer
Kuwait and then manoeuvring Iraqi troops close to the Saudi Arabian border58. These episodes first
resulted in UN sanctions and a trade ban to be imposed on the Iraqi state and ultimately, in 1991,
provoked an intervention from Iraq’s erstwhile patron, the US, in the largest and fastest mobilisation
54 When the formal peace agreement was eventually signed it practically meant that the Iran-Iraq border would be
sealed, which cut further support and habitation from the Kurdish guerrillas. The Kurds did, however, apparently
still receive aid from Iraqi Ba’ath’s long-standing enemy, Syria. (McDowall 2004, pp. 368–369.)
55 As Bartu (2010, p. 1329) points out, there had been negotiations for autonomy already in 1963, 1970–1974, and
1983. Each time the negotiations failed the relations between Baghdad and Kurds took a turn for the worse.
56 I would argue that there was a hint of truth in this statement as the US certainly sought to establish a formidable
presence in the Middle East, and not least through the major oil exporters. Nevertheless, Saddam Hussein’s actual
motives had a lot  more to do with Kuwait’s oil and ports than any kind of “anti-imperialist” agenda. (See for
example Stork & Lesch 1990.) 
57 Besides the obvious political and economic dimensions of the conflict there is another aspect to the invasion which
has religious implications – even more so with regard to the global Islamic mobilisation. Until Iraq’s attack on
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia (another of Iraq’s creditors) had established itself as the most formidable seat of religious
authority in the Sunni Arab world. Saddam Hussein, who would gradually reinvent himself as a devout Sunni leader
over the following decade or so, now challenged this authority. Both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia had to rely on US
military support: the former to drive the Iraqi troops away and the latter to secure its borders. The fact that the US,
an ally of Israel, had bases in the Sunni heartland from where it struck against another Arab state, was humiliating
for the Saudi leadership as well as for the other Gulf monarchies. Some scholars have suggested that this fact began
the intense fragmentation of Sunni Arab religious legitimacy (e.g. Kepel 2006, pp. 208–210), which, I would say, is
still under way.
58 Saddam Hussein did also strike Saudi Arabia and Israel with missiles during the war and he apparently was prepared
to employ chemical agents again, but both fear of losing his reputation as well as the threat of military retribution
from the US-led coalition forces deterred him from doing so (Spiers 2010, pp. 113–118).
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of US troops since the end of World War II. The events that unfolded would be known as the First
Gulf War59. (McDowall 2004, p. 369; Stork & Lesch 1990; Yildiz 2007, p. 34.)
The  Iraqi  army was  no  match  for  US military.  On  top  of  that  war  had  also  halted  Iraq’s  oil
production. Despite the fact that the US-led coalition forces had taken Saddam Hussein’s military
apparatus in a chokehold, it  never struck the final blow to the regime that at least some of the
spectators regionally and globally expected. Instead, the US administration did the unthinkable: in a
speech President George Bush announced the following: ‘there’s another way for the bloodshed to
stop, and that is for the Iraqi military and the Iraqi people to take matters into their hands, and force
Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside.’60
This above announcement had, intended or not, two consequences. The Shi’ites, oppressed under
Saddam Hussein’s Sunni regime and subjected to atrocities similar to the ones the Kurds had faced,
began an  uprising  in  the  Shi’ite  cities  south  of  the  country (Yildiz  2007,  p.  35).  The Kurdish
resistance had stayed away from the Gulf War because the horrors of chemical attacks and the
memories of those ‘Anfalized’ (i.e.  disappeared during the operations) were still  fresh,  and the
Kurdish  leadership  definitely did  not  want  to  risk  President  Hussein’s  retribution  or  look  like
traitors in the eyes of other Muslim-majority countries (McDowall 2004, pp. 369–370). However,
like in the Shi’ite communities, among the Kurds the announcement was taken as an indication of
US support, and with Baghdad’s forces considerably weakened and in any case focused on another
frontline, the Kurds rose in revolt. The Kurdish ‘intifada’, the Uprising, began.
The Uprising was not centrally administered, especially from the beginning. In fact the Kurdistan
Front ‘merely followed the people onto the streets’61. In many places the majority of the former jash
chiefs, now under the amnesty from the Kurdish resistance leaders, actually led the charge, with
their men expanding the strength of Kurdish forces from 15 000 to well over 100 000 in a matter of
59 An autobiographical  remark:  this  was  the  first  moment  I  became,  as  a  child,  aware  of  the  Kurdish  people.  I
remember hearing wild stories about the brutality of the Ba’athist regime followed subsequently by news reports
covering the US attack. The Gulf War and its national and international consequences as well as the broader history
of Iraq of the period fall beyond the scope and page count of my study but are addressed in detail elsewhere (e.g.
Farouk-Sluglett & Sluglett 2001, pp. 281–310; Tripp 2007, pp.  239–250). It is nevertheless an important backdrop
to events which took place in Kurdistan over the next couple of years and hence worth mentioning here.
60 Quoted in Hardi (2013, p. 122) and McDowall (2004, p. 372). Yildiz (2007, p. 34) quotes the same speech but
without the reference to “the Iraqi people” and speaking of “fighting” instead of “bloodshed”. However, he writes
that several messages, in essence carrying the same sentiment, were broadcast by the Voice of America radio station
(ibid.). The Saudi-controlled Voice of Free Iraq broadcast similar statements in both Kurdish and Arabic (McDowall
2004, p. 372).
61 Front spokesman Burhan Jaf to news agency AFP in 4 March 1991. Quoted in McDowall (2004, p. 371).
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days62. Initially, the uprising was militarily a success63. Most of Kurdistan Region, including major
cities such as Slemani, Hewler, Dohuk and Zakho, was once again in Kurdish rebels’ hands. In just
a couple of weeks the city of Kirkuk was conquered, or, as the Kurds would insist, reclaimed. (ibid.
pp. 371–372.)
In reality the US administration had no intentions to back up militarily the possible revolt in Iraq.
This soon became painfully apparent to both the Kurds and the Shi’ites. First Saddam Hussein set
out to retake Southern Iraq, his troops killing some 300 000 people in the process (Yildiz 2007, p.
36). After the Shi’ite rebellion in the south of Iraq was suppressed, Saddam Hussein moved his
Republican Guards, with tanks, aircrafts and heavy weaponry, to the Kurdish region. In less than
two weeks after Kurds had gained the control of Kirkuk, the The Iraqi forces regained control of the
majority of the bigger Kurdish cities. Like during the Anfal, the Iraqi troops’ methods were cruel.
For example, there were reports of phosphorous bombs being dropped from helicopters on fleeing
civilians64. More than 100 000 people were captured by the Iraqi forces in Kurdish areas and at least
some 20 000 of these people disappeared.  (McDowall  2004, pp.  372–373;  Yildiz  2007,  p.  36.)
While oppression and violence had continued after the Anfal65, it was the scale of Saddam Hussein’s
retribution that gripped the Kurdish population with unprecedented fear. Over 1 500 000 Kurds left
their homes and tried to make their way to either Turkey or Iran66. A number of the refugees became
stranded in mountain passes with very little shelter or water (King 2008, p. 331; Yildiz 2007, p. 37).
Despite several new emergency camps being set up, many refugees, especially the oldest and the
youngest, fell sick or died (McDowall 2004, p. 375). 
If the Anfal went largely unnoticed at the time, nevertheless the plight of Kurds in 1991 was widely
publicised. Under the mounting public pressure, and a tragic refugee crisis in their hands, the US-
led coalition as well as several UN member states decided to act. First, the UN Security Council
62 This event  transformed the status  of  many of  the  jash.  As the  mustishars were recruited by the parties  in the
Kurdistan Front (especially KDP and PUK, but smaller parties such as Kurdistan Socialist Party KSP too), so did the
men under their command become integrated into the Front’s forces. (McDowall 2004, pp. 371–372.)
63 According to Yildiz (2007, p. 35) more than 50 000 troops from Iraqi armed forces are thought to have deserted
during this  time.  He also points  out  that  during this  period known members  of  the various Iraqi  security and
intelligence services, as well as other high-ranking Ba’athists, were most likely singled out for revenge killings, in
both the Kurdish north and the Shi’ite south (ibid. pp. 35–36).
64 See for  example  journalist  Rafet  Balli  about  the  road  to  Turkey in  The Independent  April  23  1991,  cited  by
McDowall (2004, p. 373). According to McDowall (ibid.) similar scenes took place on the roads to Iran. See also
Amnesty International (July 16, 1991).
65 See Middle East Watch and Physicians for Human Rights (1992, p. 11) for examples of executions carried out in
1989.
66 McDowall (2004, p. 373) estimates the number of refugees in this instance to be 1 500 000. Yildiz (2007, p. 36)
concludes, referring to Lawyers Committee for Human Rights report (1992), that up to 500 000 people took refuge
in Turkey while 1 500 000 ended up in Iran. Interestingly, both sources note that of the two neighbouring states, both
known for their heavy-handedness towards their own Kurdish minorities, Turkey had largely remained hostile while
Iran was far more welcoming to the Kurdish refugees. 
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resolution 688, follow up to the original resolution 687 during the Gulf War, was passed which
condemned the Iraqi state's repression of its own people. Second, the US and Turkish governments
agreed on the international relief operation called ‘Operation Provide Comfort’. Additionally the
Iraqi government, now having lost the war and agreed to a ceasefire, was obliged to help logistically
in the relief aid to Kurds within Iraq and taking refuge in neighbouring countries. Third, and the
most important, decision was the introduction of ‘Operation Safe Haven’. At Turkey’s suggestion,
who made the proposition largely to deal with the international criticism of its refugee policies, a
safe haven (or a buffer zone for refugees) was established in much of what is now the Kurdistan
Region. (Hassanpour 1994, p. 6; McDowall 2004, pp. 373–376; Yildiz 2007, pp. 37–42.) The safe
haven project as well as the imposition of a no-fly zone on northern (Kurdish) and southern (Shi'ite)
parts of Iraq ensured that despite the fact that clashes (which caused the further deaths and the
displacement of additional hundreds of thousands of people67 as well as thousands of casualties for
the Iraqi forces; see for example McDowall 2004, p. 378) still erupted and fear justifiably lingered
among the Kurdish population, the absolutely worst was finally over.
3.3 Poverty, violence, and civil war
'But violence has its tomorrow even in situations in which war and genocide have given
way to peace and security and the promise of a more hopeful future.'68
The 1990s were still extremely difficult for the Kurds in Iraq. With Saddam Hussein’s troops and
administrators withdrawn from the region they were more or less in charge of their own affairs, but
struggling economically. In addition to the sanctions and the trade embargo imposed by the United
Nations as a result of Iraqi state's invasion of Kuwait, the fledgling semi-autonomy was facing a
separate blockade set up by Baghdad. Kurdish employee’s salaries were cut off and the imports of
provisions and fuel to Kurdistan were severely limited. Kurdish-controlled areas were surrounded
by minefields and Iraqi army troops. Slemani was struggling too, because it was furthest away from
the Turkish supply route. UN relief efforts were also often disrupted. In short, the Kurdish regions
of Iraq were militarily besieged and under a heavy economic attack69. (McDowall 2004, pp. 378–
384; Yildiz 2007, pp. 73–78.)
67 The events around the turn of the decade signalled also the beginning of the larger scale of migration of Kurds from
the Iraqi Kurdistan to Europe and the United States.
68 Paul Farmer (2009, p. 42).
69 At the time of my fieldwork, when al-Maliki’s government in Baghdad was withholding Kurdistan Region’s 17
percent share of the federal budget, parallels to the situation just some two decades earlier were apparent especially
to the older generations
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Under the shadows of political isolation, economic hardships, and dangers of renewed war certain
important events and developments occurred, which can still be seen in Slemani and the Kurdistan
Region as  a  whole.  Their  implications for  the social  realities and imaginaries of  contemporary
Slemani will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters, but they are worth mentioning in
this historical overview for the sake of completeness. 
First of all, despite its internal struggles, and its status as a widely unrecognised entity, the region
managed to successfully hold its first own elections in 1992. The process resulted in a two-party
system with the Kurdistan Regional Government and the 105-seat parliament lead jointly by the
rivals KDP and PUK70. (McDowall 2004, pp. 380 – 382) Second of all, smuggling and extra-legal
trade  networks,  commonplace  in  all  societies  ravaged  by  violent  conflict  and  economic
uncertainty71, proliferated. (Leezenberg 2005, p. 642; McDowall 2004, p. 390, 392; Yildiz 2007, p.
75) At the same time all three major political actors, KRG, the political parties, and local landlords,
were trying to boost their revenues from the same sources, mainly the taxation of trade (McDowall
2004, p. 383). Unsurprisingly, the KRG administration finished last in the race. Thirdly, and finally,
exorcising  the  demons of  some three  decades  of  totalitarian  rule  proved difficult.  Internal  and
external socio-political pressures, economic disparities, land disputes, fierce political and personal
rivalries72, and a long tradition in the use of excessive force with impunity plunged Iraqi Kurdistan
into armed conflict between KDP and PUK in 1994. The situation was further aggravated by the
interference of Baghdad as well as Turkey and Iran. A state of civil war, which was marked by
continuous violence and uncontrolled strong-man politics, lasted until 1998. Over the four years at
least thousands of people died, disappeared, or became displaced. (Leezenberg 2005, pp. 638–639,
641; McDowall 2004, pp. 386–392; Yildiz 2007, pp. 48–50) One important result of the conflict
was that Kurdistan Region had effectively to two parallel administrations until 2006, a fact which
still marks many of the internal political functions.
Some much-needed assistance was provided to many of the inhabitants within the KRG-controlled
zone through the UN's Oil-For-Food programme, which allowed the Iraqi state to sell some of its oil
to meet the humanitarian needs that the sanctions were creating. It did, however, suffer from several
problems nonetheless: part of the money went to the Iraqi state's war reparations, UN's operational
costs, and to the weapons inspection program that was taking place in accordance with the previous
70 Governmental posts were arranged so that  where PUK member was the minister a KDP member would be the
deputy, and vice versa (Yildiz 2007, p. 46). Many of the smaller parties were dissolved into the two major leading
formations of the Front, KDP and PUK. They both had 50 seats in the parliament with the remaining five reserved
for Assyrians. (McDowall 2004, pp. 380–382). At this point, the Islamic parties and the Turkmen (as well as smaller
minorities) had no separate parliamentary representation.
71 This important point is discussed in more detail in the following chapters.
72 Most notably between KDP camp led by Masoud Barzani and PUK camp led by Jalal Talabani.
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UN Security Council resolutions. Proposed projects also progressed slowly, and the UN, careful not
to  insult  Baghdad,  did  allow  Saddam  Hussein  considerable  leverage  in  the  program's
implementation. It also created a culture of dependency in an already strongly centralised state.
Despite its short-comings, it is estimated that if the program was terminated 60 percent of Iraqi
population would not have been able to feed itself. (Yildiz 2007, pp. 71–75). 
An important quality to the Kurdish experience that has to be addressed here is the inception of the
Kurdish diaspora73 which largely gained its current volume due to the violence of the 1980s and
1990s.  Individual  Kurds  and smaller  communities  had been escaping from marginalisation  and
oppression  already during  the  previous  decades  (as  well  as  settled  around the  world  for  other
reasons too), but there is a striking increase from the 1980s onwards. As I have already noted, over
a  million  Kurds  fled  the  region  in  the  Exodus  of  1991.  Prior  to  these  events,  however,  the
transnational quality of the Kurdish nation had already began to take form. The 1979 revolution in
Iran and the following persecution of minorities had Kurds steadily fleeing the Islamic Republic
from 1980 onwards. The PKK-led insurgency against the Kemalist state in Turkey had displaced a
number of Northern Kurds since the mid-1980s and the Iran–Iraq War and the Anfal campaigns had
done the same in Kurdistan Region in the south. Many fled to neighbouring countries, to the Soviet
Union and so on, but many routes and paths have ultimately led to the Global North. Newroz, the
Kurdish  New Year,  is  celebrated  in  halls  and  parks  from Toronto  to  Tampere  and  London  to
Düsseldorf. Even if my thesis focuses on the larger, world-economy level aspects of transnational
phenomena, I do acknowledge the Kurdish diaspora is an integral part of globalisation in Kurdistan.
3.4 ’The War on Terror’
“We don’t say ’the fall of Saddam’ here. You know, in wars two things can happen: the fall
of the capital or the fall of the regime. Now, in Syria the capital has fallen, but the regime
has not. Look at Egypt: the regime fell, but not the capital. Here in Iraq, then, both the
capital and the regime fell.”
A fourth year private university student
The relations between the United States (and the Global North in general) and Iraq had soured in
1990 and continued to deteriorate during the 1990s and early 2000s. Initially the US policy towards
73 By diaspora, I mean a very concrete existing social reality as much as a field of stories, meanings, and experiences.
'Diaspora',  or  a  'diasporic existence',  refers  to an experience of  belonging or  a  shared past  within members  of
communities or nations in exile or long-distance dispersion. For further elaboration on the term, see James Clifford
(1994).
38
Saddam Hussein’s regime was that of containment through no-fly zones and sanctions (e.g. Tripp
2007, pp. 269–270; Yildiz 2007, p.  90). There had been sporadic military engagement between US
forces and Iraqi military structures, but plans to depose President Hussein, while they existed, were
largely covert.  However,  following the September 11 terrorist  attack in  2001 the United States
President George W. Bush had declared  a ‘War on Terror’ and nominated Iraq as part of the ‘axis of
evil’ (the other two being North Korea and the US’s long-standing opponent Iran), after which the
rhetoric towards Saddam Hussein toughened considerably for the next couple of years. Especially
the US and its ally Great Britain were determined to overthrow the Ba’athist regime. Since the
defeat of Iraq in 1991, humanitarian concerns and especially disarmament and inspections looking
for Iraq’s supposed WMDs (weapons of mass destruction) had been a major source of contention
and  international  sabre-rattling  in  diplomacy  and  military  circles.  The  US  administration  had
embraced the ‘Bush doctrine’,  formulated by neo-conservative ‘hawks’ over the last  few years,
which sought to tame hostile ‘rogue states’ through pre-emptive aggression, unilateralism, and full-
scale invasion. In spite of the fierce criticism of such an approach, the increasingly aggressive US
(and British) policy towards Iraq found equally enthusiastic support: Saddam Hussein’s regime’s
brutality was indisputable, and since the destruction caused by 9/11 attacks especially people in
certain Northern countries were a lot more receptive towards claims about international terrorism74.
In late March 2003 air raid sirens were sounded in Baghdad. The Second Gulf War had begun.
(Tripp 2007, pp. 267–274; Yildiz 2007, pp. 95–105.) 
The Kurds perceived the invasion of the US-led coalition generally positively, a stance for which
there was not necessarily a lot of support in many parts of the Middle East and the rest of the world
at the time. In fact,  they ended up playing a considerable role in the coalition’s operations.  As
Turkey refused to take part in the ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’, or give permission to use its lands as a
base, the Kurdish cooperation allowed the US-led coalition to open a northern front in addition to
attacks launched from the Persian Gulf. To the Turkish state's horror75, Kurdish peshmerga forces
entered into an alliance with the coalition. They also captured Kirkuk, once again, and generally
moved towards  the areas  that  Baghdad had previously claimed and forcibly Arabicised.  (Tripp
2007; p. 274; Yildiz 2007, pp. 105–115) However, for my study, the most important frontline where
74 I do not wish to make a statement of the “Americans again” kind (see Friedman 2000a for this discussion). It is
nonetheless worthy of attention that the US is home to many of the transnational elites operating at the core of the
world-system, or at least an important linchpin in the processes how these political, economic or cultural elites (in
trade as well as global politics) meet and do business. It is also at the core of the centralisation of global military
capabilities (Arrighi 1999).
75 Turkish government was vehemently opposed to any political or regional gains the KRG might succeed in obtaining.
This was largely because of the fear of what consequences such advancements might have for Turkey’s own Kurdish
minority. Ankara had even threatened to invade Kurdistan Region. (Yildiz 2007, pp. 105–115) Such ‘war within a
war’ was nonetheless avoided.
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the Kurdish troops were engaged in was located in the governorate of Slemani, near the Iranian
border. This was where PUK’s peshmergas and the US forces confronted in a joint operation Ansar
al-Islam, the Kurdish Islamists linked to Al Qaeda, who had taken hold of several villages in the
region (Yildiz 2007, p. 105).
The majority of Kurds were, and still are, Muslims. However, for decades there have been frictions
of some degree or another between the most conservative religious factions within the society and
the most secular elements of the nationalists. McDowall (2004, p. 355) notes how a number of the
Sufi76 sheikhs were collaborating with the Baghdad regime, some of them as jash leaders to oppose
the  left-leaning  and  secular  nationalists  (especially  PUK).  Equally,  the  aspect  of  religion  was
another point of interference for surrounding states: various Islamist factions were already in the
1990s financially supported by Saudi Arabia or Iran (McDowall 2004, p. 380). The first bigger
Islamist parliamentary faction in the 1990s appeared when various political Islamic groups joined
the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan (IMK) (ibid.).  IMK’s support was strongest in areas where
PUK,  the  more  liberal  of  the  two  leading  parties,  dominated  and  the  more  conservative  (or
“traditional”) alternatives such as KDP were weak (McDowall 2004, p. 386). Such an area was
found around Slemani. 
IMK had already clashed with PUK around Halabja during the course of the 1990s (McDowall
2004, p. 387). Over time the majority of IMK formed, despite their grievances against the more
secular nationalists, a legitimate actor in KRG’s politics. However, the 2000s saw the emergence of
another faction made up from various more marginal elements of IMK and other Islamist factions,
which  from  the  outset  had  virtually  no  sympathy  for  the  ‘Kurdish  cause’.  The  group  which
ultimately would assume the name Ansar al-Islam were a socio-politically Taleban-esque faction,
allegedly  trained  in  the  war  against  the  Soviet  invasion  of  Afghanistan,  who  were  seeking  to
violently  build  a  form  of  conservative,  “pure”  Islamic  governance  in  Kurdistan.  While  the
leadership  was  Kurdish,  the  Kurdish  ‘Ansars’  who  had  declared  a  jihad  against  the  KRG
establishment were thought to include also non-Kurdish combatants in their ranks. Ansar al-Islam
attacked  Kurdish  politicians,  security  forces,  and  ordinary  civilians  in  the  eastern  parts  of  the
Slemani governorate. (Human Rights Watch 2003; ICG 2003; Yildiz 2007, p. 105.) Their campaign
was crushed by the peshmergas together with US troops, and over the course of the 2000s their
activities inside Kurdistan Region have become more clandestine. Nonetheless, as I will try to show
76 Sufism is a broad and varied group of denominations within Islam, usually organised as brotherhoods, which places
emphasis on mystical experiences and acts which bring the practitioner closer to God.
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in the Chapter 6, their social impact in both Kurdistan Region and the Kurdish diaspora should not
be underestimated.
The  history  of  Kurdistan  Region,  decades  marked  with  poverty  and  violence,  is  thoroughly
embedded in the social realities of contemporary Slemani. The public space is adorned with pictures
of old national heroes and martyrs, and paintings and monuments remembering the suffering of the
Kurds. Portraits of political leaders look over offices and teahouses. Many families have lost their
close ones to either one or many of the wars that have ravaged the region, and an equal number of
families have sent one or many of their kin to safety in Europe. At the same time, many have
returned,  even students  who either  fled as  children or  were  born in  Europe or  the US.  To the
ethnographer, these biographies open in unexpected situations: a taxi driver might say “oh, from
Finland? Is that close to Germany, because my brother fled there?” or a random acquaintance by the
mall could remark “University of Tampere? I know the city, I spent 99 days there”. 
The deep internal  divisions  and the socially shared memory of  struggle  and danger  are  folded
seamlessly into the 2010s, increasingly so because of the continuously uneasy relationship with the
Baghdad government, widespread economic crisis, the brutal civil wars around Iraq and Syria, and
the violence committed against the Kurds by ISIS and other Sunni insurgents. Students in Slemani
make up a  generation  that  was “formed” under  Kurdish rule,  but  they too carry the legacy of
uncertainty which, in spite of the promises of stability and prosperity propelled by the oil fields,
dissolves into another age pervaded by a sense of emergency.
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Picture 4: A shopping centre in Slemani's centre. 
(Photograph by Ville Laakkonen)
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4. The World in Kurdistan: governance and education
What is an ordinary day in Slemani like? I went out to buy some handmade stress beads from one of
the old greyed men sitting by the fence of the big mosque. On the street, I passed by two physically
well-trained, bulky Western men with short-cropped hair. They were wearing Bermuda shorts and
tight, short-sleeved shirts. It was obvious they were military trainers, or “security consultants”. The
Oxfam types (I have seen them around too) would not, in my experience, look like they would excel
at commando training grounds. After a while, in order to escape the scorching heat, I side-stepped
from the main street into the cooling shadows of a teashop for a cup of intensely flavoured, sugary
tea and some bottled water. Standing next to me was a middle-aged Kurdish man in khaki sporting a
blue WHO [The UN agency World Health Organisation] vest. After I had conducted my business
with one of the beads vendors I went to have lunch and got into a conversation with the man
running the kiosk. It turned out he had just fled Syria some months ago. 
Back on the main street it is again fashion boutiques, luxury car dealers, and party offices with
armed guards. The biggest hotels down the street, those hosting businessmen and elites rather than
ordinary vacationing families (or ethnographers), have signs indicating that firearms are prohibited
on their premises. A member of staff outside one of these hotels, holding equipment used to check
under cars for possible bombs, gave me an intense look as I walked past him. Back at my own
accommodation, I was preparing myself to confront the staff about my satellite television problems
and tried to remember what the word for an extension cord would be in Swedish.77
How is the global world-system instantiated in Kurdistan Region? Despite the Kurdish wishes and
dreams to the contrary, Kurdistan Region is still part of the Iraqi state78. Thus, I begin this chapter
by looking at the Iraqi state as a whole79, before moving in closer to Kurdistan, because many of the
things that can be said about Iraq are equally true for the Kurdish regions too. 
77 Excerpt from personal field notes, autumn 2014.
78 Quite a few Western scholars have, already since the 1990s, referred to Kurdistan Region as a ‘de facto state’ (e.g.
Gunter 1993). I feel it is not an easy statement to make, considering the dependence of KRG on the benevolence of
its allies. Nonetheless, after the latest political and military turmoil that has gripped the region, it is interesting to see
how  this  notion  transforms  over  the  next  couple  of  years.  A further  difficulty  with  the  notions  of  state  and
sovereignty  is  offered  by  scholars  who  point  out  that  there  are  numerous  recognised  states  whose  level  of
sovereignty defies the very concept of being sovereign, such as Andorra, Kosovo, and Vatican (e.g. Caspersen 2012,
pp. 3–6).
79 It is not, however, within the scope of this study to elaborate on ethnographic realities outside Kurdistan Region. For
an account of the chaos and uncertainty as it  is experienced elsewhere in Iraq see for example Al-Mohammad
(2012), Al-Mohammad & Peluso (2012) and Juntunen (2011).
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In 2005 Eric Herring and Glen Rangwala posited that 'the Iraqi state is not representing Iraq in a
globalising world: it is representing the globalising world in Iraq.' (Herring & Rangwala 2005, p.
667). Writing shortly after the CPA (Coalition Provisional Authority, established by the US after the
destruction of the Ba’athist regime) ceded power to the Iraqi Interim Government in 2004, they
argued that post-war debt and foreign reconstruction funds, trans-border informal trade, and local
Iraqi  socio-economic  configurations  had  shaped  (and  continued  to  shape)  a  very  particular,  if
contingent, globalised neoliberal economy (Herring & Rangwala 2005). A key term for Herring and
Rangwala in understanding this  dynamic is  ‘imperial  globalisation’.  On the one hand, the term
makes an explicit reference to the role of the United States as an empire-like entity80, highlighting
the fact that the US not only effectively invaded Iraq but later also had a hand (together with global
institutions  such  as  the  IMF)  in  selecting  the  appropriate  Iraqi  representatives  in  local
administration, not to mention that a majority of contracts in reconstruction (security, infrastructure,
logistics, construction et cetera) were picked up by American companies or transnational companies
with major American stakeholders (ibid.). On the other hand, however, it can be seen to describe the
flows of  the  capital  itself  as  well  as  the  practices  of  non-state  powerbrokers,  the  transnational
economic  elites,  who transcend nation-state  borders  and retain  privatised  control  over  the  vast
majority of global profits.
However, as Herring and Rangwala rightly point out, looking at the US involvement alone would
not help us to fully appreciate the circumstances in post-Ba’athist Iraq. They write about ‘decentred
globalisation’ to refer to all those different actors which shape the socio-economic reality of Iraq
(and Kurdistan Region) from below: trans-border informal trade, extra-state networks, transnational
organisations, other states81, and local companies and workers. (ibid.) These forms of trade, both
legal and extra-legal,  are particularly important when looking at any conflict  zones, as Carolyn
Nordstrom (2004; 2009), when talking about ‘shadow economies’, has thoroughly argued.
I would argue that Herring and Rangwala’s notion, that the state is representing the world in Iraq
and not the other way around, holds equally true some ten years later. Rather than focus on what the
US foreign policy doctrines do or have done, one should look at the larger constellations of different
80 Whether the US actually is an empire is a source of quite a long-standing debate that cuts across political doctrines
in a sense that while leftist and other anti-globalisation movements (and other anti-systemic movements, to use the
Wallersteinian concept) have accused US politicians and companies of imperialism, similarly neoliberal politicians
and commentators have celebrated the US “empire”, and in some cases urged the US administration to exercise its
“imperial powers” more globally. For an analysis of the empire argument as well as the US foreign policy, see for
example David Harvey (2005), and for a critique of the concepts of 'empire' and 'imperialism' in the contemporary
global context Dan O’Meara (2006). I personally refrain from using the term ‘imperialism’ (or ‘new imperialism’)
due to its potential for anachronisms (in relation to, say, the British or Roman Empires), and because its analytical
and descriptive dimensions are fairly limited.
81 Apart from the Global North, especially Iraq’s neighbours Iran, Syria, Turkey, Jordan, and obviously the Gulf States.
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actors and processes. It is considerably more fruitful to consider how, in spite of the Iraq’s Shi’ite
regime’s  emboldened  and  increasingly  authoritarian  policies,  various  foreign  state  apparatuses,
motivated by the global capitalist world-economy of transnational companies and elites, extra-state
trade networks, and international governing and advisory bodies, condition the contemporary Iraqi
political  life,  and  without  doubt  continue  to  do  so  in  the  foreseeable  future.  The  situation  in
Kurdistan Region is in many ways very similar, despite its relative internal stability. How did this
reality came into being, especially in the view of the workings of the world-system?
4.1 Global trade, global governance
“If you want to change the [political] system, you're forced to leave.”
A recent public university graduate
It is perhaps reasonable to suggest that the US-led invasion to Iraq was primarily motivated by the
need to guard the interests of the core in the oil-rich region and countering the anti-US influence
fostered  by  both  Iraq  and  the  neighbouring  Iran.  The  Ba’athist  state  had,  despite  the  heavy
sanctions, risen back to its feet by the early 2000s, and centred even more on its president and his
coterie. (Tripp 2007, pp. 259–270.) After the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime and armed forces, the
international community, led by the US and the British, sought to implant all the pillars of liberal
democratic rule in Iraq: the rule of law, the principles of good governance, and an all-inclusive
central administration with remarkable amount of reconstruction funds at its disposal. 
The background against which this new dawn for the peoples of Iraq was to be realised was not
given too much thought: a state which was artificial since the beginning. Little actual consideration
was given to  decades  of  violent  totalitarian  rule  in  which  also foreign  states  had  interfered  in
different ways.  In hindsight it  is  easy to say that members of the coalition,  as well  as various
international  organisations,  did not understand the nature of the different  and separate  societies
within  Iraq,  forcibly  knit  together  by fear,  which  were  largely  “tribalised”  in  a  sense  that  the
claustrophobia of the Ba’athist state had led to people turning more and more to social groupings
they could identify with and networks they could trust82. As will be discussed later in this chapter,
for the Kurds this factional reality meant family and political party networks above anything else.
82 Tripp (2007, pp. 259–267) argues that the core of the Ba’athist regime, Saddam Hussein’s coterie, was itself in fact a
‘shadow state’, which functioned both inside and outside of the formal state structures and was motivated by both
personal loyalty and fear of President Hussein’s retribution.
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Post-Ba’athist reintegration
The KRG, much to the annoyance of many others in the region, managed to secure a considerable
amount  of  power  to  itself  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Ba’athist  regime’s  fall.  As  the  new  central
government was established after successive ‘provisional’ and ‘interim’ governing bodies, both the
Iraqi president and the foreign minister were prominent Kurdish politicians, PUK’s founder and
leader Jalal Talabani83 and KDP veteran Hoshyar Zebari respectively. The peshmergas attained a
legitimate status as formal armed forces while their duties were reserved exclusively to protecting
the Kurds or Kurdish-controlled areas. KRG leadership got ultimately into a position where no
major constitutional decisions could be made without their consent. To an extent, the situation was,
as was noted a few years ago, that the ‘erstwhile kings of the mountains, Iraqi Kurdish parties have
become kingmakers in Baghdad’ (Hiltermann 2008, p. 6).
Military strategy aside,  there is  another  dimension to  the Global  North – Kurdish cooperation.
When analysing the ‘liberal peace’; connections between development agencies, humanitarian aid,
conflict resolution, and military involvement in the ‘new wars’, Mark R. Duffield has noted that
over the last few decades regional and internal conflicts have come to dominate, instead of wars
between nation-states. At the same time, the relationship between conflict and poverty has become
the  central  focus  of  development  and  security  discourses.  Furthermore,  as  the  result  of  the
reinvention of development as conflict resolution, the ‘poor’ (or those framed as poor), erstwhile
proxies in the wars of the Cold War, have been increasingly incorporated as strategic allies in the
projects to transform entire societies. (2001, pp. 113–135). I would argue that as much as internal
and external violence in Iraq prior to 2003 invasion, especially during the 1980s and 1990s, was
already very much a ‘new war’, the Kurdistan Region as a more or less separate and economically
struggling region of Iraq represents the ‘poor’ in Duffield’s sense of the word. More importantly,
while people in other conflict zones and under different totalitarian regimes might be compelled to
follow leaders the Global North (i.e. the core in world-systems’ terms) sees unfit or out of line
(ibid.),  the  Kurdistan  Front’s  leadership,  once  rugged  nationalist  idealists,  had  already  been
cultivated in  the lobbying circles  of  Europe and the US,  and yet  remained popular  among the
Kurdish population. In other words, the Kurds were an ideal ally for building a new (neo)liberal
Iraq.
83 To this day, the largely ceremonial post of the president of Iraq is reserved for the Kurds. Current Iraqi president is
Mam Jalal’s (‘Uncle Jalal’, as he is known in Slemani) fellow PUK member Fuad Massum, who has previously
served in several prominent positions within both the KRG and the post-Saddam Hussein Iraqi administration.
46
However, I would argue that Kurdistan Region’s integration as a separate entity to the world-system
did not begin with the fall of Saddam Hussein. First of all, as Bozarslan (2014) notes, the majority
of wars and upheavals since 1979 in the region have had direct impact on Kurdish realities too.
These  wars  have  always  had something  to  do  with  the  global  world-economy,  in  one  way or
another. Secondly, the integration’s grass roots foundations were laid in the 1990s, not only over the
course of the political warm-up to war, but also during the sanctions, trade embargo, as well as the
Oil-for-Food program. 
To survive economically, individuals and communities, as well as the political party structures, were
often forced to  engage in  smuggling and cross-border  trade.  Unregulated or black-market trade
exceeded formal economy in importance and volume by 1996 (McDowall 2004, p. 392). If,  as
Michiel  Leezenberg  (2005,  pp.  635–636)  argues  following  Charles  Tilly  (1986),  the  difference
between states and criminal gangs is ‘not in what they are doing, but in whether they are perceived
as having the right to do it’, then something along the same lines can be said of legal or regulated
and  extra-legal  or  unregulated  trade.  As  Nordstrom (2004)  notes,  the  “extra”  in  extra-legal  is
difficult  to  point  out  anyway,  when  conflict  zones  connect  everything  from  medical  trade  or
weapons manufacturing to the markets of raw natural resources and electronics, and often at one
point or another perfectly legal businesses84. I would argue that the effects, in terms of the capitalist
world-economy, are quite similarin both cases: the vast majority of the profits go to the elites, and a
sufficient  amount  of  people  in  various  cadre  and  middle  class  positions  benefit  economically
enough  to  lend their  support  to  the  system.  Equally,  those  in  less  advantageous  positions  feel
compelled to engage in identical activities, for instance Yildiz (2007, p. 75) notes that during the
1990s, as Baghdad deliberately offered a higher price for wheat than KRG, many local Kurdish
farmers actually smuggled their crops southward.
In Kurdistan Region, many of the elites who controlled the cross-border trade and illegal smuggling
of oil are still in power. For example, KDP is said to have received most of the revenues coming
from extra-legal  trade  across  the  border  to  Turkey  (e.g.  McDowall  2004,  pp.  389–390),  with
President Barzani’s nephew and current KRG prime minister Nechirvan Barzani being in control of
the black market oil revenues (Leezenberg 2005, p. 638). It is important to remember, however, that
the extra-legal, or “shadowy” trade did not come into being out of low ethical standards or greed,
but rather as a necessity. For instance Kurdistan’s, and probably the whole Iraq’s, only billionaire
84 The case of European and US companies’ connection to Iraq’s chemical weapons program would be a good example
in Kurdistan Region’s case.
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Faruk Rasool85,  founder  of AsiaCell,  laid  the foundations of his  telecommunications  empire by
smuggling cell phones to Kurdistan at the time when Saddam Hussein had banned them altogether
(Cuadros 2013). The point is,  instead, that in the post-World War I era this type of economical
arrangement was the first time when the Kurds in Iraq were conducting major scale trade separately
from the central government, and that the same leaders, as well as very much the same structures,
are still in place. 
How does the world-system, specifically as it  is  operated from the core,  function in Kurdistan
Region? Mariellaa Pandolfi  (2010, p.  155) argues that Western involvement in the Balkans has
transformed  from  ‘temporary  state  of  intervention’  (to  prevent  genocide)  to  a  condition  of
‘permanent  transition’,  where  the  terms  ‘emergency’  and  ‘long-term’  are  not  contradictory
apparatuses. She writes: 
‘[t]he emergency, the need to act now, −punishing the bad guys and aiding the victims− produces a
state of exception that entails the partial abrogation of strategic, economic, and moral standards.
From  communism  to  liberalism,  from  war  to  peace,  from  ethnic-religious  conflict  to
cosmopolitanism,  in  an  endless  permutation  of  violence,  where  once  emergency roamed,  now
postemergency and permanent transition dwell.’ (ibid.)
The  actors  within  a  'state  of  emergency',  a  collective  of  transnational  and,  oddly  enough,
“sovereign” actors in itself within an otherwise sovereign geographical location (in Paldolfi’s case
Bosnia and Kosovo, in my case Kurdistan Region), can only legitimately reproduce and exert their
influence over matters as long as the emergency persists. This is established through a chain of
micro-emergencies, for instance individual military operations and humanitarian operations, where
the transnational security and humanitarian apparatus (Duffield’s ‘liberal peace’, also referred to
these days as ‘conflict management’) has a specific toolkit for each occasion (Pandolfi 2010). These
mechanisms are evident in Kurdistan Region. It began with a humanitarian intervention (‘Operation
Safe Haven’), transformed into a military cooperation (‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’), and gradually
dissolved into hundreds of reconstruction and aid projects. Obviously, there has been the need for
international organisations, transnational companies, NGOs, and external states to be involved in
Kurdistan Region. The point I am trying to make here is that we can establish a pattern in the terms
and timing of their involvement, where the infusion of global economic and geopolitical concerns
85 Faruk  Rasool,  from  Slemani,  is  a  well-known  Kurdish  self-made  man.  According  to  his  company’s  website
(http://www.farukholding.com),  he  controls  numerous  businesses  in  diverse  fields  such  as  telecommunications,
construction, cement and steel industry, real estate, pharmaceuticals and car trading. He is also member of the board
of trustees at the American University of Iraq, Slemani.
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can be explicated. At the same time, freedom from the authoritarian and genocidal centralist regime
has  been  transformed  into  a  continuous  state  of  emergency.  This  is  a  point  which  is  seldom
considered in connection to Southern Kurdistan. 
It is interesting, that with the current stage of crisis in Iraq, the international community has been
vocal in its vows to preserve Iraq’s ‘territorial integrity’. It is the same political stance which has
been proclaimed continuously since the 1980s. Contradictorily, in spite of a state apparatus which
has been hostile to the interests and goals of the US and its allies, Iraq has been nevertheless the
centre  of  the  Global  North’s  power  in  the  Middle  East.  Saddam Hussein  was  a  threat  which
legitimised the presence of US troops in the Persian Gulf. Later on it was sectarian brutality and
post-invasion terror which guaranteed the need for international community’s involvement. Most
recently  the  civil  war  in  Syria  and  the  subsequent  rise  of  ISIS  have  strengthened  these  same
concerns. I would argue that ironically it is precisely those forces which are framed to threat Iraqi
states’ territorial integrity, most importantly sectarianism and separatism, which are actually this
integrity’s  only  guarantee.  A major  point  in  Pandolfi’s  (2010)  argument  is  how  the  political
processes of inclusion and exclusion construct a very particular status for Bosnia and Kosovo. The
same can be said of Kurdistan Region. On the one hand, they are welcomed as an ally, portrayed in
European and US media as the vanguard against terrorism, and on the other hand, they are excluded
from the anti-ISIS coalition’s meetings. States in the Global North open consulates and establish
diplomatic relations with the KRG, arrange trade deals and deliver weapons and ammunition, but
proclaim Iraq’s territorial integrity as the single highest priority. Carrot and stick. The markets for
construction and oil companies, consumer goods, and security and intelligence firms flourish.
In  Kurdistan  Region  at  the  helm  of  its  reintegration  have  been  a  group  of  individuals  and
communities which are embedded in a very particular political networks within the formal political
structures. Interestingly, it would seem like these networks are structurally quite similar, if far less
oppressive and destructive, than what Tripp (2007, pp. 259–267; as referred to above) identified as
the ‘shadow state’ in Iraqi politics during the 1990s and early 2000s. Its economic roots have been
discussed  already,  but  its  political  foundations  and  functions  are  important  here,  because  they
directly relate to the uncertainty and discontent many of my interlocutors felt.
The elites in Kurdistan Region have in many ways been connected to and shaped by party politics.
This is especially the case with KDP and PUK. Organising and operating a resistance movement
obviously required a lot of secrecy in politics, military operations, and financial matters. I would
even argue that it was perhaps the only way to work against the Ba’athist state. Secrecy requires
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trust and this trust was established through networks of party affiliation, kinship, and patronage.
Political power in Kurdistan has traditionally been personified (e.g. Bruinessen 1992; McDowall
2004),  perhaps  due  to  its  marginalised  position,  and  the  already  centralised  party  leadership
(Masoud Barzani  for  KDP and Jalal  Talabani  for  PUK) courted  in  turn with  local  leaders  and
landowners for support. During my fieldwork, my friends would tell me how the political support of
social  groupings  connected  to  a  particular  landowner  or  local  notable  used  to  be  bought  and
bargained for. This history of “buying” chunks of votes rather than persuading individual voters has
further strengthened the corporate and party-political nature of the political sphere. Similarly, an
unemployed fresh graduate complained to me that even when he was applying to a very manual,
low-skilled position, the prospective employer told him to go to negotiatiate the employment at the
local PUK office first. 
Parties, especially KDP and PUK, have thus become sprawling and corporate organisations which
have  a  stake  in  virtually  every  aspect  of  social  and  political  life86.  Structures  of  kinship  and
patronage were folded into the party organisations’ everyday functions. In the shadow of continuous
risk of violent conflict party politics, political ambitions, land use disputes, economics, personal
grievances,  and  nationalist  resistance  became  infused  into  a  very  particular  form  of  social
organisation. (See for example McDowall 2004, pp. 385 – 386.) This historical background has
obvious  implications  for  present-day  Kurdistan  Region.  While  in  the  1990s,  according  to
McDowall’s (2004, p. 380) estimate, merely some 20 percent of Kurds in the region claimed tribal
identity,  certain  families  and  tribal  affiliations  still  carry  weight.  Certain  names,  most  visible
examples  being  Barzani  and  Talabani,  regularly  mark  political  influence.  Political  histories,
especially those connected to party politics, structure governance and the justice system. Market
surplus often flows along these same lines.87
The global  world-system,  its  expansive  nature  and its  actors  at  the  core,  has  for  its  part  been
involved in enforcing this configuration of Kurdish political life. I have already noted how the KDP
and PUK leadership was ideal for cooperation in 2003. I find it crucial how, without anyone barely
noticing, the nationalist Kurdistan Front, mauled by wars and held on a chokehold by surrounding
political regimes, gradually learned an approach to global politics which finally won the trust of the
Global North, most importantly the trust of the US and Great Britain. It is noteworthy how many
successive administrations there have been in the US and Britain, how the Cold War went on until
86 This aspect of higher education is discussed  in detail below.
87 This element of Kurdistan Region’s politics, and its connection to economy and higher education, is analysed later
in connection with the concept of wasta. 
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eventually ending with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and how at the same time the KDP and
PUK leaderships have remained the same.
The Kurdish elites of the “old world” have been accompanied by the elites of the new neoliberal
markets, but often these two are the same, or at least their relationship to one another is remarkably
symbiotic. Landownership and extra-legal cross-border trade have been replaced by media empires,
oil industry, and construction businesses. Political parties control the majority of the media outlets
and run their  administrations more or  less like they did decades  ago.  Interestingly,  the centrist
liberal Gorran, which for many of my student acquaintances heralded a current of change in its anti-
corruption program, was actually formed by politicians who split from PUK (which in turn split
from  the  KDP  in  the  1970s).  The  party  leader,  Nawshirwan  Mustafa,  is  an  old  peshmerga
commander and ex-member of the PUK political bureau who took the political battle to where it
was actually waged: he formed what is  now one of the major media corporations in Kurdistan
Region, the Wusha Corporation.
The Kurdish elites have become entrenched in a continuous state of emergency and uncertainty. The
sense of emergency persists, only the face its has been replaced by terrorism, refugee crisis, and oil
markets. The Kurdish elites have changed their mountain enclaves to palaces and military training
has moved from hidden camps to massive barracks and academies. Centralist, heavily bureaucratic
administration is in many respects mimetic to the one imposed on society during the Ba’athist era.
Political  dissent  is  only begrudgingly tolerated.  Credible  alternatives  are  difficult  to  formulate,
when the very foundations of the fragile autonomy seem to be under attack at all times. But as
Nordstrom (2004; 2009) points out, conflict and war are also beneficial to some. This is also where
the line between legal and illegal, as well as local and global, becomes blurred. Locally there are
social  groupings  which benefit  from the  enterprise  which the need for  either  reconstruction or
protection generates. Globally, somewhere, someone has to manufacture the highly sophisticated
weaponry,  medical  supplies,  and  technologies  which  the  state  of  emergency  requires.  These
products have to be marketed and transported and they, in turn, support enterprises somewhere else.
These interconnections are what Nordstrom (2009) calls ‘fault lines’, flowing from the epicentre of
conflict along political, economic, and ethical relations and interests.
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Oil
A big catalyst for Kurdistan’s integration is obviously oil. After the World War I it was of major
interest to the British (e.g. McDowall 2004, p. 135; 143) and the oil-rich Mosul vilayet had been a
main point of contention for the British and the Turkish (McDowall 2004, p. 143). As King notes
(2008, p. 330), oil was a deciding factor as new states were drawn on the map after the World War I.
It  also continued to do so after the independence of the Iraqi state. Similarly,  it  has carried on
playing a major political  role throughout the 20th century.  In the aftermath of the 2003 war, as
Kurdistan Region became formally acknowledged as a largely autonomous region within the Iraqi
federation, numerous foreign oil companies have flocked into the Kurdish lands and made several
new discoveries. Oil is important here, not only because it is obviously one of the elements which
has facilitated a good number of social upheavals as well as military catastrophes in and around
Kurdistan Region, but because it is of particular relevance in connection with the question why
Kurdistan is a periphery. 
A good number of works by social scientists from different theoretical focuses I make reference to
in  this  study88 point  out  directly  or  indirectly  that  in  the  global  world-economy communities,
societies  or  nations  rarely achieve  prosperity  or  stability  due  to  their  “inherent”  and  “natural”
“industriousness”  or  “innovativeness”,  but  rather  by  virtue  of  their  relative  position  in  the
overarching relations of global power, hierarchy, and economic dominance. Therefore, in spite of its
oil reserves, Kurdistan Region has relatively little say in global matters. Generally looking at the
world-system,  economist  Samir  Amin  has  made  some  interesting  observations,  which  can  be
applied to understanding Kurdistan Region’s position too. According to Amin (2014, pp. 4–5), the
core  (or  ‘centre’ in  his  words)  maintain  their  dominant  position  through  five  monopolies:  (I)
technological  monopoly,  (II)  control  over  the  worldwide  financial  markets,  (III)  monopolistic
access to planet’s natural resources, (IV) media and communication monopoly, and (V) monopoly
over the weapons of mass destruction. Thus, states and their transnational economic elites which
dominate the world-system are the states which can afford to spend in technological superiority
(including military technology), and by and large control how and where global capital can flow.
The  core  successfully  claims  access  to  natural  resources  everywhere  around  the  world  while
limiting the level of their exploitation for others. Power over media and communication guarantees
that these institutions can be manipulated. Finally, there are the weapons of mass destruction (partly
connected with technology) over which, despite of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, still the US
88 It is obvious in the works within the world-system paradigm such as Amin (2000 & 2014) and Wallerstein (1974a &
2004), but also discernible from writings on institutionalised violence and inequality (e.g. Bourgois 2009; Farmer
2004; Graber 2012) as well as historiography about Kurdistan (e.g. McDowall 2004; Hardi 2013).
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and its allies retain effective control. As Amin notes (2000, pp. 601–602; 2014, p. 5), these five
monopolies effectively deter industrialising, or newly reintegrating, societies from attaining a more
central position or developing core-like production. Such ‘development’ would be threatening to the
world-system’s balance of power based on the existing axial division of labour.
It is apparent that what Kurdistan Region does not possess, despite the tendency towards further
industrialisation and KRG's commitment to alliance89 with states at the core, is the actual access to
any of these Amin’s five monopolies. The region is, however, very much connected to the aims and
needs of the core states. This fact was exemplified by the speed with which international assistance
was mobilised in the Global North as ISIS’s combatants came within only tens of kilometres from
the capital Hewler. Another point is that the peshmerga forces undeniably needed the assistance,
too, as, despite their status as the formal armed forces of the region, the majority of their military
technology was largely at the same level it used to be during the guerrilla war against Saddam
Hussein’s regime, a detail which brings us straight back to the monopolies I and V outlined by
Amin.
In the world-economy oil, together with some other raw natural resources, is the only commodity
exported out of Kurdistan Region. In many parts of the Kurdish-controlled areas infrastructure such
as  roads  are  in  a  great  condition  in  the  proximity  of  the  oil  production  facilities  while  the
dominantly agricultural or rural parts are still in a state of neglect. Notwithstanding wheat and few
locally  consumed  agricultural  products,  virtually  everything  is  imported.  A look  at  shops  in
Slemani, from corner kiosks and bazaar to shopping malls, is telling: cheese from Saudi Arabia,
toiletries  from United Arab Emirates,  nuts  and kernels  from Lebanon,  olives  and cement  from
Turkey, cars from Japan and the US, the list goes on. The same goes for technology. Some of the
students that attended a group interview I held joked “you make them, we use them – that's the
problem”90, as we were comparing our mobile phones and I took out my old Finnish Nokia. Once
again, looking at oil is revealing: as the region has no technology to refine the oil pumped out of its
soil,  it  is  by and large  impossible  to  monopolise  the  production  even relatively,  which  further
89 I use the term 'alliance' deliberately, but carefully. I base my use of the term first and foremost on fact that in 2003
peshmergas and US forces carried out military operations together as a part of the US-led coalitions northern front.
Similarly, and perhaps as much as a sign of quilt because of what happened in the previous decades as an act of
gratitude (and to prevent the “war within a war”), the US administration was willing to support Kurdish aspirations
over the NATO member Turkey’s political interests, as well as Kurdish claims in the formation of the new Iraqi
administration. Gratitude, or alliance, has its limits nonetheless. The most recent event to cast doubt on this alliance
is the fact that the Kurds were excluded from the anti-ISIS coalition meeting which took place in January 2015 in
London (see Kurdistan Region Presidency January 22, 2015). Incidentally, Turkey, which is internationally criticised
for its unwillingness to join the fight against ISIS, was invited. It would seem like the Kurdish–US alliance, if it
ultimately is an alliance at all, is one of those alliances where one party stands to gain more than the other.
90 A rather  perceptive  remark,  considering  that  power  relations  and  economic  hierarchies  are  elementary  in  the
manufacture and trade in technology too. This is something that is still rarely considered. (E.g. Hornborg 2014).
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enforces the region’s production’s confinement into a peripheral position in the capitalist world-
system. 
Nonetheless, there have been attempts by the Kurdish government to improve the region’s relative
position in the world-economy. Especially since the 2010s the distribution of oil revenues has been
a point of fierce debate between the KRG and the Iraqi central government as Kurdish authorities
increasingly  began  to  export  oil  drilled  in  the  region  directly  through  Turkish  ports.  Iraqi
government objected and claimed the practice to be unconstitutional, that all revenues should be
centrally administered through Baghdad. It also threatened foreign companies who did not abide by
its will. (See for example The Chemical Engineer July 2012 & February 2013.) 
The year 2014 saw the oil debate intensifying with an increasingly international focus. Over the
course of my fieldwork, the issue was fiercely debated in the Iraqi parliament, with news about
Baghdad threatening foreign companies and states with lawsuits seemingly appearing daily. At the
same  time  tankers  loaded  with  KRG  oil  were  stuck  on  the  seas,  as  their  legal  status  was
internationally disputed.  Baghdad had already withheld KRG’s share of the federal  budget  and
public sector struggled to pay its employees’ salaries. During my first trip to Slemani, the region
was yet to have a new parliament as the negotiations had been in a virtual deadlock since the
September 2013 elections, which further increased the angriness and the uncertainty caused by the
delay of salaries. People seemed to be tired of the very nature of local political processes, yet at the
same time  they were  ready to  jump into  heated  conversations  about  politics  at  every possible
opportunity. The everyday rumour mill was overheating: someone had heard the peshmergas would
be receiving their salaries next, others were betting on the civil servants at one of the ministries.
Before my arrival in late March, Slemani had already seen strikes by the Teacher’s Union (Kurd Net
February 3, 2014a) and the public hospital staff (Millet Press January 17, 2014). In general the
feelings towards the whole crisis were ambiguous, as the following discussion I had with a few
students shows:
Man 1: Because  we do not  live  in  our  own home [an independent  state],  our  leaders
wouldn't like to hand in the revenues to the Iraqi government. I mean, why would you give
up something that’s yours? You know, I'm just trying to understand why this has happened.
On the other hand, the Iraqi government gave our share,  the 17 percent,  and now they
stopped everything all of a sudden. Why would we have to share with them but not the
other way around?
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Man 2: You have to make decisions. If you are with the Iraqi government you have to be
straight with them and send all the revenues to the Iraqi government. Then you’ll your get
your share, the 17 percent. And, if you decide that you’re not with the Iraqi government, let
us then be properly separated…
Man 3: And then our government shouldn’t expect money from them either.
Man 2: …yeah, don’t take money from them either.
Man 4: I think one argument is that why would we give them money if it goes to Iran
anyway [a  reference to  Baghdad’s  Shi’ite  leaders’ presumed connections  to  the  Iranian
authorities]?
Woman 1: One of the reasons for all the shady dealings is that from the 17 percent the
KRG should get, they [Iraqi government] send yearly about 10 percent. They always try to
find some reasons to cut our share of the budget. And in return our leaders do the same. But
none of them, I guess, actually want this kind of a conflict. Instead, they’re are all victims
from their own point of view.
The conversation above highlights several aspects of the discussions and interviews I would have
with the students. First is the deep mistrust, with Baghdad, on the one hand, and KRG, on the other.
Second is the acknowledgement of foreign interference, real or imagined, into both Kurdish and
Iraqi affairs. Thirdly, nobody would propose a practical solution to the problem – it was as if they
felt they had no part in the governance of KRG or Iraq anyway91.
4.2 Higher education
“I began my studies without knowing anything about my subject. It was just my fate.”
A third year public university student
91 The most radical of my acquaintances would, lowering their voice, even confess that nothing short of a revolution
would ever bring them back to politics.
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The higher education system in many parts of Iraq was relatively good for a long time, until it
collapsed  during  its  isolation.  This  erosion  can  be  attributed  to  two  major  elements:  Saddam
Hussein’s Ba’athist administration and the international sanctions regime. (E.g. Kaghed & Dezaye
2009). After 2003 a considerable amount of resources has been directed in Kurdistan Region to
revive, and recreate, its education system. Over the course of last 5–10 years a good number of new
campuses and universities have been established, and similarly old campuses have received major
investments in facilities and computer technology. University studies are also supported financially
by  the  KRG.  The  Regional  administration,  especially  the  Ministry  of  Higher  Education  and
Scientific Research, has facilitated several international conferences and needs assessments, which
have  resulted  in  systems  which  aim  at  the  implementation  of  international  quality  assurance
strategies and auditing. With conferences in London, needs assessment conducted by the University
of Exeter92, and the establishment of private universities such as American Universities in Slemani
and Dohuk, the reconstruction of Kurdistan Region’s higher education has received considerable
support and direction from the Anglo-American academia. (ibid.) Notable KRG politicians have
played  an  important  role  too:  Nechirvan  Barzani,  the  current  prime  minister  of  KRG,  has  for
example supported the Exeter Centre for Kurdish Studies by providing scholarships, and he was
behind the establishment of University of Kurdistan-Hawler (Whitney 2008, p.  56).  His cousin
Masrour  is  the  chairman of  the  board  of  trustees  at  the  American  University  in  Dohuk,  while
veteran  PUK politician  and former  prime minister  (and former  deputy prime minister  of  Iraq)
Barham Salih holds a similar position at the American University in Slemani.
According to one of the university lecturers I was acquainted with, many of the changes have been
positive. Facilities and teaching resources had improved. Some of the quality assurance strategies
sought to redress issues which were really problematic, such as the fact that there had been no
incentives  to  academic  work  (for  instance  academic  merits,  workload,  or  publishing  were  not
compensated  financially),  which  had  resulted  in  many  lecturers  feeling  completely  indifferent
towards their work. I got the feeling that the higher education system’s interconnectedness with the
political structures still resulted in shady practices regarding publishing and tenure appointments,
but my friend told me that there was a points-based system to monitor university staff for example
in terms research publications, public appearances, and conference attendance. 
92 University of  Exeter  also has  Centre  for  Kurdish Studies.  Its  initial  funding was provided by Ibrahim Ahmad
Foundation, charity established by the poet and politician Ibrahim Ahmad’s family. (e.g. University of Exeter Centre
for Kurdish Studies Website) Ibrahim Ahmad was one of the founders of PUK. His daughter Hero is the wife of
PUK leader and former Iraqi president Jalal Talabani.
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To appreciate the scale of these transformations, and the possible ambiguities they entail, we have
to look at how the situation unravelled according to the students’ own experience. One important
thing  is  to  consider  what  the  gaps  between them and their  parents  are.  While  the  “old  guard”
currently in  power received their  schooling in a very good, established academic surroundings,
where global student movements,  intellectual debates and arts were observed to a much higher
degree, the present-day students had been born during the double-sanctions as the citizens of an
entity which was not even formally recognised. For example, I was told that since the 1990s there
was little education in languages (and very few would want to study Arabic, for instance – a stance
that is still very much alive). There is a noticeable gap between the “old guard” who grew up at the
heyday of international student activism and the new generation who are educated in a system that
has to be virtually reconstructed from the scratch. On the other hand, majority of the students in
public universities I talked with were the first in their family to attend higher education. If any of
their parents had been to university, it would be the fathers so for the female students it was even a
bigger change.
Students valued the new knowledge they could learn, a point which is very important in regard to
their relationship to religion, as I will be discussing later. Yet, they noted with some agony how the
resources  to  study,  gain  knowledge,  and  ultimately  realise  their  potential  were  still  unevenly
distributed. The most striking difference was between students at private universities and public
universities.  During  group interviews  and  private  conversations,  the  private  university  students
remained a lot more optimistic. Granted, they perceived corruption around them, and especially
those who had moved in from elsewhere (for instance Europe, or Baghdad) might consider life in
Slemani to be dull and restricted. Nevertheless, they often had a vision of how they could contribute
in the society and displayed a lot less uncertainty about their future. On the other hand, many of the
public university students I  talked with, while they were as perceptive as their  peers at  private
universities,  remained  pessimistic  about  their  future,  and  noticeably  angrier  about  the  current
situation in the region. While private university students often had access to textbooks and used for
example  Moodle  and  Turnitin93 routinely,  public  university  students  could  sometimes  only get
photocopies  of  lecture  notes.  It  is  interesting  that  when  religious  piety  and  the  need  for  the
protection of morals were asserted, it was done by students from public universities, even if there
were religious students in private universities too.
As I will discuss later, the students at public universities were placed in various universities and
departments according to their  baccalaureate  marks.  This was a harsh game,  where the usually
93  Moodle is an online learning platform and Turnitin is a plagiarism detection software.
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malleable social  structures once again became those administered by the opaque centralist  state
bureaucracy.  As  I  talked  with  a  group  of  students  majoring  in  finance  and  economics  related
subjects, it turned out very few of them had actually wanted to pursue this particular academic path.
A woman told me “it was compulsory. The government assigned me. You see, I would’ve loved to
study Kurdish  language  and  literature  instead.”  Another  woman  chimed  in  by  saying  that  the
department  and the  course  had  been  her  seventh  choice  (students  generally  had  to  list  fifteen
choices in their application) but “as you can see, here I am. I’m trying to adjust to the thought but
not quite feeling comfortable.  I’ve been working for long in a completely different field,  but I
figured that I needed a backup plan, something that I can rely on if I lose my job, some kind of a
certificate.”
In fact, students had already made an important choice which would define their possibilities in
terms of pursuing an academic degree. On their tenth year in school students in Kurdistan Region
have to choose between natural sciences or humanities specialisation. Those who went for the latter
would basically be exempt from any natural sciences degrees at the later stage, while those within
the natural  sciences background could in  theory choose from a lot  wider spectrum of possible
university courses. Obviously, this would have further implications later in terms of employment
and also restrict further postgraduate study choices in the public university system. To me it looked
like that while the public sector was committed to offer a certain amount of jobs to fresh graduates,
it  was  done  with  a  very  particular  system  of  educational  engineering  which  fashioned  very
particular types of obedient subjects to future civil service. Two students enforced this perception. A
man told me in a particularly fatalistic manner that “luck defines your fate. If you have a problem
with  your  baccalaureates,  then  everything's  gone.  You  know,  you're  gonna  lose  a  lot  of
opportunities, because your student record and your marks define who you are and what are your
choices.” A female student said her dream had always been to study medicine, but “I waited and
waited, and ultimately got nowhere. When I reached twelfth year at school, I got sick and because
of that I got lower grades so I ended up here. I feel okay with what I am doing nowadays, but I’m
still dying to be a medical student.”
One final point I wish to raise here regarding the higher education is the distinct connection it has to
the global world-system. There is a kind of double-ambiguity which is most visible in the private
university business. On the one hand, they have the educational resources the public universities
rarely do, and thus are equally desirable (and useful) to even students who maintain scepticism
towards the level of foreign involvement in Kurdistan Region. Likewise, the involvement of foreign
educational industry is desirable to the KRG administration, because such entrepreneurs without
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doubt  both help in reconstructing a  credible  educational  system and form links to international
organisations and companies. Foreign lecturers may well sincerely care for their students, and see
their  work  as  something  resembling  humanitarian  development  (Whitney 2008  is  an  excellent
example of this approach). 
On the other hand, it is another arena of world-systemic expansion, which reproduces the North-
South dependency structure so strikingly manifest in Kurdistan94. That transnational elites as well as
local  power-holders  are  so  deeply involved in  their  establishment  and functioning  mirrors  this
aspect. The system, which is prevalent in private education but noticeable in public universities as
well,  has  an  inherent  logic  of  market  standardisation  and  measurement,  which  reduces  those
involved into production units: I would hear students stating that they were attending university
only for the degree certificate (an attitude exacerbated in public universities by the fact that they
may have had little choice over their major subjects) as well as lecturers mourning that the system
was just producing degrees and not educating. It is the neoliberal state-led politics of auditing and
accounting,  which imposes the logic and vocabulary of private business administration to areas
which  generally  operate  by  different  premises  and  goals,  such  as  education,  social  service,
healthcare et cetera (see Shore & Wright 2000 in the British context).
94 King argues (2014, p. 170), that the American University of Beirut 'simultaneously taught Arab young people in the
American ways while serving as a focal point for Arab rebellion against Western control'. It is of course possible that
similar twin role is or will be emerging in American universities in Kurdistan Region. 
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Picture 5: A lecture hall at the Dukan Technical Institute 
(Photograph by Ville Laakkonen)
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5. Burning certificates: studying in uncertainty
Why are so many problems today perceived as  problems of intolerance,  rather  than as
problems of inequality, exploitation or injustice?95
Given the history of the region, what are the conditions of studying in Slemani and the Kurdistan
Region in general? The question quoted above, and proposed by Slavoj  Žižek, has wide-reaching
implications, also in the context of Kurdistan Region and the whole Middle East. His answer is that
the concept of culture has been operationalised and politicised to account for a variety of social
phenomena, especially violence, instead of seeking to identify and redress their actual, often socio-
economic,  roots.  Political  differences  are  naturalised  and  neutralised  into  ‘cultural’ differences.
(Žižek 2008, p. 119) Similarly, what I observed on Slemani’s campuses, namely dissent and anger
which are sometimes expressed in the tendency for religious self-fashioning and reform, are not
created  by a  generational  gap  (the  “ungrateful”  and “spoiled”  youth  versus  their  hard-working
parents) or the effect of radical religious institutions, but rather result from a very particular social
reality  where  different  configurations  of  power,  hierarchies,  economy,  culture  and  religion  are
present. Likewise, that some students have formed a religious conviction which goes against the
mainstream  Kurdish  (and  Western)  sentiment  has  more  to  do  with  the  histories  and  the
circumstances I have outlined in the previous chapters than with some “nature” of Islam or the
Middle East. 
In  my  opinion,  what  characterises  the  student  experience  (especially  those  trained  in  public
universities) in Slemani best is the all-pervasive sense of uncertainty and emergency. It is a sense of
the limits and dangers, actual or potential, by which the students orient and reorient towards their
future. This sense operates on three interconnected levels: uncertainty about the economic situation
(both  personally and regionally),  uncertainty caused by  violence (both  internal  and external  to
Kurdistan), and finally uncertainty about one’s status in the social surroundings the students inhabit.
My central argument is that this sense of uncertainty and emergency, together with a perception that
the local socio-political structures have not met the students’ expectations, catalyse an exploration
into new socio-cultural forms of taking control of the adverse circumstances. One of these forms is
religiosity which, by connecting with global religious flows and debates, transcends the local and
95  Slavoj Žižek Violence: six sideways reflections (2008, p. 119).
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paves way for subjectivity which simultaneously constructs both a sovereignty  in the globalised
world and a meaningful interaction with it.
5.1 Economic uncertainty
For  all  of  us,  in  my  opinion,  the  standards  of  living  are  much  more  important  than
following your aspirations. Personally, I sacrificed my preferences to get something I could
live on.
A third year business student
Economic  uncertainty  is  caused  by several  factors.  As  mentioned  before,  the  dispute  over  oil
revenues between Kurdistan Regional Government and the central Iraqi government in Baghdad led
to the latter  freezing Kurdistan Region’s share of the country’s federal budget.  Effectively,  this
meant  that  a  lot  of  the  public  services  faced  severe  economic  difficulties  and  public  sector
employees (constituting a vast majority of Kurdistan’s workforce: civil servants, teachers, lecturers,
law enforcers, health care professionals et cetera) were soon without their salaries. During my first
visit in March–April public sector could afford to pay salaries approximately every two months. On
my second field trip in September–October the salaries were paid only every three months. KRG
was struggling to pay its employees and offer work to fresh graduates, many already married in
their early 20s. The situation was exacerbated by the war against ISIS, which had begun by the time
of my second fieldtrip, and the well over a million displaced people from Iraq and Syria who sought
refuge within KRG’s borders.
In April 2014, during the provincial election campaigns and at the time of my first stay in Slemani,
fifty frustrated university graduates burned their degree certificates in the town of Halabja around
an hour’s drive away. Interviewed by KNNC (April 10, 2014a), the graduates’ spokespersons stated
they would burn their voter cards next, and if their demands were not met, they threatened to torch
their identity cards and passports too. The protest was their way of saying “we are nothing to the
government,  we have  no future”.  The strongly symbolic  act  was carried  out  to  protest  against
favouritism and partiality perceived to be exercised by government officials in charge of human
resources  and  recruitment  in  the  public  sector.  According  to  the  protesters,  only  those  with
connctions of the right kind would ever find employment. (ibid.)
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Wasta
It is not, to my understanding, an exaggeration to suggest that the protesting students’ concerns
were  largely  accurate.  Unemployment  is  currently  plaguing  Kurdistan  Region,  and  what  few
graduate entry-level jobs there are in the public sector, they seem to be often allocated along the
lines of a system of patronage networks particular to Kurdistan Region, called wasta96. Wasta could
be interpreted as a parallel to patron–client networks traditionally held as characteristic of Middle
Eastern cultures. It could also be compared to blat, an ‘economy of favours’ prevalent in Soviet and
post-Soviet surroundings (Ledeneva 1998). Mostly, and often by Kurds themselves97, it is simply
referred to as nepotism and corruption. To illustrate wasta in practice, let me recount an anecdote I
heard and recorded in my field notes:
As new residence complexes are being built, a system of reservations is set up for people wishing to
move in once the constructions are finished. To retain their rights to the flats, prospective residents
pay monthly a certain sum of money, often hundreds of US dollars. It is not uncommon, however,
that the schedule set for the construction project will be delayed. Sometimes there might be genuine
hardships, as one might expect in such volatile surroundings, but other times the construction plans
may have been too ambitious since the beginning, or other times the whole project has been set up
simply to siphon off funding for some other endeavor, business or personal. 
A man in his late thirties had been paying for a flat under construction for quite some time. The flat
was supposed to be the future home for him and his family and the construction project was way
behind schedule. He confronted the constructor about the delay and the constructor said the time set
in the contract meant the days actually spent working at the site and holidays were not included. The
man  was  not  satisfied  with  the  explanation  and  went  on  to  file  a  complaint  at  the  official
administering  such  construction  projects.  The  government  official  who  happened  to  be  an
acquaintance of the constructor (perhaps related through marriage), and without doubt subsidised
his low salary with payments resulting from good construction deals, said that indeed holidays are
excluded from the set timeframe. The man added, too, that in fact whatever delay there was had
taken place because of last season’s bad weather which prevented the work from carrying on. The
family never moved to the flat.
96 The word itself,  wasta, is Arabic but several of my Kurdish friends used it as they would use the term Daesh for
ISIS.
97 Many of my interlocutors complained about rampant corruption. Often the students I talked with claimed it was one
of the biggest obstacles in Kurdistan Region’s growth towards a higher degree of stability.  This statement, and
explicitly in reference to wasta, was echoed by a number of professionals (academics, engineers) I was acquainted
with.
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Yet,  dismissing  wasta simply  as  corruption  would  not  appreciate  its  depth  and  functioning  in
Kurdistan Region’s social life. Though not using the term wasta, Diane E. King (2014) has written
rather extensively about the patronage networks in Kurdistan Region. While her experiences are
often from rural Kurdistan, and thus paint a distinctly different picture of Kurdish society, some of
her  arguments  are  important  to  my  analysis  as  well.  To  King,  characteristic  of  patron-client
networks in Kurdistan is how social life is structured around seeking both patronage and clientele. It
results in a network where every man98 has at least one person whose influence and resources he can
count on as well as one or more individuals who are relying on his own generosity and capability in
turn. Individuals also seek favours from their patrons exclusively to be able to provide favours for
their own clients. New relations of patronage are actively sought after at the same time as already
existing  ones  are  more  or  less  regularly  cultivated.  (ibid.).  According  to  King,  patron-client
networks are an extension, and one of the major features, of Kurdish social life which she calls
'connecting'. In Kurdistan people 'connect', locally and globally,  through for example patronage,
kinship,  gender  and  politics,  and  invest  considerably  in  maintaining  and  building  these  social
connections. (ibid. pp. 7–8). 
The  issue  I  have  with  King’s  characterisation  is  that,  as  I  mentioned  above,  her  undeniably
impressive fieldwork experience spanning decades  is  drawn mostly from rural  areas  and small
towns. Take patrilineal descent, for example: the educated city-dwellers I got to know in Slemani,
and many of them had been in the ’cultural capital’ for generations, were not particularly inclined to
evoke  a  patrilineal  ancestor  eight  generations  away.  While  cultivating  social  relations  was  of
extreme importance, they did not follow Ernest Gellner’s “tribalist” notions such as ’segmentary
alliances’ (1989; 1990).  Instead,  people I  was acquainted with generally had far more practical
reasons for ”connecting” outside their closest living kin. It is a point which can be derived from
Bruinessen’s analysis (2002) too, that affiliations in Kurdistan, while no doubt engendered by tribal
or  patrilineal  relations  far  more  often  than  in  many other  contexts99,  are  in  practice  on  many
occasions  based  mostly  on  mutual  social,  economic  or  political  interests  than  some  kind  of
primordial  descent. In order to appreciate the workings of power in Kurdistan Region, I would
suggest that instead of flashy anthropological categories such as tribe or segment we are better off
thinking in terms of influential families like the Kennedys or Bushes of the USA or old aristocrat
and industrialist families in Finland100. As far as student life goes, if there is an aspect of descent
98 For King the patron-client relationships are to a degree an extension of the patriliny. However, in my experience
women are not ultimately exempt from wasta practices, even if they often become involved primarily through male
relatives.
99 The categorisations of ”tribes” in Sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, have been justifiably criticised in anthropology
(among other disciplines) over the last few decades (e.g. Bruinessen 2002).
100 It has to be stated here that Kurdistan Region is nonetheless a patrilineal society, tracing descent along the male
lineage. For example, as a friend of mine was late for our meeting he apologised and said he was held up because his
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which structures the social life of urban academia, it is one pertaining to family with its filial limits
rather than the tribe as such. 
Another point to consider in connection with wasta is raised by Caroline Humphrey in her analysis
of favours in (mostly) Post-Soviet surroundings (2012). Her argument is that a favour is not a type
of  exchange,  but  works  independently of  the  economy of  markets.  It  includes  a  dimension of
morality – an element of gratuitousness and the act of choosing a specific person to receive the
favour. As it renders everyone involved significant, favour transforms both the person performing it
and the person receiving it. While favours, much like  wasta in Kurdistan Region, are carried out
among  family and friends,  the  act  actually  also  transforms individuals  into  ‘kin’ and 'friends’.
Favour becomes a source of self-worth. (ibid. pp. 22–23). I would argue, too, that patron-client
relationships and networks of favours in Kurdistan are not about exchanges as such, though they
often assume the task of structuring economic activities, but instead operate on a more profound
level of the social fabric. During my stays in Slemani, every time I sat for tea or a meal, my hosts
were adamant in their decision of paying the bill. Good manners and hospitality, perhaps, but more
importantly it was a way to affirm and transform our relationship to one another.
It is true that corruption and nepotism are wide-spread in Kurdistan Region, and individuals also
employ wasta for prospective economic gain. However, I am tempted to suggest that it is often the
other  way around – instead,  in  order  to  retain  a  face  of  benevolence,  it  is  the  cold  economic
calculation  that  is  disguised  as  favours.  Often  my  interlocutors  would,  despite  deriding  one
particular form of “favouritism”, readily engage in another. It was perfectly possible that a person
would dismiss employment processes as corrupt, but shortly after note that if he had a problem with
the authorities he would call one of his uncles to sort it out. Wasta is not only corruption and neither
it is a survival strategy, even if it at times takes the form of one, but rather (I) a way to build and
maintain social relations, and (II) a way to do things in a more convenient, personalised way. Many
times wasta seems to be just a courtesy, a way of acknowledging the uniqueness of whoever one is
interacting with, and sometimes it does moderate and smooth transactions. It is when it is crashing
with the reality of the markets, the sprawling corporate political parties and the unequal North-
South trade relations conditioning the socio-political spaces that it becomes the vehicle for nepotism
and greed.
“sister’s husband had just  had a child”.  Furthermore, as noted in Chapter 4, there is  an undeniable element of
“tribalism” in the ways how elites and the processes of elite-formation function.
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Opportunities
Not being able to navigate successfully in the patronage networks was far from being the only thing
worrying  students  and  fresh  graduates.  Another  important  matter  was  the  disparities  among
different configurations of social and economic capital the students possessed. Or, as one of my
friends, a university lecturer, simply put it: the inequality of opportunities. For reasons outlined in
Chapters  3  and  4,  both  the  history  and  the  present  stage  of  higher  education  is  remarkably
tumultuous. Personal, educational, and economic backgrounds play a considerable role in shaping
the  students’ futures.  Many primary and secondary schools  did little  to  teach anything but  the
rudimentary skills, much to the students’ disappointment. People with whom I brought this topic up,
both students and members of academic staff alike, thought that there was a significant amount of
catching  up  to  do  at  the  beginning  of  university  studies101.  Whether  students’ parents  valued
education, or could afford it, was important too. 
Also,  being  accepted to  university in  the first  place  was a  challenge to  some.  In principle  the
admissions are based on baccalaureate marks: the higher marks you receive at your final exams, the
more choice you have in where to study. Based on these marks the government allocated applicants
to different courses and universities and, thus, someone who had dreamed of studying fine arts at
the University of Slemani might find him- or herself stuck with management and finance at a lower
tier rural university. Or one might be sent off to Hewler for studies. I did also hear stories (which I
had no time to corroborate) where the applicant’s family’s political background might be a factor in
the admissions process, and prospective students with parents active in oppositional groups might
be offered places in more remote institutions. The private universities offered more autonomy (and
generally better studying resources) but charged tuition fees which, despite scholarship programs
being offered, not everyone could afford102.  Furthermore, the choice between public and private
university affected student’s career prospects: I was told many times that the public sector refused
to hire private university graduates while the private sector recruited almost exclusively from the
pool of private university graduates103.
101 For instance, a foreign lecturer at a private university said the students had in the beginning struggled with essay
assignments, complaining that they did not know what was required of them, because they had been used to simple
correct and wrong answers. Similarly, a school teacher, a relatively recent English graduate from a public university
I met, cynically observed: “I can’t speak English, and I’m supposed to teach them how to do it.”
102 Interestingly, at least in the case of American University of Iraq in Slemani (AUIS), the sum of tuition fees, too,
depended on the applicant’s baccalaureate scores. 
103 There are a number of reasons for this. For instance, many private university such as AUIS and KUST used English
as the language of instruction and used the same software (in the case of finance, for instance) that would be used in
the industry while most public universities, despite the fact that some campus areas were excellent, could generally
only afford lecture notes and photo-copied articles. On the other hand, the public sector is also legally obliged to
provide a certain amount of jobs specifically for its graduates.
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An example to illustrate this friction: on my second trip in autumn, I met with a male student from a
public university I had been acquainted with in spring. He had finished his degree in an economics
subject with high marks, spoke good English and had work experience under his belt, but was now
struggling to find employment. He had an on and off part-time job in a field which was completely
outside of economics and finance, and which earned him less than a hundred US dollars per month.
As we were on a  piazza through the city’s new centre he told me about his classmate,  another
student I had met in the spring. This man, now another public university top graduate, had managed
to land a job in the oil sector – as a driver employed by one of the Western companies. A stark
contrast to the situation of these two men was offered by a man I originally got to know when he
studied in a business-related field at  a private university.  He had already garnered considerable
work experience while studying and upon graduation he had got a job instantly in the oil industry.
As we sat drinking five dollar coffees in a cafeteria popular among the private university students
and urban middle class he mentioned he was pursuing a career switch to a post within a certain
international NGO. He said he could afford the slight decrease in his salary, because the job was
personally more meaningful.
5.2 Violence and uncertainty
As we were nearing the airport we entered a buffer zone and continued on a road lined with blast
walls. We would not be stopped for a while though (“at this point they only check cars which don’t
have Kurdistan license plates”, my friend told me). After threading (what at least felt like) several
kilometres among roadblocks made from concrete, passing by a number of Asayish [gendarmes]
armed with assault rifles (some of them wearing balaclavas),  we finally arrived at a checkpoint
where passengers  got  out  of  the  cars  and continued on foot  for  a  few metres  while  cars  were
checked with dogs for possible explosives. To get to where I am now [the gate from where the flight
will leave] I went through security checks with metal detectors three times and had my passport
inspected  three  times.  I  was  photographed  and  fingerprinted,  and  my  passport  was  carefully
examined with UV light. I did not have to open my bags, which is probably because one could tell
from a kilometre away that I was European.104
As I have argued, and hopefully proved already to some extent, life-worlds in Kurdistan Region are
in  many respects  conditioned by violence.  The students  are  not  an  exception  to  this.  It  is  not
violence of one single type or source, such as the Ba’athist Republican Guard or more recently ISIS,
104 Personal field notes spring 2014.
67
but violence as an all-encompassing experience. It is violence internal and external to the society,
and violence as sudden bursts as well as social structures. At the same time, it is violence of the
past, and violence of the present. Violence, as I am studying it, consists also of both acts and results.
And finally, violence also joins different locations and social realities together.
The first element of uncertainty connected with violence is obviously the impact of violence of the
past, of the present, and of the future has on the social imaginary105. As Giorgio Agamben (1993, p.
96)  has  noted,  the  modern  concept  of  time  is  rectilinear,  homogenous,  and  abstracted  from
experience. In most cases, the same applies to the act of writing or recounting history,  and my
outline of the Kurdistan Region's past in previous chapters obviously, too, risks painting a picture of
this kind of history. However, time and history are experienced (ibid. p. 91), and the experiences of
violence, and the sense of uncertainty they engender, challenge this notion of rectilinearity. 
It  would seem like in  the moments we come face to  face with violence,  or  the potentiality of
violence, time and history flow back and forth106. The rhetorical references to Anfal in the midst of
economic pressure imposed by the Baghdad government (Chapter 3) are an expression of this on a
larger societal level. The violence of the 1980s, the poverty, uncertainty, and polarising civil war of
the 1990s as well as the war of the 2000s configure a present loaded with expectations of further
conflict or unrest. Such conditions have been elaborated in Indian context by Veena Das, who notes
how, in the aftermath of PM Indira Gandhi's assassination in 1984 bloody protests against Sikhs
were further fuelled by wild rumours circulated among the Hindu population. The veracity of these
rumours was validated by past experiences (such as the 1947 partition riots). (2007, pp. 108–133).
Henrik Vigh identifies in some ways similar processes as 'negative potentiality' (2011): that people
anticipate violence to manifest in a present 'that is pregnant with negative processes, forces, and
figures' (ibid. p. 94). My experience of the social imaginary of Kurdistan Region is in many cases
similar to Vigh's experiences of Bissau and Belfast. The government's policies are known, and more
importantly,  expected  to be corrupt.  The public university system is similarly known, and often
expected, to be rife with nepotism and arbitrariness. The Arab 'other' singularly, and Baghdad107
collectively, are seen as potential oppressors. Vigh characterises this as 'hyper-vigilance', a state of
being alert at all times and looking for signs of trouble. It is created by constantly reconfigured and
105 By 'social imaginary', I refer to what Henrik Vigh (2006, p. 483) has defined as 'the way in which we comprehend
the unfolding of our social terrain and our position and possibilities of movement in it.' Social imaginary 'designates
our understanding of our society's movement through space and time and our formation as social categories created
and defined within this perceived spatio-temporal development.' (ibid.)
106 See also Eric J. Haanstad's (2009) discussion of violence and temporality.
107 To a degree also the Kurdish ministers, and especially MPs, seem to share this perception of Baghdad's negative
potentiality.
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disrupted political processes and short lived power formations and it persists even during a period
of peace with seemingly established parties, institutions and allegiances. Hyper-vigilance leads to
the world becoming 'hyper-signified'. (Vigh 2011, p. 98). A closely parallel state can, I would argue,
be  observed  especially  among  many  of  the  public  university  students  of  Slemani.  It  is  a
contradictory state of disbelief bordering nihilism accompanied by a passion for social protest in
equal measures, of being always on the lookout for signs of further unrest or political failure.
The second element of uncertainty engendered by violence is constituted by the various forms of
violence to be experienced. It is related to the concept of negative potentiality to a degree, but at the
same time it extends the social imaginary to actual structures, policies, and global concerns. I will
seek to address this phenomenon here by looking at Phillippe Bourgois' (2009, p. 19) 'Pandora's
Box of Invisible Violence': (I) structural violence, including the political and economic forces, the
international  terms of trade,  and unequal  access to resources,  services,  rights,  and security,  (II)
symbolic violence, which is domination, hierarchies, and internalised insults that are legitimised as
natural  and  deserved,  and  (III)  normalised  violence,  which  includes  institutional  practices,
discourses,  cultural  values,  ideologies,  everyday  interactions,  and  routinised  bureaucracies  that
render violence invisible and produce social indifference.
For Farmer (2004; 2009) structural violence108 is historically rooted global inequality which renders
some people or populations into more a vulnerable position than others, and I largely subscribe to
this view. However, structural violence is also local, and the sites where it manifests in certainly are
so. Bourgois notes (2009, p. 19) that structural violence, despite its invisibility, is shaped by visible
institutions, relations and ideologies such as international trade terms based on unequal markets,
legal and carceral systems, and inequity among genders and other social positions people assume
are cast into. The concept aims at addressing an institutional arrangement which results in physical
or psychological harm to a portion of population, or which limits their freedom (Graeber 2012,
112). 
David Graeber (ibid.), however, puts forward another reading of the same term. What generally is
referred to as 'structural violence' are situations and structures which have violent outcomes, but
instead,  they should  be seen  as  'structures  of  violence'  because  'it  is  only the  constant  fear  of
physical violence that makes them possible, and allows them to have violent effects'. To him for
example racism, sexism or poverty could not exist except in an environment defined by the threat of
physical force. (ibid. pp. 112–113). This leads him to conclude that structural violence is structures
108 As referred to by Graeber (2012) the term 'structural violence' was originally coined by Johan Galtung (1969).
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backed up by the threat of force and coercion, rather than simply structures which produce harmful
or violent outcomes. (ibid.)
The concept of symbolic violence, the second type of invisible violence in Bourgois' analysis, was
originally developed by Pierre Bourdieu (e.g. 2001). It is essentially a mechanism by which the
dominated or marginalised naturalise the status quo and blame themselves for their domination.
According  to  Bourgois,  symbolic  violence  occurs  through  a  process  of  misrecognition,  as  the
socially dominated  come to believe  that  hierarchies  which limit  their  possibilities  are  'accurate
representations of who they are, what they deserve, and how the world has to be' (Bourgois 2009, p.
19).  Normalised  violence,  institutional  practices,  beliefs,  norms,  and  everyday interactions,  are
observable  for  example  in  institutional  tolerance  towards  violence  against  women  or  poor
healthcare. It is the social production of indifference towards brutality and inequality (ibid. p. 20).
Violence in practice
How do these aspects and forms of violence that engender uncertainty appear in contemporary
Kurdistan Region? First, I will address symbolic and normalised violence which will, however, be
analysed  in  more  detail  below when  discussing  uncertainty  in  relation  to  social  status.  I  was
surprised during my fieldwork how some (not all of them, by any means) of my interlocutors would
speak  of  Kurdish  culture  as  backward  and  introverted.  This  was  especially  the  case  in  group
interviews, when some of those of more secular outlook elaborated on the effects of globalisation
and new technologies positively as something which would force Kurdish culture to change. Having
said that, statements which followed similar logic, even if they were quite the opposite in substance,
would be made by some of the most religiously devout students. In my experience, while the more
religious held that popular culture with music videos was destructive to moral tradition, they also
found pristine Islam through religious websites (“it simply depends on how you use the internet” as
one my interlocutors said), a conviction they felt the Kurdish society had lost but with which they
themselves were now being reconnected. 
Both discourses outlined above, which seem to be in conflict  with the high level of nationalist
sentiment found around the region, reveal an underlying effect of symbolic violence. For long the
Kurds as an ethno-linguistically distinct group have been subordinated, dominated first by two great
empires and then by increasingly centralist authoritarian states where they have been a marginalised
minority (e.g. McDowall 2004; Nezan 1996). In the same way, they have been both subjugated by
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major colonial forces such as the British Empire and caught in the midst of the Cold War and post-
Cold War global power games. In spite of the fact that present-day Kurdistan Region in Iraq is
perhaps the only Kurdish-majority region where Kurdishness is not actively marginalised, a form of
symbolic violence persists: the idea of Kurds as uncivilised people, incompatible with modernity
without external support,  or alternatively as lowly unbelievers of some kind. In short,  the very
portrait painted by dominant Arab, Persian and Turkish administrations. One of the most common
opinions among my acquaintances was that improved access to media and literature in general was
a good thing for any society, not just the Kurds, and it was precisely this access that globalisation
and economic change had granted, and which the previous conditions had not allowed. Still, there
were undeniably also sentiments in which symbolic violence was embedded. When this pervasive
feeling of inadequacy occurred, which was by no means all the time, I would argue it was created in
many ways by the misrecognition of both the historical reality as well as the peripheral experience
of invisibility, where the former justified the latter109. 
There are two more apt, and relatively common, discourses marked by symbolic violence. First of
all, during the flights between Finland and Kurdistan Region, when I would talk about my trip with
Kurds permanently residing in Europe, to my surprise people would tell me to be on guard at all
times, because their fellow Kurds would try to cheat me anyway. Notwithstanding my inability to
bargain properly, in reality there were no situations in which I would have been taken for a ride, yet
supposedly “Kurds can't be trusted”, as one gentleman at one of the airports noted. Second of all,
and this is a topic which I am trying to analyse with as much care as possible, another common
form  of  symbolic  violence  concerns  violence  against  women.  I  will  discuss  intimate  partner
violence later in connection with both naturalised violence and uncertainty caused by social status.
Here I would like to only point out that the same kind of logic that designates Kurdish traditions (or
rather, a reified version of various strands of tradition) as the remnants of an uncivilised past is
likewise found in ways how political actors and social activists, as well as some of my interlocutors,
refer to violence against women taking place because of the society's Kurdishness110.
The case of normalised violence is even more complicated. In more than one way it is related to the
question of status I am about to elaborate on below, but a short discussion about the subject is in
order here. This type of violence is exemplified by the proliferation of different (and often heavy
handed) security organisations as well as the partly shadowy carceral system of the region. Another
109 Often I would also encounter situations where this form of symbolic violence, as well as the relative marginalisation
of Kurds, was challenged and turned on its head. It was in bars or other informal surroundings where men would on
many occasions proudly tell me things like “you see we're not Iraqis, we're not killers like the Arabs”. 
110 See Abu-Lughod’s (2011, p. 35) discussion of this phenomena in connection to writers, intellectuals, and activists of
“the East” asserting their progressiveness. 
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aspect relates to values and social norms. Judging by what I have observed, Kurdish culture, in
cities,  and even more so in  “the villages”,  emphasises three things:  family (including extended
family), honour, and loyalty. 
This results in a number of positive, supportive social phenomena. For instance, in the airplane, in
Slemani's  parks  or  streets  or  virtually anywhere in  the public  space people  look after  children
whether they were their own or not. One example of this is how at the airport security control it was
not uncommon to see the guards letting pregnant women or women with small children to skip the
queueing and move past the line. In spite of the sentiment that underlines the rampant corruption of
the region and, as I discussed above, the vigilance towards the negative potentiality of 'others', there
was very little, if any, street violence or theft. Street vendors, even those selling mobile phones or
luxury items, would display their merchandise out in the open without the fear of somebody in the
crowd stealing anything. The same goes for the old men who exchanged money: they would sit by
the street with huge stacks of cash being piled up on top of small drawers or chests. Shopkeepers
could go somewhere during midday and simply leave boxes of beverages or snacks unlocked and
on the pavement. Family ties were cultivated, in some cases the fact that someone had not seen his
mother for about three weeks was a social distance bordering alienation. My fieldwork was made
considerably easier (practically possible in the first place) because of connections my friends would
have, as someone always had a sister's husband, nephew, brother, spouse, or any other relative in
possession  of  something  I  needed,  or  this  relative  happened  to  work  or  study in  this  or  that
institution.
Yet, these values, family, honour, and loyalty, manifest also as instruments of oppression or social
pressure. As Kurdistan Region's recent past shows us, a breach of trust may result in retaliation, and
loyalty may engender violence. As will be analysed below, social life in Slemani is constructed
around  various  norms  and  expectations  of  proper,  honourable  conduct,  as  well  as  obligations
towards one's kin and close ones. This results in configurations of inclusion and exclusion, ways to
penalise improper behaviour, and enforce correct and modest conduct. Values and norms relating to
religion could also cause conflicts. For example, Muslims, which majority of Kurds are in one way
or another, were not (in theory, as I will discuss later) permitted to consume or trade alcohol. Shops
selling alcohol are essentially ran buy either Christians or Yazidis, which creates a kind of “double-
othering” on the whole issue around alcohol. In 2011, following a Friday sermon, riots erupted in
Zakho,  Duhok governorate.  Liquor  stores,  massage parlours and a  tourist  accommodation were
torched. The unrest reached Slemani as well, where a massage parlour was also set on fire. Whether
it was simply religiously motivated, or an extension of a deeper political friction between KDP and
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KIU (Kurdistan Islamic Union) supporters (because, in retaliation, KIU premises were similarly
attacked) remains unclear. (Karim & Saifaddin, December 5, 2011; Asaad December 15, 2011).
Public spaces are often strongly gendered: women are not expected to just walk around on their own
or sit at teashops. Instead their past-time is first and foremost circumscribed to restaurants, shopping
centres, parks (provided they are accompanied by other people, such as friends or family), and in
the most extreme cases to home. Most of the time only married couples are seen to hold hands in
public. I will later offer some examples of both inherent ambiguities and counter-discourses to this
picture of Kurdish social norms, but for now it is sufficient to acknowledge that at times these
norms are violently enforced. Occasions of violence and murder, especially against women, which
are in some weird way facilitated by the present institutional and social conditions are far from
being unknown to Kurdistan Region.
The length at which I have addressed structural violence should not divert our attention away from
the fact that violence is not obviously simply structural or ‘invisible’. Instead, it is very much also
physical and concrete, sometimes predictable and other times abrupt. ISIS, or Daesh, is a real threat
to many Kurds. Likewise, the authorities' violent suppression of 2011 demonstrations against KRG
in  Slemani  governorate,  which  left  ten  people  dead  and  hundreds  wounded,  escaped  nobody's
attention111. Similarly, while some experience police brutality, others join the ranks of the security
apparatus. Violence and conflict also breed further violence, often of a different shape and form. 
I  would  like  to  propose  that  to  make  sense  of  both  direct  and  structural  violence112,  and  the
uncertainty they engender, we also have to, again, look back in time. In Kurdistan Region, not only
the hundreds of thousands of casualties and an even greater number of displaced mounted over the
decades, but also the landscape and the social surroundings constantly remind people of war and
terror. Just to give one example which applies widely to many parts of Kurdistan Region: according
to Almas Heshmati and Nabaz T. Khayyat, only one sixth of the mines laid have been cleared and
between 1991 and 2007 landmines and explosive remnants of war, none of them manufactured in
Kurdistan, have claimed 8 174 victims (including both casualties and those injured) (2013, p. 27).
The anti-mine  NGO coalition  ICBL’s  report,  in  turn,  shows that  in  2013 NGO IKMAA (Iraqi
Kurdistan Mine Action Agency) destroyed 8 108 anti-personnel mines and 323 anti-vehicle mines,
as well as 6 309 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) from an area of just 4.32 km² (ICBL October
29, 2014). As David Henig (2002) notes, mines, shrapnel and other types of military waste not only
111 See for example Kurd Net (February 17, 2014).
112 I am referring to structural violence here in its both understandings, as discussed by Farmer and Graeber above.
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pose a threat to health in the areas afflicted, but also construct a very particular configuration of
memory and spatial orientation. Shrapnel and mines ‘belong to no-one, and yet to everyone’ (ibid.
p. 23). Obviously, majority of my acquaintances were from the city area, and thus lived free of
minefields  (which  naturally resided in  the  border  areas  of  the  governorate),  but  another  active
reminder of past and present violence pervaded Slemani thoroughly: the security apparatus.
As  I  mentioned  in  Chapter  3,  historically  Kurdistan  has  consisted  of  several  fiefdoms  or
principalities/emirates  where  notables  and  leaders  obviously  had  their  own troops.  During  the
course of the 20th century, the struggle against the authoritarian and centralist state apparatus lead to
the creation of the peshmergas, an irregular guerilla force, who carried on fighting the Ba’athist
regime until the latter’s disposal in 2003. As I have also noted in Chapter 3, the Kurdistan Front’s
peshmergas were both supported,  and at  times opposed, by tribal and village militias or armed
troops led by other charismatic leaders such as Sufi sheikhs. I believe it is justifiable to argue that
this tradition of armed struggle and threat of lethal force met in 2003 a new social and political
reality when the Kurdish troops had an internationally recognised entity to protect (the southern
border KRG shares with the rest of Iraq, however, was and remains disputed). 
Quite understandably, considering that Kurdistan Region's autonomy was not perceived positively
around the region and the civil war raging elsewhere in Iraq113, over the course of the last ten years
or so the size and the pervasive nature of the security apparatus has grown. In addition to police,
Asayish,  and  peshmerga,  several  other  intelligence  and  counter-terrorism  agencies  are  also
operating within the region. King has observed how the amount of firearms seen on the streets has
decreased over the last few years114, indicating the growth of the modern state’s power (2014, p.
219). The modern state has, at least ideally, a ‘lock on legitimate use of violence’ which renders
non-state violence illegal. She also notes that the KRG has assumed a considerably larger role in
security than either it or the Iraqi government did earlier. (ibid. p. 220). I was once going to one of
Slemani’s public parks with a friend of mine, a student at the University of Slemani, as we walked
past a group of five policemen. My friend’s notion was telling: “Before there was agriculture, but
now there's just the police! Everyone here is police, peshmerga, Asayish115... You know, there's like
ten  different  names for  the  security forces.  And in the  occasion  that  people don’t  work in  the
security, they're government officials.”
113 Indeed, while such incidents were practically unheard of for years until late 2013, bombings did occur previously
within Kurdistan’s borders too.
114 This is easy to believe. I personally saw only twice any armed guards without uniform of some sort (basically police
or Asayish).
115 The Asayish are the gendarmerie and security services responsible for internal security.
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The nature of this security apparatus is ambiguous, not least because there are still actually two
separate apparatuses functioning in the region. The internal political division which erupted into a
civil  war  in  1994  also  separated  the  administrative  sphere  of  KRG into  two  different  parallel
governments. This is reflected in the contemporary arrangement where the governorates of Duhok
and Hewler are for a large part under KDP’s control and the Slemani governorate is controlled by
PUK. While the formal political representation today is a lot more colourful, especially with Gorran
now drawing a lot of PUK votes and pushing the latter to opposition, on the ground level a lot of the
administration,  including the  security  forces,  is  centred  on  the  two traditional  parties116.  While
nominally upholding order and protecting the Kurdish society against the threats of terrorism (both
home-brewed and external), like in the 1990s they do at times act as an extension of both party
political interests and patron-client loyalties. While King’s notion about the state power is certainly
true, I would suggest there is another point which should be considered – that the state, when trying
to accommodate to its separate position in the global world-economy, has actually incorporated a lot
of  “non-state”  roles  and  practices,  such  as  wasta networks  and  local  strongmen,  within  its
repertoire. In other words, where ordinary men used to be carrying guns for protection now these
guns are accompanied by an officially sanctioned uniform. An outgrowth of this is that security
forces do occasionally for example also “police” free speech and political dissent, as police and
counter-terrorism agents are known to harass or attack journalists117 critical of the KRG.
One of my non-Kurdish acquaintances noted to me that “people here give up some of their freedom
in exchange for safety”. Later in the evening I began to think that the remark actually carried far
more depth than I had initially thought. The historical trajectories, successive decades of violence
and the threat of even more violence, have resulted in a social imaginary revolving around security
and continuous emergency, which is fed by the immanence of terror and brutality that has engulfed
the  rest  of  Iraq.  It  manifests  in  cold-blooded  policing  of  Kurdistan  Region's  borders,  violent
personal  or  factional  rivalry,  and crackdowns of  independent  media  and other  forms of  voiced
dissidence, acts which are carried out with the same ease as one buys a pack of roasted sunflower
seeds from a street vendor. 
116 An example to illustrate this in practice: as ISIS began its bloodiest assault in Iraq during the summer of 2014, it was
the peshmergas of PUK that moved in to take the hold of Kirkuk. The Shingal tragedy that made headlines across
the Global North too, when initially tens of thousands of Yazidis were besieged by ISIS on Mount Shingal without
food or water, was in turn a major blow for the KDP who was responsible for the peshmergas who had left their post
in the city of Shingal.
117 Abuse, even murders, of journalists have taken place in suspicious circumstances, and often with impunity (e.g.
Namo Abdulla April 22, 2014; Human Rights Watch February 10, 2013). A famous case is that of Sardasht Osman,
an independent Hewler journalist who had criticised nepotism and corruption within the government several times.
After he had published a satirical poem about changing his life by marrying President Barzani’s daughter, Osman
disappeared from Hewler only to be found shot in Mosul a day later, outside formal KRG borders. To everyone's
surprise, official government investigation concluded that Osman was in fact in contact with Ansar al-Islam who had
killed him. (E.g. Reporters Without Borders May 4, 2012; Committee to Protect Journalists May 5, 2010).
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It is a social reality rife with Vigh's negative potentiality – the same kind of vigilance which makes
students  mistrust  the  political  process  or  the  administration  of  higher  education  that  consumes
members of the political bureaus who fought for years to get to where they are now. Similarly, men
and women who joined the police or the Asayish, perhaps because of willingness to serve their
society,  due to loyalty,  or simply to find any kind of employment,  did not do so to be able to
legitimately crack down political opposition, but rather end up acting on this hypersensitive form of
vigilance. It is a very particular social reality of a society regenerating its wounds, resulting from
impunity,  terror,  and  inequality,  both  locally  and  globally.  In  some  respects,  it  is  a  situation
unsettlingly similar to Michael Taussig's 'spaces of death' which 'blend into a common pool of key
signifiers binding the transforming culture of the conquerer with that of the conquered' (Taussig
1991, p. 5).
5.3 Uncertainty of status
“It's not in the city. That's why they still behave like villagers.”
A public university graduate commenting on a rural university
One of the most personal, and contradictory, aspect of uncertainty in the student’s lives was created
by concerns about one's social status. This is obviously connected to both economy and violence,
but in certain respects also goes further. A person's, in this case a student's, status is engendered
through  various  practices  and  expectations  connected  with  socio-economic  auspiciousness,  the
successful  observance  of  social  obligations,  and  honourable  conduct.  Status  in  Slemani  is
constructed and maintained in the eyes of different social groupings such as peers, family, and the
society, which may often have mutually incompatible expectations.
Work
One telling example concerns the display of wealth analysed below in Chapter 6, which seems to
me to be directly connected with a person's perception of status (“I have done this well in life”).
Many of the even slightly older people (30 years and above) criticised the urban youth of being
obsessed about prestige, which was indicated by flashy consumer goods and “international” style. I
was also told that the youth were picky about what jobs were good enough for them, and that work
such as waste management was below their self-proclaimed standards. As will be elaborated in the
next chapter, the students themselves would voice similar kinds of criticisms towards what they
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perceived as an overtly materialistic way of life. A friend of mine noted, with a hint of irony (and
intended or not, accompanied by a nod towards the economic relations between North and South as
much as at the inversion of symbolic violence in Kurdish-Arab relations), that “when we Kurds
travel to Europe we do whatever work we can find, cleaning, services and so on. But at home we
refuse to do those. It's the Arabs and others who have to do it.”118
However, some of my acquaintances would protest that their families and their social surroundings
did not for example consider service work to be “real work” either119. It was as if one could not earn
a proper living, or support oneself or one's family honourably by collecting rubbish or bowing to
anyone. As unemployment among fresh graduates was currently a major issue in Kurdistan Region,
status related to work, and for men also related to the capability to support oneself or a family
financially, became a highly pressing and ambiguous matter in many of the conversations I would
have with students  and recent  graduates in  Slemani.  On the one hand,  my acquaintances  were
largely  from lower  and  upper  middle  class  backgrounds,  and  sought  to  assert  this  position  in
contrast to the Kurdish society of the past decades, or they felt angry that they could not achieve
what their class position and education should entitle them to. On the other hand, I would argue that
refusing  one  type  of  work  was  also  about  resistance,  dignity,  and  sovereignty.  That  Kurds
collectively would refuse work such as rubbish collecting specifically in Kurdistan Region, but not
in other locations, was also about national sovereignty: “this is our land”.
Talking about others
The proper,  honourable conduct,  as  discussed  above in  relation to  normalised  violence,  is  also
central  to the production of status. Through behaviour and signifiers such as clothing in public
spaces, this honourable conduct is connected to the visible display and embodiment of status. On
the other hand, status is produced and altered through the invisible, by laws requiring men to be
present for example when a woman gets her passport (King 2014, p. 109), but also by rumours,
gossip, and reputation. These dimensions of status are the most important in relation to gender and
118 Two important  things can be  discerned  from this  statement.  First  of  all,  service  work,  even if  poorly paid by
European standards, is a much better source of income than similar jobs in Kurdistan Region. Second of all, to my
understanding Kurds in Europe, while identifying with the city or neighbourhood they live in (such as “Londoners”
or “Tampere-born”), define themselves often as Kurds and not Finns or British in terms of national identity. This
relates also to the complex configurations of ethnicity, social capital, otherness, and marginalisation. I cannot go into
the dynamics of  class and ethnicity here,  but  will  note that  in Kurdistan Region the Kurds occupy an entirely
different social position, that of a majority.
119 Indeed, the number of ethnic Kurds working in the services industry around the city centre was proportionally low.
When they did, it was often jobs where a level of prestige was involved, such as security, or better hotels, shopping
centres and fashion boutiques catering to the middle and upper middle classes, as well as the numerous foreigners in
the region.  
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the concepts of modesty and sexual honour by which it is constructed. A female acquaintance of
mine had studied at the University of Slemani, but at another campus which was located outside of
the city in a smaller more rural town. She explained questions about modesty and honour in practice
to me in the following way:
“Most  of them [inhabitants of the more rural  town],  they are close-minded. They don't
accept those students who come from the outside. They couldn't understand what kind of
parents would let their daughter go to another town for studying, and doubted if I am a
good, modest person. Very few of their own children studied in Slemani, because most of
them wouldn't allow their girls to go away on their own.  And this applies especially to the
girls. While the boys are free to go wherever they want, the girls are not. They were not
allowed to hang in the town, they just came to the college and went straight back home
after  the  lectures.  No parks  or  cafes,  just  to  college  and back,  and that's  all.  It's  quite
different here. As I told you I covered [wore a headscarf] during my time there. And if I go
there now, I will cover again, because they met me like that in the first place. If they meet
me like this, they'll be surprised and they go like “why isn't she covered, why?”” 
Honour seems to me to be the amalgamation of modesty, decency and trustworthiness. Honour is
also connected to family: on the one hand a person is not supposed to bring his or her family to
shame and on the  other  hand,  family is  supposed to  look after  their  children  and kin.  As  my
acquaintance shows above, what honour exactly entails varies from community to community and
family to  family  (“if  I  go  there  now,  I  will  cover  again”).  The  fundamental  sentiment  that  is
described in the example above is that women especially were expected to be modest and well-
behaved. Even if many of my interlocutors would not see the headscarf as any indication of honour,
good manners, or religiosity, they certainly perceived the surrounding society often to be doing so
(actually, one female student felt obliged to explain to me “I don't wear hijab, but I do love God and
pray regularly”). What is apparent in the quote below, however, is that honourable conduct was also
expected of men. Status, whether in regard to honourable behaviour or for example wealth, also had
to be safeguarded. This was one of the motivators for “proper” conduct. A friend of mine told me
once, anxiously, that “rumours are absolutely the worst thing about our society”. The same woman
quoted at length above explained rumours on campus like this:
“Yeah, there's rumours everywhere. We don't talk about ourselves, as a society, we talk
about each other. “Why is she sitting like that? She should sit like this” “He drinks a lot, he
shouldn't  drink like that.”  “Oh that  girl's  sitting here.”  We talk about  others,  not  about
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ourselves. We talk about the non-important things. And at the university, I'm talking about
my university obviously,  and I  hate  it  because of this...  [Laughs]  I  mean I  have many
friends  there  who  are  open-minded,  but  many  other  people  are  just  gossiping.  But  in
Slemani  it's  somehow a  lot  freer  than  where  I  studied.  People can kind of  sit  and eat
wherever they like, even at lectures.”120
In my experience looking at and talking about others has a two dimensions. On the one hand, as my
interlocutor above stated, people were gossiping and talking about others while, in theory, it was
most likely none of their business, but on the other hand, my acquaintances were often also telling
me about events through other people. Very rarely would anyone tell me for example how they had
found their wives or husbands, but would be happy to enlighten me about how other people had
done it. Expressions like “well, some people are...” or “people always...” were far more common
when we were talking about themes relating to status. It was another strategy to direct attention
away from oneself. And I would not press my interlocutors to do it in any other way.
Defending honour
I often went to this one bar to go through day’s field notes and observe the “different” kind of
Slemani: one with Western music videos, loud hip hop, open consumption of alcohol, and guest
workers. Tonight something exceptional happened. A couple, a man and a woman in their early
twenties, came in. It was the first  time I had ever seen a Kurdish woman in a bar.  Even more
exceptional was that they were not married, the man introduced the woman to me as his girlfriend (a
word  rarely  used  in  Kurdistan  Region,  where  romantic  involvement  was  usually  confined  to
formalised relations such as ‘husband’, ‘wife’ and ‘fiancé’ or ‘fiancée’). It turned out they lived in
Europe. Men in the bar were staring at the couple, especially at the woman. All of a sudden the man
noticed that someone took a photograph of his girlfriend. After a short shouting match the situation
was about to escalate to a brawl, and the bouncer of the bar had to intervene. The man who had
taken the photograph was escorted out together with his friends, still shouting.121
I have argued above that spatial mobility (“who can go where”) and proper, honourable conduct
(“who can do what”) were, together with success in studies and employment, the major sources of
status for the students (and to a degree for all social groupings in Slemani). Contradictory to some
previous scholarly work on the subject (e.g. King 2008, 2014) and a lot of popular culture myths, to
120 In fact, in my experience students at the public universities in Slemani did not sit at lectures any more freely than in
university campuses  outside the  city.  It  might  also be  that  the  students  I  was  in  lecture halls  with were more
conservative than some of my other interlocutors.
121 Personal field notes, spring 2014.
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me it looked like the boundaries of honourable behaviour were not most of the time curtailed or
enforced  by force  as  such  but  by nuanced,  invisible  social  practices  which  rendered  men  and
women who breached those limits as suspicious, unwanted, and dirty – not proper men and women.
One primary concern was over sexual purity. Like in many other regions and societies, in Kurdistan
Region sexual affairs outside marriage are often strictly prohibited. Pre- or extra-marital affairs,
even suspicions of such incidents, can result in serious damage to one's status and even in violent
retribution, on rare occasions of the most extreme kind. This was especially the case for women, but
formally to  men  as  well  despite  the  considerable  leeway they usually  enjoyed  compared  with
women in terms of modesty. 
While men could also be victims of actual violence relating to transgressions on honour, I was
usually  told  it  would  be  the  women  who  bore  the  brunt  of  this  kind  of  violence.  It  is  often
conceptualised in contemporary discourses as honour-based violence, its most extreme form being
what is referred to as “honour killings”, where the honour of a family or lineage is restored by
murdering the woman who caused the loss of honour with her conduct, often by engaging in an
illicit sexual affair. This act of homicide is carried out usually by the woman's father or brothers. In
her survey of “honour killings” King (2008; 2014, pp. 131–137) has come to the conclusion that the
phenomenon  is  observable  in  societies  and  cultural  communities  stretching  from  circum-
Mediterranean to Middle East and South Asia. The key feature for all of these societies is, for her,
patrilineal kinship reckoning122 (2008, pp. 318–319). 
Following  Lila  Abu-Lughod  (2011),  however,  I  propose  another  kind  of  take  on  violence
conceptualised as honour-related, and domestic violence in general. King is probably right to assert
(2008;  2014,  pp.  131–137)  the  relevance  of  agnatic  descent123 in  the  ways  how  honour  is
constructed.  Nonetheless,  her  tendency  to  downplay  the  possible  influence  of  socio-historical
factors and relations of power, and the limits of her own ethnographic account124 come close to
creating a kind of reified version of Kurdish culture, one which is reproduced in its pristine and
primordial form. She offers an interesting description how the purity of women, i.e. the future of a
lineage (men have to be sure that the child is really theirs), became equated with the future of a
nation after  the events  of 1991. Having said that,  what King's  analysis  seems to stop at  is  the
recognition  of  the  patriliny.  The  possibility  of  violence  and terror  creating  a  'culture  of  terror'
122 See also Delaney (1991) to which King makes number of references in relation to honour's connection to patrilineal
descent.
123 On the other hand, the same could be said of the effect of any kind of descent in any kind of social contexts, at any
given time, on any kind of concept of honour. Nonetheless, it is useful to keep in mind that these interrelations do
exist.
124 For instance, a good part of her material she is referring to is collected during or right after the civil war, another
high point of ‘negative potentiality’ in Vigh’s terms.
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(Taussig 1991, pp. 3–36), and that violence against women, too, is contingent on both the socio-
historical context and the present institutional, legal, local, and global social configurations (Abu-
Lughod 2011) are not seriously considered. Neither is the fact that subordination of women does not
seem to be confined to any specific cultural community, but is global instead. It is ironic that, when
King (2008, p. 318) argues that the 'hymen is both a symbolic and real border to membership in the
group' (i.e. the Kurdish nation), Abu-Lughod states, and in no relation to King's thesis, that 'it is a
leap to go from the importance of sexual propriety to the conclusion that women are reduced to
their hymens' (2011, p. 22).
There are also ethnographic reasons why King's analysis seems to me as insufficient. While King
describes that most of her 'female interlocutors who were of childbearing age (but not those younger
or older) seemed to live in constant fear' (King 2008, p. 322) of honour killings, my experiences
among  the  students  were  very  different125.  Some  of  my  interlocutors  did  lament  the  gender
inequality present in the region, and others were afraid of more lax morals. Likewise, many were
proud of the changes that the gender system in Slemani had gone through over the course of last 5–
10 years, while others considered Kurdish culture to be backward in this regard. Gender, sexuality,
and honour were very much present in both private chats and group interviews, but their meanings
were debated and contested, not taken for granted. The excerpt from my field notes quoted at the
beginning of this section illustrates this dynamic character of honour. The man did not think there
was anything transgressive about them being not married or anything exceptional that his girlfriend
was at the bar. Nevertheless, what he objected to was the fact that others were taking photographs of
his girlfriend, and took it to himself to defend her, and his, honour.
In many ways the gender system in Kurdistan Region has somewhat loosened over the last few
years, or at least transformed. There are, however, clearly masculine and feminine roles. One visible
role  structure  is  related  to  work  life.  Women,  who generally  are  assumed  to  take  care  of  the
household  and  cook  at  home  were  almost  never,  according  to  my  observations,  working  in
restaurants or cafes where the staff consisted exclusively of men. The same applied to other low
skilled labour and work where one might get one's  hands dirty,  such as street vendors, bakers,
shopkeepers,  mechanics,  taxi  drivers  and so forth.  Otherwise,  on the  surface,  women could be
working in white-collar jobs and participate in politics. Though heads of departments were mostly
men, women worked at universities as well, and to my knowledge, generally made up the higher
proportion of the student body too. There are women (albeit in smaller numbers) serving in police,
125 King  is  hardly  oblivious  to  the  fact  that  material  she  collected  on  the  field  may  have  limits  in  terms  of
representativeness. She does mention in passing that she 'did get a sense from several women who had previously
lived in the large city of Mosul that they had experienced less fear there than in the towns' (2008, p. 322).
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Asayish and peshmerga forces, a detail which the media in the Global North seems to valorise and
mystify in almost Orientalist fashion, to quote Edward W. Said (2003).
We achieve equally little if we either downplay or over exaggerate the role of the concept of honour
in violence and, while we recognise that domestic violence is a real issue, a more nuanced approach
is  possible.  Equally  so  in  Kurdistan  Region.  Even  more  importantly,  and  this  is  also  an
anthropological concern, when concepts such as gender norms are discussed, there is always a risk
of making the mistake of reifying culture. To quote Abu-Lughod (2011, p. 51): ‘[T]he specifics are
important, and as an anthropologist I must insist that we must go deeply into different systems of
gender, power, and morality if we want to understand interpersonal violence: how it is provoked,
understood, experienced, and regulated’. In reality there is no singular, monolithic “culture” which
all people in a given group would experience, recognise or follow in the same way126. Religious and
cultural practices or moral norms are never perfectly reproduced or adhered to (e.g. Schielke 2009;
Dahlgren & Schielke 2013). The same is true about the students I worked with. It was perfectly
possible to me to sit in a cafe with a female student or a recent graduate without anybody taking
offense (and I was told that they did so with their Kurdish male friends too), but it was equally
possible that a female student would tell me this:
“I  like  popular  culture  to  be  restricted.  Globalisation  shouldn't  mean that  there  are  no
[moral] boundaries. I don't like to see two actors in the drama kissing each other. But I can
live with that, I wouldn't be killing them just for that.”
“Just for that” can be a joke. At the same time it can imply that there are other transgressions of
moral boundaries where killing one or both of the individuals involved would be understandable. Or
that  somebody  else  would  resort  to  violence  for  such  an  offence.  Yet,  even  those  who  were
concerned  with  status,  or  observing  traditional  or  Islamic  doctrines127 as  they  were  generally
understood in Kurdistan Region, would often circumvent some of the implicit or explicit rules that
came with their personal disposition. For instance, an interlocutor, a man in his late twenties, would
be indulging himself some vodka and nod to me “I'm a Muslim, you know, but in this regard I'm a
Christian”. Another man told me, with a mixture of irony and apology, and after professing his
religiosity, that “well, I actually only follow sermons on Fridays”. Dating and sex do also occur,
even if it was elaborated on only with hushed voices. Some of the men I was acquainted with did
126 There are also other reasons for violence against women that do not relate to honour, such as social marginalisation
in general, or acts pertaining to jealousy, heartache, or mental disorders. 
127 It is important to note, as Abu-Lughod (2011, e.g. p. 48) too suggests, that neither tradition and religious piety nor
honour and sin are interchangeable.
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openly look at women they found attractive when walking around the city. Romantic involvement,
dating, sexual relations, or looking for a suitable partner for marriage often seemed to involve a lot
of secrecy and bending of social conventions. In arranging meetings with one another, young men
and women would enlist the help of their siblings who might know the person they were interested
in. Mobile phones made relationships and courting easier128. I was also told about the strategy of
setting  up  numerous  Facebook  accounts  to  cover  one's  tracks:  first  would  be  the  account  the
person's parents saw and the rest were used to whatever the person did not want their families to
know about. “Obviously, we like the girls so we have to find a way”, said a friend of mine about
discreetly “checking” women.
Some of the major changes that have taken place over the course of last  5–10 years in gender
structures are also related to women's mobility. While I rarely saw women driving cars, I was told
this did happen nowadays129 (King 2014, pp. 103–108 notes the same thing). A female NGO worker
told me of a particularly busy day she had had earlier  in 2014. She was organising matters at
different refugee camps and therefore had to take a taxi on her own several times. She remarked that
she was really surprised that not a single taxi would refuse to take her, which would not necessarily
have been the case a few years ago. Public spaces have changed too. Nowadays, in addition to
picnics, shopping centres, cafes and restaurants were places where women could hang out and meet
with their friends. This was something that even Slemani, known in Kurdistan Region for its open-
mindedness, did not use to have to this extent.  Some of the students and friends with whom I
discussed this topic said it was due to globalisation. This is certainly true, but what aspect of what
we know as globalisation is it  that we are talking about? It might be due to the availability of
various  forms  of  media  from around the  world,  or  it  could  be  the  effect  of  foreign  NGOs or
investments. A more plausible, and empirically founded, explanation might be hinted at by King
(2014, p. 112) when she notes that according to her observations a lot of North American popular
culture such as rap music came to Kurdistan the with Kurdish people who came back the US and
Europe. 
After the end of Saddam Hussein's brutal reign more and more Kurds have returned to Kurdistan
Region from Europe and the US. It is not completely unheard of that Kurds who had either lived
extensively or even born in Europe would, upon their return, build spa hotels, cafes serving burgers,
128 Generally, though, marriage required the approval of the spouses' parents.
129 It is important to note that driving was not a punishable act for women, and it had not been so even before. It was
more like one of those things that just did not happen, because it might raise suspicions of one kind or the other.
Teashops, which were exclusively men's area, were a similar case. If a woman went to a teashop, she would cause
confusion, perhaps anger, and probably incite a few laughs or start some rumours, but it was not necessarily a grave
insult as such.
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and shopping centres offering Italian fashion. Ultimately, the thing with cafes, for example, is that
there simply were not that many of them ten years ago, and yet there definitely is a demand for such
enterprises now. Likewise, one final thing to consider in relation to gender roles, domestic violence,
and  women's  autonomy is  that  local  activists,  politicians,  Kurdish  NGOs,  and  women's  rights
groups have independently struggled for gender equality for decades. While international support
has certainly helped, it is not international NGOs or global pressue which originally started the
movements  working  towards  gender  equality.  Most  importantly,  I  would  argue,  it  is  the
disappearance of the double-sanctions and the (even partial) international recognition of the region
which have helped in improving the possibilities of “indigenous” Kurdish activism.
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Picture 6: Mobile phones and tablets for sale.
 (Photograph by Ville Laakkonen)
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6. Transforming subjectivities, altering faith
“The whole world must know that we are fighting against a corrupt government.”
A private university student.
How do students react to uncertainty? To answer this I will first address the general ambiguity of
studying and living in Slemani as it is experienced by the students themselves. Later on I will be
looking at how students reflect on these contradictory realities from a religious point of view. While
my focus here is on the ethnographic reality of Slemani, at times larger developments in the whole
world and the Middle East have to be brought to the fore to appreciate their  role in Kurdistan
Region.
At the end of a group interview session at one of the city's public universities a female student
raised her hand and, after warmly welcoming me to Kurdistan, asked what did I think about the
students,  their  ideas  and  their  level  of  knowledge.  Did  I  consider  them  to  be  poor  and
underdeveloped? I replied that quite to the contrary, as based on my experiences I perceived the
students to be extremely up to date, observant and critically analytical in the socio-economic and
political matters we had been talking about. The question, however, continued to haunt me for the
rest of the day. It was a fairly straightforward and simple question but, like the best straightforward
and simple questions usually do, offered a possibility of catching the sight of a whole array of
questions present in the students' everyday life that were far more complex than they would seem to
an outsider. 
The  rapid  economic  transformation  after  the  fall  of  Saddam  Hussein's  Ba'athist  regime  and
especially during the last 5 – 10 years has altered the social structures and surroundings of the
students'  lives.  As  already  stated,  the  parents  of  most  students  I  met  especially  at  the  public
universities had never undergone higher education. In addition, the emergence of numerous freshly
new shopping centres, malls, cafeterias and campus facilities have transformed the public spaces the
students take part in. The new towering flats and residential complexes being built around the city
force concepts foundational to culture such as home and family, already violently transformed over
the  past  20  –  25  years  due  to  forced  displacement,  genocide  and  war,  to  yet  again  undergo
reappraisal.  And  finally,  perhaps  most  pertinent  to  the  students'  generational  experience,  the
introduction of new technologies, especially smart phones, the internet and various forms of social
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media, has dramatically changed their perceptions of the social contexts amongst which they daily
tread. In less than a decade Kurdistan Region has moved from circumstances where the possession
of mobile phones, not to mention satellite phones, meant high treason to an era in which smart
phones,  satellite  television,  and personal  internet  connections  dominate the urban spheres.  This
technological transformation is well described by one of my acquaintances, whose father had been
particularly interested in new technology:
“Before 2003 there were few houses that had satellite television. Our house was one of the
few that had it. Everyone, our relatives and our neighbours, were so surprised that we had
Turkish or French channels.  It  was unimaginable at  the time. After 2003, there was an
explosion in the market for these things. Now everyone has satellite television, even more
than  one  satellite,  in  their  homes.  And  everyone  has  many  televisions  at  home,  even
multiple  laptops.  Similarly,  we  had  in  our  house  one  of  the  first  personal  internet
connections in 2003. No-one had internet at home at the time. Now it’s like every single
person would have it: I have my own internet and my husband has his own internet. The
same goes with my friends. Technology changes things very quickly.”
This grand scale transformation is usually assessed through the discourse of development. The term
itself,  development,  is  often far from being neutral.  First  of all,  I  would argue it  is  one of the
concepts that have been ‘falsely universalised’ in both academia and lay discourses, much in the
same way as  for  example  ‘globalisation’ has  been  (Bourdieu  & Wacquant  1999;  cf.  Friedman
2000a).  As  we  de-contextualise  a  concept  or  an  analytical  term,  that  is,  ignore  the  particular
circumstances of its genesis, we also risk becoming blind to the relations of power inherent in its
production and reproduction. Second of all, I would claim that as the term implicates essentially a
turn for the better, the “subjects” of this development also feel the pressure to prove themselves to
be developed, to position themselves at the end of a rectilinear temporal string describing the stages
of “before” and “after”. In many cases, the turn has undeniably been for the better. Sometimes,
however, the results have been far more ambiguous. The first half of this chapter is dedicated to the
exploration  of  this  tension.  Further  on  this  point  of  view is  broadened  in  the  second  half  by
analysing the processes through which Muslim subjectivities of some of the students are formed and
reformed.
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6.1 Tensions and transformations 
“To get something positive from globalisation, you have to make sacrifices. You have to
give up something else. That's a trade-off. One aspect of your life improves at the expense
of some other aspects.”
- a female student from a private university
The question of development leads us to a set of concepts that are used almost casually in both lay
and academic discourses such as ‘modern’, ‘liberal’, ‘secular’, ‘conservative’ or ‘religious’. As with
‘globalisation’  or  ‘development’,  the  abundance  of  these  concepts’  appearances  in  different
contexts, however, normalises them and hides the relations of power embedded in them. There is a
considerable political, economic and educational asymmetry between societies such as Kurdistan
Region which have only recently been integrated into the capitalist world-system and the Global
North at the very core of this same system. I would like to suggest this hierarchical asymmetry is
also implicit in the ways we talk about ourselves and each other, and in the process it forces those
further away from the core to define themselves according to discursive standards which have been
developed at  the  core.  The modern  subject,  and indeed  modernity itself,  is  modelled  after  the
Western secular Protestant130. 
It is of utmost importance to note that by no means I am suggesting that, for example, the hope for a
greater level of personal self-determination is a Western construct imposed from the outside on the
life of a Kurdish university student. What I am saying, instead, is that these hopes often find their
expression through a particular vocabulary and a set of symbols that can generally be ascribed to the
dominant Western-born neoliberal tradition. As Bourdieu and Wacquant (1999), as well as Friedman
in his response to their analysis (2000a), suggest, these are vocabularies essentially formulated and
transmitted by the elites in any given social surroundings. Having said that, I will also acknowledge
the fact that in some cases these particular forms of expression may well be the prerequisite for a
meaningful discussion about the students' hopes or fears. Another important thing to consider of
course  is  that  the  wide-spread usage  of  concepts  such as  modern  and liberal  naturally  lead  to
alterations in their meanings and one should not make the mistake of expecting concepts to have
130 My argument  follows  here  Asad's  (2009:  20–63)  analysis  of  blasphemy in relation to  the  Danish  newspaper's
satirical cartoons about Prophet Muhammad. The concept of modernity and its relation to Islam and the Middle East
has been debated extensively, by both European or North American and Middle Eastern scholars and commentators.
It is not possible in this research to go through the literature or the arguments in detail, especially because it has been
done already elsewhere (Masud, Salvatore & Bruinessen 2009; Tripp 2006). It is sufficient to note that the position I
am assuming here is one insisted by Osella & Soares (2009), when the say that 'modernity is always necessarily
singular and global, always instantiated locally – in the West as elsewhere – within wider configurations of social,
political, and economic power and historically specific trajectories.' (ibid. p. 4, emphasis original) 
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identical  meanings  in  every  context  or  social  reality.  For  example,  as  I  was  running  a  group
interview in one of the Slemani’s public universities, a female student, who interjected as a couple
of men were telling me their fears about the deterioration of both the environment and cultural
values, commented on the question of socio-cultural globalisation in the following way:
“From my point of view globalisation is good, even if there are some disadvantages. It’s
obviously bad what the oil companies do for the environment here in Kurdistan. But on the
other  hand they are at  least  giving  some employment  opportunities  and bringing some
money. Culturally, it's also good, because when we’re increasingly in contact with the rest
of the world’s cultures, they can introduce you to good things too, and not only bad ones.
Like in the past families forced their daughters to get married a lot earlier, and the girls had
no choice. Now one of the best things that have happened is that girls are more free to
choose what they do with their lives, when to get married and so on.”
There is an important point here in the quote above. When the female student spoke in our group
interview session about the more progressive attitudes towards women, her concerns were related to
girls’ ability to choose the when to marry – the marriage institution itself  vis-à-vis any alternative
arrangements  of cohabiting or romantic  involvement  was not under  revision.  Likewise,  another
female interlocutor who was working in the private sector, and who was very conscious about being
modern and building her own career, reflected on the future prospects of employment like this:
“You know, in my situation you have to put one arm in the public sector and the other in the
private sector. Because when I become a mother I will have to resign from my current job.
Then I have to choose to ask my husband and my own family to support me financially.”
Here it was not the case of if she became a mother, but when. No concept or social category is in the
end fixed, but malleable and contextually constructed.
Moral ambiguity
In the group interviews held at the campuses I asked the participating students to reflect on their
position to the ongoing economic transformation by bringing up two different topics. These were:
(I) the students’ thoughts on the presence of the many transnational, often Western-led, companies
particularly in the region's oil fields, and (II) their relationship with the new mobile technologies at
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their  disposal.  Regarding  the  foreign  companies  operating  within  the  Kurdistan  Region's  oil
industry, one widely held opinion was that the companies generally took more than they gave to the
region, one male student even went as far as called global oil  industry as nothing more than a
refined form of  colonisation (though this  sentiment  was in  the minority).  This  stance could be
interpreted  simply  through  the  tradition  of  post-colonial  critique  and  the  anti-globalisation
movements but I want to argue there is a more complex, local dimension to be taken into account. 
First of all, many of these students were sympathetic towards the party Gorran (‘Change’) and were
not  concerned  with  left-wing  political  sentiments  but  instead  subscribed  to  the  nationalist  and
reformist anti-corruption program of the movement. The conversation also often stayed within the
local  framework I  initially offered and the students  were rarely interested in  going beyond the
national or regional point of view131. Second of all,  several students were inclined to blame the
Kurdistan  Regional  Government  for  the  situation  rather  than  the  companies  themselves.  This
argument essentially takes part in a wider political debate currently going on in the region, as well
as within the Kurdish diaspora. It is one that is perhaps rarely invoked by non-Kurdish researchers,
journalists or NGOs. Thirdly, it was also suggested to me in several conversations that at the same
time the oil deals were helping the Kurdistan Region to gain international recognition as a separate,
independent entity. This stance is worthy of some additional consideration, as it points at to what
separates the Kurdistan Region from its neighbours and the many peoples and nations in the Middle
East in general: its relationship to Western – and Eastern – presence in the region. While nationalist
movements in large part of Middle East and North Africa during the 20th and 21st centuries have
sought to break free from the imperial powers of the West or the Soviet Union (see for example
Kepel 2006; Teti & Mura 2009), the Kurdish nationalist movement's relationship to these very same
powers has  been a  lot  more complex.  While  uprisings against  imperial  occupation such as  the
Ottoman or the British presence in the region have often taken place, at the same time the concept
of seeking alliance with powers such as the Soviet Union or the United States has been far from
alien to the Kurdish nationalist movement132. As King (2014, p. 169) notes, ‘freedom’ in Kurdish
nationalism is first and foremost freedom from the surrounding states, not from the West. 
131 It has to be noted here that the explicit regional focus regarding the topic was not because the students would not be
interested in the world outside Kurdistan Region or were not knowledgeable about politics elsewhere. For example,
in other situations I was, for instance, asked to comment on certain European countries' legislation regarding the
bans on religious clothing or prohibitions to build minarets.
132 Kurds, perhaps because of the harsh treatment they have been subjected to by surrounding states, were probably the
only faction  which  opposed  the  withdrawal  of  the  US forces  from Iraq.  Babakir  Zebari,  a  former  peshmerga
commander turned into lieutenant general of the Iraqi army, raised quite a few eyebrows and prompted a visit from
the then Iraqi PM Nuri al-Maliki when he stated in a press conference that Iraqi army would not be ready to take
over until 2020 (e.g. Chulov August 12, 2010).
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Hence, during my time on the campuses the discontent the students felt, too, was essentially often
about the means and not the ends – they rarely took issue with the fact that trade agreements were
made but rather protested against the conditions of these agreements. Many of the students felt
betrayed by Western governments, foreign companies, and investors who had not returned the gift,
in  the  Maussian  (Mauss  2011;  cf.  Carrier  1991)  sense.  The  presumably  corrupt133 Kurdistan
Regional Government, in turn, was blamed for setting national interest aside and agreeing to deals
which granted them substantial personal gain but contributed far less to the national economy, as the
following conversation portrays:
Man 1: I live in Kalar, so I’m only studying here. But what I have observed is that the oil
companies give us only very few, if any, high-skilled jobs. It’s just the menial jobs for us, I
don’t know, cleaning and stuff like that.  As they reserve all the more demanding work for
themselves, what will happen once they leave Kurdistan?
Woman 1: They [the oil companies] take more than they give.
Man 2: Yes, they take more than they give but who’s responsible for that? Our government.
Because our government has given them a piece of land or the whole field just like that. It’s
their oil fields now, not ours. The oil has become their oil. 
Man 3: If there’s something wrong, it’s with our government.
Man  4:  Yeah,  in  my  view  the  problem  isn't  with  the  oil  companies.  Like  any  other
enterprise they seek profit, that's their idea right? But the problem is with what happens to
the profits and that’s the responsibility of our government. Here lies the hidden income...
the main problem is the hidden side of revenue these companies return. I believe a specific
political party takes most of it and we don't know how much.
In other words, in the students' opinion the politicians (who stood to gain personally from the oil
businesses) were not enforcing regulations on companies who in turn had little concern for the
133 Several students I met explicitly made the point about at least part of the oil revenues being hidden and nobody
knowing where they would go, except that it was widely held that a portion of the region's income ended up in the
pockets of the political and the economic elites. These speculations were not unfounded in any case, as according to
KRG Commission on Integrity, by 30th of March 2014 only 28 out of 111 Kurdistan Region MPs had filled out
forms to reveal their wealth as required (Kurd Net March 30, 2014c). More recently, Kurdistan Islamic Union MP
Sherko Jawdat,  head of  the parliament’s natural  resources committee,  criticised the opaqueness and scarcity of
information within the administration (Devi November 13, 2014).
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needs of Kurdish society. One female student in her early twenties remarked to me that “a house
needs doors”: on the one hand, she wanted doorways and not the isolation of Kurdistan Region, but
on the other hand, the doorways needed doors – a set of regulations to control on which terms the
global markets entered Kurdistan Region. 
The  students'  relationship  with  new  technologies,  smart  phones  in  particular,  was  even  more
ambiguous.  On  the  one  hand  many,  students  said  that  internet  has  made  them  a  lot  more
knowledgeable and allowed them to become more broad-minded through individual exploration on
their own terms as they were now, to quote one student, ‘literate and well-learned’. Access to a
seemingly infinite number of different sources of information was mostly perceived to be a positive
thing and mobile phones made it easier to stay in touch with friends. There was a strong sense of
personal liberation and growth in the ways how several students reflected on their experiences to
me. For the first time on such a major scale, the youth were able to search for information on topics
of  their  choosing without  the  presence of  their  families,  teachers,  employers,  imams and other
authority figures134. On the other hand, many students complained that in some regard their social
relationships had deteriorated due to smart phones. They said that people were more concerned with
the newest iPhone and its functions than being with each other. One private university student told
me, bewildered, that she “did not even know her neighbours”. These new technologies have also put
a strain on family ties, acting as a substitute for social interaction, as one public university female
student commented:
“When I go to a family visit I see them [her family] with their mobiles, checking Facebook,
talking with someone or checking, I don't know, whatever. So after a while I have to leave
them again.  In  the  past  we  would  have  been  chatting  and  having  an  interesting  time
together, but not now because we're using technology in a bad way.”
Some students  with  a  more  socio-culturally  conservative  outlook  on  life,  especially  those  few
ascribing to the global Salafi movement, felt these new information technologies were essentially
destructive. Internet and new forms of media endangered the Kurdish culture by subjecting people
to  morals  and  social  values  of  the  wrong  kind.  In  their  opinion,  the  Kurdish  identity  was
unnecessarily challenged by corrupt foreign influences. This standpoint and its implications will be
discussed in  more detail  below. For now, it  is  sufficient  to  point  out  that  these arguments  are,
134 This is not to say, of course, that there would not be authority figures around the web as well. However, the process
of learning has changed drastically in a sense that information was not solely available through prescribed, already
established local pathways and social circles such as mosque sessions, school curriculum, state media or family
traditions. 
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interestingly enough, very much a part of a global neo-conservative Islamic revival perhaps most
visibly spearheaded by the Salafist movements. Thus, while nostalgic and somewhat parochial in
rhetoric, they are in fact very much modern and international themselves. 
Even  without  overtly  socio-culturally  conservative  undertones,  or  articulating  their  concerns
through  religious  sentiments,  several  students  were  critical  of  people  “caring  only  about
themselves”  and what  they perceived as  rampant  consumerism and the  obsession  with  owning
property, on the one hand, and the compulsion to amass more and more wealth, on the other. Indeed,
shiny new pick-ups, massive Land Cruisers, Land Rovers and Chevrolets similar to those crowding
the streets of the city were also parked in numbers on the large campus car parks, and latest smart
phone models were being exhibited during lunch breaks and between lectures. When one night I
was bought drinks by a man in his early twenties waving several hundred-dollar notes I was not
even surprised any more.  Those who could afford it  went well  overboard,  for example bought
custom-made license plates which could cost more than the cars themselves. As we were walking
past a few shopping malls and design shops a friend of mine studying in a public university, shaking
his head, remarked: “You know they say Slemani is the capital of culture? For these people ‘culture’
means fashion.”
However,  while  such,  almost  ritualised,  celebration  of  individual  success  was  also  enacted  by
students who genuinely were considerably well off, for many it was simply a vehicle for trying to
match, whether they could  afford it or not, the stereotype of prosperity spread like a canvas over
the new emergent middle classes and upper middle classes of the urban centres around the region.
The  point  I  would  like  to  suggest  here  is  that  the  students  were  intellectually  and  socially
deadlocked135 in  a  position  where  they,  on  the  one  hand,  were  intentionally  taking  part  in  an
exhausting  cycle  of  success  performance  and,  on  the  other,  remaining  highly  conscious  and
critically  reflective  of  the  very  same  cycle.  One  student  in  early  twenties  crystallised  this  by
commenting that they were themselves to blame and rhetorically asked “why buy iPhone5 if you
already have iPhone4?” 
If the post-apartheid South Africa is, like Jean and John Comaroff have argued, “trying to construct
modernist nation-state under postmodern conditions” (1999, p. 284), more or less the same can be
said of Kurdistan Region, a possible future nation-state and nevertheless relatively sovereign at the
135 There were those students, of course, who did not voice any particular concerns regarding either the consumption
culture or the presence of international oil companies. For example, a couple of students I had lunch with at a private
university one day more or less took for granted employment in the oil industry and genuinely enjoyed the very
same things their peers in public higher education had feistily despised just a couple of days earlier. These two
privately educated students' parents also had university education and worked in white-collar jobs in Hewler.
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moment already. And while direct parallels cannot be drawn, much like black underclass youth in
South  Africa,  the  youth  in  Kurdistan  most  tangibly  embody  the  contradictions  this  state-
construction project  entails.  The uncertainty lingering on the students'  lives,  from the turbulent
politics and a history of violence and persecution and the arbitrariness of their position in higher
education to the conflicting loyalties and social roles in public, within the household, as citizens and
as individuals, leads to a very particular dynamic process of subjectivity formation. The changing,
fluctuating identities and presentations of these identities are a condition hardly unique to Kurdish
youth. In fact different social roles and socially constructed persons are more or less widely taken
for granted in contemporary social sciences136. However, my aim here in making this argument is to
draw attention to the processes and motivations pertinent to students in the Kurdistan Region. There
is  a  distinct  reality where  urban spaces,  everyday technology,  and the  society's  economy have
changed drastically seemingly overnight while much of the socio-cultural, communal and political
structures, within which these changes take place, have not done so in a fundamental way. And if
anything, many existing configurations of power have become even more entrenched. Thus the
students are simultaneously trying to interact with and transform their surroundings as loyal family
members, as Kurds, as the descendants of the persecuted, as the new generation, as modern world
citizens and neoliberal market agents. One thread from this process of the realisation of meaningful
subjectivity is religious and moral self-reformation as a Muslim.
6.2 Free to choose, forced to make a stand: religion and identity
“All the [Abrahamic] religions are different and their books are different. And as it says in
the Qur'an, you are free to choose between any of them. But remember that Islam is the
latest.  The last message from God came to the Prophet Mohammad. And when you are
reading this message [the Qur’an] you’ll find out that even if they [in Prophet Mohammad's
times]  destroyed  all  the  other  books  before  them,  they  respected  all  the  religions
nonetheless. The message from Qur’an is clear to anyone who reads it. It means all the
people, not just Muslims, they’re free to choose their faith. This applies to Kurdistan too.”
A public university student
136 For a classic formulation of these aspects of human life, see Erving Goffman (1963; 1971) & Pierre Bourdieu (1977;
1984). A more recent take on social construction, which partly informs my theoretical understanding of the subject,
is posited in relation to gender by Raewyn Connell (2005).
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The lecture halls and seminar rooms in many of the universities in Slemani have an interesting
spatial quality to them, namely that they are almost desolate. Granted, when packed with students it
is like any other class room but nevertheless the atmosphere is that of a temporary arrangement. It is
as if the rooms had been built and but never used until now, this very moment. The massive pale
white walls devoid of any signs, posters, decorations or furniture, little piles of construction dust in
the corners, and curtains which are firmly closed for most of the time. Despite traffic jams in the
scorching heat outside, the air-conditioning keeps the air inside cool and in motion. It is the same
feeling of not being ready yet that penetrates the entire city with its countless construction sites and
refurbishment projects.
It was in one room like those described above that I was asked by a public university economics
major whether I thought religion137 to be an obstacle to economic growth or not. After squirming a
little at the apparent banality of, and the discomfort caused by, such an inquiry I replied that I did
not think religion as such was any kind of a hindrance. However, the question actually was far from
banal as it directly commented on the constitutional separation of economics and religion, the basis
of the post-Enlightenment European tradition on which many of our contemporary institutions are
founded, namely the secularisation thesis. According to Asad (2003, p. 181) it is postulated by the
secularisation theorists that essential to the development of modernity is, (I) increasing structural
differentation of social spaces, the separation of politics, religion, economics, science and so forth;
(II) the privatisation of religion within its own sphere; and (III) the declining social importance of
religious  belief,  commitment  and  institutions.  My  unease  towards  the  student's  question  was
understandable. As an anthropology student I had learned that there was no singular, monolithic
religion but a myriad of different configurations of tradition, morality and belief, all dependant in
the  historical  and  geographical  context  in  which  they  manifested  in,  and  I  had  not  faced  the
Weberian notion of modernisation particularly often. The reason for the student's question was soon
apparent, as I realised she was intentionally probing into my standpoint towards the secularisation
thesis, an act which I would encounter several times during my time in Slemani. 
To my surprise,  actually many of  the  devoutly religious  students  I  met  had  from the  outset  a
defensive stance regarding their faith as if they were being interrogated. I initially thought that there
was something about my behaviour or the questions I posed. However, I soon accepted that it was
not  necessarily  me  but  what  I  represented  a  priori:  a  Westerner,  embodying  certain  political,
economic, and ethical configurations. To some I represented an ally or a vehicle in globalising the
137 It is useful to note here that when talking about religion, the students almost exclusively meant Sunni Islam.
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Kurdish cause even further, and to others I was somehow one of the Europeans who had looked the
other way when Kurds faced the worst imaginable atrocities. Nonetheless, there was something
inherently European (and Christian, regardless of my personal non-religious conviction) about me,
which at once entangled me in the webs of different global social, political, religious, economic,
and cultural debates. There was nothing wrong with it, though, as this kind of entanglement was
what  my work  was  ultimately  about  in  the  first  place.  My role  in  the  field  was  that  of  the
interrogatory ethnographer,  with a  notebook and a  digital  recorder,  being constantly recast  into
different equally ambiguous role expectations. 
When we are looking for the roots of this ambiguity there are two fundamental explanations. First,
we have to consider that Islam, especially visible and devout Islamic faith, has become globally
fiercely contested. On the one hand, this is due to social reform and a critique of established power
becoming increasingly articulated through religious discourses and, on the other hand, the global
economy and power hierarchies in the Middle East, as well as in relation to the Middle East, have
turned into more and more polarised and volatile from the 1980s onwards. Oil trade, the Israeli
strategy in Palestine, the 9/11 attacks, the two Gulf Wars, the expansive spheres of power (Europe,
the United States, China, Saudi Arabia, Iran), the exponentially penetrative transnational cores, and
global claims to religious leadership all have a role in these processes. And Kurdistan Region is
right in the middle of it all.
Second,  we have  to  return  to  the  secularisation  thesis  and its  implications  for  both  the  global
academic and political discourses on Islam and the everyday social realities of Kurdistan. While
there  is  no  point  in  going  through  the  history  of  Middle  Eastern  societies’ engagement  with
expansive  global  capitalism,  especially  because  others  have  already  done  it  with  remarkable
scrutiny (e.g. Tripp 2006), three aspects, which apply to Kurdistan as well, have to be pointed out
here. First of all, like in all societies globalised capitalism (i.e. the world-system) has fundamentally
transformed the  existing  logics  of  exchange,  trade,  and work.  Second of  all,  established social
structures have been, for better or worse, altered in the many ways that the ethical, religious or jural
legitimacy enjoyed by existing social practices have to be revaluated over and over again. Finally,
these transformations, and the pervasiveness of the world-economy, have engendered a myriad of
new (and often mutually unsatisfactory) ways how individuals and communities interact with the
state to which they are subjected to.138 Intellectuals and politicians throughout the Middle East have
138 The claim that  capitalism would be ”without ideology”,  and that  expanding world-economy would be either  a
necessity or ultimately beneficial to everyone, obviously has little empirical grounds. This attempt to circumscribe
our understanding is close to what Georg Lukács referred to as ‘phantom objectivity’ (Lukács 1971, pp. 83–84).
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analysed  these  phenomena  and  formulated  responses  to  the  challenges  global  capitalism  has
provided (Tripp 2006), and it is obvious from their varying stances as much as from the “ordinary
peoples’” that systematic, unavoidable secularisation as promoted by European Enlightenment, and
prophecised especially by 19th and 20th century social scientists, has never happened. As Dahlgren
and Schielke point out, ‘the ways religions interact with processes of modernisation has not made
them secondary in the lives of ‘modernising subjectivities’’ (2013, p. 1).
Instead,  different  convictions,  movements,  and ambitions  oscillate  around,  as  much  as  directly
affect,  the larger  global  processes.  Some organise in  support  of,  and other  against,  the endless
accumulation of capital on which the world-system is based, but nevertheless there are as many
different reasons for each as there are different projects, assemblages, organisations or ideologies.
Yet,  the major proprietors139 in global world-economy, much like state’s functions for James C.
Scott (1998), have the tendency, for the sake of simplification and manageability, to ignore practices
which do not ascribe to the dominant ethos of the Global North. The relevance of all this to my
work is that the students I met in Slemani seemed to, consciously or unconsciously, embody and
reproduce this multifaceted ambivalence. The ambiguity in the students’ perceptions seemed to have
a  lot  to  do  with  the  expectation  of  the  web  of  contradictions  (North/South,  global/local,
secular/religious,  unilateralism/cooperation,  trust/pragmatism,  continuity/rupture  et  cetera)  to
manifest over the course of our interaction. 
The global subject
Practising religion is, as mentioned already, also a very personal matter. As religion as an institution
is inseparable from the wider social context (economically, politically, and historically) it manifests
in  at  any given  time,  so  are  different  aspects  of  practice  interconnected  to  both  personal  and
collective ethics and social mores.  And equally intertwined are an individual’s perceptions of his or
her place in the wider social context with the ways how those ethics and social mores are developed
and practiced.  What  I  sensed in  Slemani  was a  social  imaginary and a  political  and historical
context where everyone had to consider a position towards religions, whether they subscribed to a
particular faith or not. 
Similarly,  as  Wacquant  (2012) reminds us,  with neoliberalism we are specifically dealing with a  political,  not
economic, project.
139 This class would essentially consist of large global financial institutions, transnational corporations, and different
individuals within the different cultural, political and economic elites. In fact, because they are largely beneficiaries
in the globalised world, also a good number of people living at the core of the world-system can be included too.
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Several anthropologists  have observed how Islamic transformations have for some time, and in
recent decades even more so, been tied to moral reform and aspiration towards a greater degree of
social  justice.  The  political  (for  example,  contempt  towards  inequality,  corruption,  and  state-
sanctioned violence, among others) has increasingly been framed as a religious and ethnical quest.
For instance, John R. Bowen (2012, pp. 174–180) finds similar, and interconnected, quests among
Muslims in  diverse locations  such as  France  and Egypt.  Similarly,  Rudnyckyj  (2009),  whom I
mentioned in  Chapter  2,  has written about  Indonesian factory workers  who strive to overcome
social problems and the fierce economic competition in the industry through modern Islamic life-
coaching programs. Religion also mobilises140. Islamist parties and factions have emerged as major
power brokers in the countries which underwent regime changes and series of uprisings collectively
known in the media as the “Arab Spring”. The catastrophic Syrian civil war gained a character
which  became  increasingly  constructed  in  religious  terms  as  the  conflict  was  escalated  and
prolonged. With Saddam Hussein trying to restore his global power by reinventing himself as the
defender of Sunni Arabs, the same can be said of Iraq from the 1980s onwards. Equally important
are Islamic charities around the world, both doing relief work and aiming at socio-moral reform. All
of these aspects of social reform and mobilisation have an immense impact because they do not
only offer an alternative politicised program, but also affect an individual in person, influence his or
her sense of self-worth, and allow social relations to be restructured in a way which is hoped to be
more meaningful.
One important issue to consider is that after Prophet Mohammad the world’s Muslims have never
had an authority figure like for example the Catholics do in the form of the Pope in Vatican. Thus,
local  traditions  and  pre-Islamic  faiths  have  remarkably  influenced  the  ways  in  which  Muslim
practices  have been instantiated.  Similarly,  socio-cultural  encounters,  political  reformations,  and
wars have contributed to a very varied understandings of Islamic faith. Obviously, this is the case
with any world religion, but the key point here is that in a vast area historically comprised of such
different localities such as Andalusia, Persia, and India there really has not been a single source of
earthly authority141 behind which the world’s Muslims would be rallying. As Mahmood Mamdani
(2002)  has  argued,  Islam  is  as  extraterritorial  and  historical  as  Christianity  or  Judaism.
Nevertheless,  adherence  to  Islamic  tradition(s)  and  history  also  connects  and  unites  different
communities and locations. There are, thus, two aspects to being a Muslim which have to be looked
140 This was, after all, one of the aspects of Iranian revolution in 1979 too. For example, according to Fischer (1980), as
the Shah’s  regime suppressed  political  opposition  and  social  movements,  dissidence  and  political  reform were
increasingly expressed in “non-political” religious terms, and with a now well-known outcome. Diane Singerman
(2003) argues that Islamic networks in (and across) authoritarian states specifically articulate political activism that
cannot be produced through official channels.
141 Even within the caliphate, highest authority was never uncontested: there was ultimately a great degree of political
jockeying and religious heterodoxy (see for example Kadri 2011).
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at  before we return to Slemani.  First  of all,  Islamic traditions and Muslim experiences vary in
different  spatial  and  temporal  realities,  as  well  as  different  societies,  communities,  and  power
hierarchies. Second of all, these different sites where Muslim experiences manifest are nonetheless
interconnected through flows of knowledge142, memories, histories, and politics. This is Bowen's
(2012) point too, as I interpret it. Asad (1996) is also useful in conceptualising this perspective,
when he argues  that Islam is  ‘a discursive tradition that connects variously with the formation of
moral selves, the manipulation of populations (or resistance to it), and the production of appropriate
knowledges’ (ibid. p. 388).
Once we fuse the history and contemporary economic and political realities of Kurdistan Region
with  Asad’s  understanding  of  Islam  quoted  above,  we  are  close  to  answering  the  question
motivating and directing  my research,  which is  how changes  in  religious  sentiments  and rapid
economic transformations intersect, and how the students’ Muslim subjectivities are formed. The
global Muslim subjectivity, as it is constructed among the students of Slemani, is comprised of all
those aspects of a discursive tradition outlined by Asad above. In the face of uncertainty, through
moral  fashioning  the  individual  is  able  to  transcend  the  surrounding  social  circumstances  by
embarking  on  a  quest  of  personal  meaning-making.  This  process  of  reform also  involves  the
individual’s  social  life-world:  through  active  participation  in  religious  discussions  and  the
observance of the routines of piety he or she seeks to exert his or her influence over friends, kin,
and the entire community. On the other hand, the religious and moral self-fashioning is likewise an
act of resistance: resistance to the uncertainty which is rooted in local histories as well as unequal
global economy.  Appropriate knowledge is knowledge about the errors of society,  markets,  and
traditions,  but it  is also knowledge about the right ways of being a proper Muslim – discussed
globally, and reproduced locally.
What does this  mean in practice? Let us look at  some of the ways how some of the religious
students described to me how their relationship to Islam had improved. One student in a public
university told me that “I'm one of those who follow meticulously conversations and debates on
Facebook and other channels. You see, through internet and television and so on. It is because of
this that my personal relationship [to faith, to God] has improved”. His friend insisted that “it all
depends on how you use them, and where have you got access to. Now I read a lot more religious
texts than course textbooks, it wasn’t like this five years ago.” In another situation, a female student
reflected on her own moral quest in similar fashion, she said that “with religion it's now much
142 This knowledge includes texts such the Qur’an and the hadith, both of which are read, analysed, and debated in
nearly all groups, communities, or societies of Muslims. The hadith is essentially a corpus of stories of the Prophet’s
life. Which hadiths are real, informative, useful, or suitable is also a matter of debate.
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better. That's because technological change has helped us to get information through internet as
well. On Qur'an, on Islam, on everything. We are constantly improving our reading [of religious
texts].”
There are two logical strands to be followed here. The primary elements I have observed the devout
Islam to  consist  of  in  Kurdistan  Region  are  personal  morality,  through  modesty,  honesty,  and
commitment to God, and observance of Qur’an’s teachings. In other words, Islam is about the “right
kind of way of life”. However, the dimension which directly communicates with the social reality
haunted  by  uncertainty,  inequality,  and  the  history  of  turmoil  is  important  here.  Islam
conceptualised this way as a personal and social reform in Kurdistan Region stands in contrast to
the prevalent structures of governance, corruption, militarisation, and unequal trade relations (and
the  socio-cultural  realities  which  are  presumed  to  produce  or  uphold  them)  –  structures  and
processes which are interpreted to disrupt moral success and the construction of a just society where
the prolonged sense of emergency no longer dominates. This point of view, which is also shared by
the major Islamist parties in Kurdistan143 even though their political programs might differ, seeks to
place the political system to stand trial for its shortcomings on the one hand, and interrogates the
individual,  urging him or her to do something about the current situation,  to restore his  or her
political agency and embody change through piety, on the other144. It is the resistance which gave
birth to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (e.g. Teti & Mura 2009, p. 9; Bowen 2012, p. 175), which
has transformed into a global Islamist Salafist movement. This is also the kind of activism that
spreads informally through not only mosques, but also channels the students are apt at using such as
Facebook and Youtube. Despite the fact that this sentiment, or discursive tradition, portrays itself as
traditional and aspiring towards pure Islam, it is a thoroughly modern social movement, as Teti and
Mura (ibid.) argue in relation to Muslim Brotherhood. To a degree, this is also what Singerman
(2003) is trying to conceptualise.
Another, less political and more personal, strand is how the students use their faith, or newfound
faith, to communicate the immanent uncertainty they are witnessing around them. I have discussed
this before, but it merits further consideration. This is the more common pattern or discourse I came
across during the course of my fieldwork. Like the restoration of political agency, it centres on ways
and means to produce a personal change through moral and religious reform. However, it is far
more concerned with improving one’s personal life. It seeks to explore and redefine the questions of
status, authority, and success. This is what the female student described as “improving our reading”.
143 These are Islamic Movement of Kurdistan, Kurdistan Islamic Union (connected to the Muslim Brotherhood), and
Kurdistan Islamic Group.
144 This is, in a way, also one of the dimensions of the piety movement in Cairo that Mahmood (2012) addresses.
100
It  does not seek to challenge socially or politically the prevailing circumstances inasmuch as it
proposes to rise above them by reading and rereading them in connection with religious knowledge.
This is as connected with improved communication technologies as the other strand analysed above.
It is precisely the kind of unbounded individual exploration free of traditional authorities I have
mentioned earlier145. A male student in one of the group interviews pointed to these processes when
he  suggested  in  reference  to  terrorism  that  “in  Afghanistan,  because  they  are  deprived  of
technological products, Islamism reached them in a bad way. The more improved reading of Islamic
texts, which is facilitated by advances in technology, helps us to understand Islam in a good way
and not through terrorism.”
One final point, and this pertains to Asad (1996, p. 388) again, is directly related to the production
of knowledge, and how it is produced, reproduced and appropriated in various constellations of
global and local tropes. During one of the group interviews a student asked my opinion on the law
proposed  in  Switzerland  which  aimed  at  banning  the  building  of  minarets.  He  expressed  his
discomfort at such a law and asked “why Muslims are being oppressed in Europe while Christians
are free in Muslim countries?” This question can be divided into two components. First of all, there
was the sense of global solidarity with Muslims being oppressed elsewhere, and it connects to a set
of  debates  globally  mobilising  the  Islamist  reformers  and  their  followers,  and  transcended  the
standard position of disapproval of KRG policies. Second of all, it made a claim about tolerance
towards Christians that is a clear exaggeration, given that relations between Christians and Muslim
administrators are often as uneasy in many Muslim-majority regions as they are the other way
around in Europe. Why would he make the claim? It is not important whether he sincerely believed
it or not, what is important is that it fit perfectly into the social imaginary the more conservative of
my interlocutors often articulated: the sense of a higher morality being besieged. I would argue this
assertion is part of an ongoing discourse which identifies (and constructs) parallels between local
and global meanings, grievances, and socio-economic realities. It is a process where the Kurdish
narratives of victimhood become intertwined with the global Muslim narrative of oppression. It
seemed to encompass a shared Muslim identity, or an idea of shared Muslim identity, transcending
any other borders or frontiers (discursive or geographical), and at the same time instantiated in a
very particular social environment: a lecture hall at a university in Kurdistan Region.
145 As  Bowen  (2012,  p.  32)  argues,  these  processes  do  not  constitute  “democratisation”  of  religious  knowledge
(common practitioner vis-á-vis religious clergy, for example) as such, but nonetheless the forms of exploring and
transmitting religious knowledge have increasingly diversified.
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Faith, society, and terror
I have proposed that religious practices and traditions are evoked and negotiated in a very complex
web of power relations, cultural norms, historical trajectories and social-economic realities. There is
one further aspect  to this  argument  that I  wish to discuss.  As I  noted earlier  in Chapter  3,  the
historical  relationship  between the  two “-isms”,  nationalism and Islamism,  has  been somewhat
problematic  in  Kurdistan  Region.  The same is  true  in  the  present146.  One is  forced  to  balance
between  various  aspirations  and  processes,  and  reflect  on  whether  or  not  these  are  mutually
exclusive – and if they are, to what degree. Should Kurdistan Region remain a federal entity within
Iraq  or  should  it  become  independent?  Would  an  Islamic  state  be  preferable  over  national
sovereignty? What is the configuration between nation, state, and faith in the first place? 
These questions were as timely as ever when the increasingly brutal civil wars in Syria and the rest
of Iraq spread to the KRG, as ISIS began its onslaught against the Kurdistan Region while at the
same time people from Syria and Iraq, displaced by religiously framed hatred, were looking for
refuge inside Kurdish borders. Another matter was that certain Salafi groupings in Kurdistan Region
had  been  supportive  of  the  uprising  against  President  Assad's  regime  in  Syria,  with  youth,  in
solidarity to their Syrian fellow practitioners, joining the Islamist Sunni factions in the war147. This
solidarity  towards  other  Sunnis,  too,  became brutally  challenged  as  ISIS  attacked  the  Kurdish
regions.  In  fact,  during  my fieldwork the essence  of  Islam was also debated,  even if  religious
debates were most of the time circumscribed to piazzas, teashops or social networking sites instead
of lectures or major media. The majority of the participants in this debate fell into two opposing
groups. One argument, made often by secular intellectuals, was that the acts of ISIS' were in fact in
line with Qur'an's teachings. Because of this either the abandonment of Islam or a major historical
and hermeneutic reapprisal of Qur'an together with a theological reform was needed. The opposing
argument, however, was that what ISIS did was completely against the Qur'anic message, and that
opposition to the insurgents was a legitimate jihad. Both sides could also support their arguments by
quoting Qur'an or other religious texts. Largely these questions remain unresolved, and I did sense a
part of the defensiveness I have mentioned earlier to be connected with these contradictions too.
There is another matter to consider here in connection with religious reform or assertiveness and
terror and their socio-political dimensions. It is one that concerns specifically the Ansar al-Islam
146 For instance, according to an article in Rudaw (Soran Bahaddin July 27, 2013), in 2013 KRG administration fired 45
Islamic  clerics,  some on  charges  of  defamation.  Some of  the  supporters  of  the  clerics,  as  well  as  the  clerics
themselves, suggest these decisions were made because they were critical of the KRG in their sermons.
147 Momen Zellmi & Harem Karem (December 12, 2013).
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organisation148, which still has a presence of some degree in Southern Kurdistan. While the group
does not enjoy particularly huge support in the region, they have continued their activities and it is
claimed that they are responsible for recruiting young Kurdish men to fight in Syria for Al-Qaeda
affiliated  factions  such  as  the  al-Nusra  Front.  Also  Ansar  al-Islam  is  globally  connected:  for
example, in the autumn of 2012 Switzerland was told to have arrested two Kurdish brothers for
their membership in the group (Kurd Net October 1, 2012b). Likewise, in January 2015 Finland
ordered the deportation of a Kurdish man, a British national, affiliated with the same group who
was convicted of spreading propaganda and recruiting people to a terrorist organisation (Härkönen
January  15,  2015).  Also  the  Slemani-born  founder  of  the  faction,  Mullah  Krekar,  wanted  for
terrorism charges by the KRG and a refugee in Norway, made it recently to the headlines again as
his  prison  term  for  making  death  threats  against  several  people  (including  the  leader  of  the
Norwegian Conservative Party) was about to end and Krekar contemplated a return to Kurdistan
Region (Kurd Net December 25, 2014d). 
I  think  it  is  noteworthy that  Ansar  al-Islam has  traditionally  been  most  active  in  the  Slemani
governorate and yet none of my acquaintances, regardless of their religious conviction, made an
explicit reference to the group. It is extensively covered by the Kurdish media, less than ten years
ago it used to carry out attacks with explosive devices, and the majority of its local influence and
aggression was focused on the very same areas my interlocutors now lived in. Why? There are
several possible explanations. Might it be that they considered it gave the region a bad reputation,
and as my hosts they could not have any of that? On the other hand, they had no issues whatsoever
with giving me the most rotten possible image of the local political structures.  Or perhaps the very
fact that Ansar al-Islam existed challenged their own perception of their faith, which they saw as
ultimately  constructive,  not  destructive?  This  alternative  was  not  probable  either,  because  my
religious  interlocutors  had  no  problem with  vocally  distancing  themselves  from ISIS.  I  would
suggest that Ansar al-Islam has certain characteristics, which make it stand out a lot less than other
factions working with more or less similar agenda (the forceful establishment of a societal order
based on a particular interpretation of Islamic religion and jurisprudence). First of all, unlike ISIS or
al-Nusra Front who have their own structures and forces, Ansar al-Islam seems to have diffused into
existing political parties and movements. Second of all, they have a particular regional, or domestic,
appeal in  being able to tap into both the Kurdish biographies of victimhood and the perceived
corruption of local political system, articulating their goals through rhetoric which transcends the
ordinary discourses motivating Sunni insurgency around Middle East. Thus, if, as Mamdani (2002)
148 Ansar al-Islam has been discussed in Chapter 3.
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has argued, “terrorism” and “fundamentalism”, too, are inherently modern political projects, then I
would say Ansar al-Islam is the prime example.
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Picture 7: PUK and Gorran banners on the outskirts of the Slemani bazaar. 
(Photograph by Ville Laakkonen)
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7. Conclusion
'The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the 'state of emergency' in which we live is
not the exception but the rule.'149
I began my analysis in Chapter 3 by charting Kurdish history, especially in interrelation to the state
of Iraq, through historiography and reminiscences as they are usually articulated in connection with
these events by scholars and ordinary people alike. Moving further, gradually in Chapter 4, but even
more so from Chapter 5 onwards, I have tried to bring forth the ‘ethnographically visible’ against
the backdrop of this history including the social and economic configurations it entails. The single
biography of a nation has been, thus, transformed into the many different biographies, personal
reflections and narratives of my interlocutors, which sometimes converge and sometimes diverge
from one another. Especially Chapter 6 examined Islam as both a societal force and a personal
moral  quest,  emphasising its  connection to the wider  constellations of  history,  power relations,
economy, and processes of cultural reproduction.
As many scholars of Kurdistan's religions (e.g. Kreyenbroek 1996) emphasise, majority of Kurds
identify as Muslims, and Islam has a long history in connection with the various moral, cultural, and
political  processes of the region. It  would seem to me that while a link between the perceived
transformation (and intensification) of religiosity on Kurdistan Region’s campuses and wider global
religious mobilisations in relation to Islam can be established, there are also certain particularly
Kurdish elements to be discerned from my ethnographic account. These elements I have decided to
simply define as uncertainty. This is not to say that there would not be uncertainty in other parts of
the world, nor is it to imply that the future prospects of a student elsewhere in Iraq (or Palestine, or
Bosnia et cetera) would not be conditioned by histories of violence. Instead what I have been trying
to do is to point out to how these conditions play out particularly in Kurdistan Region.
Uncertainty  about  the  economic  situation,  about  violence,  and  about  social  status  are  all
interconnected. Also, they are neither the only possible sources of uncertainty nor solid and static by
nature as categories. They are fluid and dynamic. The sense of uncertainty is also connected to other
aspects of human life such as health and friendship. However, I will argue that majority of the
149 Walter Benjamin (1999, p. 248).
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different  aspects  of  social  and  political  life  of  my  acquaintances  in  Kurdistan  Region  are
circumscribed by economic prerequisites,  immanent  violence,  and ambiguity about  one’s  social
standing. What the students’ parents had done during the 1980s and 1990s could have an effect on
who the  students  could  marry,  their  plans  to  continue  to  postgraduate  studies  abroad could  be
curtailed by the fact that their passport said ‘Republic of Iraq’, and their socio-economic prospects
could be contingent on political  decisions that were made hundreds or thousands of kilometres
away. These are not only very palpable examples of uncertainty, but at the same time an indication
of how uncertainty also has an international dimension.
The ambiguity inherent in the transformations or intensifications of religious sentiments among the
students’ lives is  that while it  was in part  formed as a counter-discourse to a number of wide-
reaching global processes, it was also facilitated and encouraged by other processes with equally
global scope. For example, those who criticised the transnational oil companies for exploiting the
environment would at the same time be beneficiaries of the global information networks which have
largely  developed  in  connection  with  the  expansive  capitalist  markets.  Likewise,  those  who
vouched for the return to traditional “Kurdish values” readily engaged with social, political, and
technological structures which were anything but “traditional”. The foundational question which
motivated  my  study  was  how  rapid  economic  change  and  alterations  in  religious  sentiments
intersect. As an answer, and this is only one of the possible answers which further long-term study
could result in, I would propose that rapid economic change, which I have identified as connected
with reintegration into an ever-expanding world-economy, precisely precipitates these alterations. It
is  not  reactionary as  such,  but  rather  a  new way to formulate  questions  about  subjectivity and
inequality.  Likewise,  it  is  not more democratic  or a priori  liberatory in itself,  but definitely an
indication  of  a  more  polyphonic,  and  challenging,  myriad  of  life-worlds,  religious  knowledge
production and social demands.
Many questions arising from my research have not been answered in this thesis, or at best they have
been only briefly touched upon, such as the diasporic reality of Kurdishness,  the ambiguity of
global  religious  movements'  relationship  to  the  idea  of  a  nation,  the  actual  role  of  advisors,
consultants, and other neoliberal experts employed by the KRG to hammer a particular social order
in place, and so on. However, I hope I have succeeded in arguing that common assumptions about
war, religiosity, and economy should be seen as far more complex issues than what is often the case.
I  have  written  about  Kurdistan  Region  from  the  world-systemic  perspective,  sometimes  also
drawing comparisons to other societies and states. This is also where the more general applicability
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of my findings, if there is any, rises from: if, to understand Kurdistan Region we have to look at
such diverse locations such as Bosnia, Guinea Bissau, India, Iran, Latin America, Northern Ireland,
and Rwanda, it means that whatever we find in Kurdistan Region can, in turn, help us to understand
similar processes in other parts of the world, no matter how seemingly “distant” they are according
to conventional thinking.
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